KHATSUKOV A OSTATNÍ proti Rusku

THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 19259/13
Sarazhdin Talovich KHATSUKOV and Others against Russia
and 9 other applications
(see list appended)

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 27 June 2017 as a Committee composed of:

Luis López Guerra, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above applications lodged on the various dates indicated in the appended table,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.

2. The Russian Government ("the Government") were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.

A. The circumstances of the case

3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis.

5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation.

6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,800,000 for non‑pecuniary damage.

7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final and were fully executed.

8. On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour. on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law. The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments.

9. The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application.

10. Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants’ obligation to reimburse the sums paid.

B. Relevant domestic law

11. The relevant domestic law and practice governing the restoration of the time-limits for appeal is summed up in the Court’s decision in the case of Samoylenko and Others v. Russia (dec.) (nos. 58068/13 and 2 others, §§ 27-30, 7 March 2017).

COMPLAINTS

12. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and/or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the unlawful extension of the time-limit for appeal granted by the domestic courts following the defendant authority’s request had resulted in the judgments in their favour being quashed, which consequently constituted a violation of their right to a court and to respect for their property.

THE LAW

A. Joinder of the applications

13. Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

B. Strike out of the applications

14. On different dates the representatives of the applicants in several cases (see the appendix) informed the Court that they had lost contact with the applicants and were therefore unable to submit on their behalf the observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications, as well as the just satisfaction claims.

15. In the cases of Marchenko and Kazantsev the representatives of Mr V. Sanshokov and Mr A. Chekan informed the Court that the applicants had died and none of their relatives expressed a wish to pursue the applications on the late applicants’ behalf.

16. On 18 February 2015 Mr V. Guber, informed the Court about his wish to withdraw his application due to the loss of interest.

17. On different dates indicated in the appendix the applicants were notified that the period allowed for submission of their comments and just satisfaction claims had expired and that no extension of time had been requested. The applicant’s attention was drawn to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention, which provides that the Court may strike a case out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application.

18. No response has been received from the applicants, who have not contacted the Court ever since.

19. The Court considers that, in these circumstances, the applicants may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue their applications, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the applications.

20. In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the applications in part of Mr S.Khatsukov, Mr R. Gukepshokov, Mr M. Baragunov, Mr M. Bzhaumykhov, Mr A. Kodzokov, Mr A. Ashirov, Mr A. Afaunov, Mr V. Guber, Mr K. Shaov, Mr M.Goroyev, Mr A. Geloyev, Ms N. Dokshukina, Mr V. Potkalo, Mr Z.Shomakhov, Mr V. Sanshokov, Mr A. Partayev, Mr V. Kovalenko, Mr A. Chekan, out of the list.

C. Admissibility of the reminder of applications

21. The Government submitted from the outset that the domestic judgments in the applicants’ favour had been executed in full prior to being quashed and they were not required to reimburse them afterwards. Consequently, the Government considered that the applicants had not suffered any significant disadvantage as a result of the domestic judgments in their favour being quashed.

22. The applicants maintained their claims.

23. Article 35 of the Convention provides as follows:

“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:

...

(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”

24. The Court notes at the outset that it has already addressed similar issue in the identical case Samoylenko and Others (cited above). It thus does not see any ground to depart from the findings in that case.

25. The Court notes that the main aspect of this criterion is whether the applicant has suffered any significant disadvantage. The absence of any such disadvantage can be based on criteria such as the financial impact of the matter in dispute or the importance of the case for the applicant (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 36659/04, § 33, 1 June 2010, with further references).

26. In the present case, the applicants do not dispute that the payments due under the initial judgments were made to them in full. Although these judgments were subsequently quashed, the domestic courts ruled that the applicants could not be required to repay the sums paid (see paragraph 10 above). Consequently, the financial implications of the proceedings could not present any particular hardship for the applicants.

27. As regards their claim that they had suffered distress on account of the enforcement proceedings, the Court observes that the judgments in their favour were quashed by the regional Supreme Court, which also ordered the reversal of the awards paid. The applicants then lodged a supervisory review application with the Presidium of the same court. It was open to them and their lawyers to request while lodging their supervisory review application that the enforcement proceedings be stayed (see paragraph 9 above). They could thus have avoided exposing themselves to the risk of having bailiffs attempt to seize their property pending the examination of their supervisory review application. They however failed to do so.

28. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicants did not suffer any “significant disadvantage”.

29. As to the question whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits, the Court points out that it has already held that respect for human rights does not require it to continue the examination of an application when, for example, the relevant law has changed and similar issues have been resolved in other cases before it (see Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], no. 19324/02, § 51, 30 March 2009).

30. The present case raises a problem of an unjustified extension of the time-limits for appeal resulting in a final judgment in the applicants’ favour being quashed, an issue which has already been addressed by the Court on several occasions, including in a case against Russia (see Ponomaryov v. Ukraine, no. 3236/03, §§ 41-42, 3 April 2008; Bezrukovy v. Russia, no. 34616/02, §§ 33-44, 10 May 2012; and Karen Poghosyan v. Armenia, no. 62356/09, §§ 44-53, 31 March 2016). The examination of this application on the merits would not bring any new elements to the Court’s existing case-law (see Burov v. Moldova (dec.), no. 38875/03, § 33, 14 June 2011, and, by contrast, Mikhaylova v. Russia, no. 46998/08, § 49, 19 November 2015).

31. The Court therefore concludes that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols does not require an examination of the applications on the merits.

32. Lastly, as regards the third condition of this inadmissibility criterion, namely that the case must have been “duly considered” by a domestic tribunal, the Court notes that the applicants’ case was subject to several rounds of domestic proceedings. The applicants were present at each hearing and were therefore able to submit their arguments in adversarial proceedings.

33. The three conditions of the inadmissibility criterion having therefore been satisfied, the Court finds that the applications must be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Decides to strike the applications in part of the applicants indicated in the appendix out of the list of cases;

Declares the remainder of the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 July 2017.

Fatoş Aracı Luis López Guerra
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX