Přehled
Rozhodnutí
FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 59726/21
Zdenka JELUŠIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 15 January 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Frédéric Krenc, President,
Davor Derenčinović,
Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 59726/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 1 December 2021 by a Croatian national, Ms Zdenka Jelušić (“the applicant”), who was born in 1942, lives in Kraljevica and was represented by Mr S. Jelušić, a lawyer practising in Rijeka;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the discontinuation of the applicant’s old-age pension on account of the fact that she had acquired the status of a full-time parent carer (roditelj njegovatelj) of her disabled son.
2. In 1998 the applicant retired early in order to take care of her son, who had become tetraplegic as a result of a traffic accident in 1994. She was awarded a pension in the amount of 2,900 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 380 euros (EUR)).
3. In November 2013 the applicant requested to be granted parent-carer status under the provisions of the Social Welfare Act. Following her request, she was invited to the Rijeka Social Welfare Centre where she signed the minutes of that meeting stating that she had been acquainted with the relevant legislation governing the parent-carer status and the consequences thereof. In particular, the signed statement expressly reads that, should the applicant be granted parent-carer status, since it concerns a right with elements of employment, the payment of her pension will have to be discontinued.
4. On 8 September 2014 she was recognised as a full-time parent carer of her son, entitled to receive HRK 2,500 (approximately EUR 330), as well as pension, health and unemployment insurance akin to those of an employed person in accordance with special regulations.
5. Consequently, on 24 October 2014 the competent authority discontinued paying the applicant her old-age pension because she had obtained the status of parent carer to her son and had thus become insured similarly to an employed person on those grounds. Upon appeal by the applicant, the second-instance authority explained that since she had benefitted from compulsory social insurance as a parent carer, according to section 99 of the Pension Insurance Act, her pension payments had to be discontinued as long as she remained insured on other grounds.
6. In subsequent administrative proceedings, the Rijeka Administrative Court quashed the decision on the discontinuation of the pension, holding that it was unacceptable for an individual who took on full-time care of a disabled person, thus replacing the State’s constitutional obligation to care for the disabled, to lose a previously recognised right to receive a pension and ultimately receive a lower amount of income.
7. That judgment was quashed on appeal by the High Administrative Court by a judgment of 19 July 2017, which noted that the State’s constitutional obligation to protect disabled persons was related to the applicant’s son and not to the applicant. It could thus not be said that the recognition of the applicant’s status of parent carer could have violated her son’s constitutional rights. The High Administrative Court also stressed that the applicant was not deprived of her right to receive a pension, but that the payment of that pension had simply been discontinued while she was insured on another ground in accordance with the domestic legislation.
8. On 28 October 2021 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint finding that the interference with her property rights had been proportionate on account of the rule of law, legal certainty, the State’s right to protect its property interests and the good governance principle, which involved terminating the payment of one right once the person had become entitled to another one. It also dismissed the applicant’s discrimination complaint for failure to exhaust effective remedies.
9. Meanwhile, in 2017 the applicant’s parent-carer status was terminated at her request and her pension payments resumed without delay.
10. The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, about the unfairness of the administrative proceedings and the violation of her property rights. She also complained under Article 14 of the Convention that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her son’s disability.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
- Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
11. The general principles applicable to complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as regards pensions have been summarised in Moskal v. Poland (no. 10373/05, §§ 49-52, 15 September 2009). In particular, the principle of “good governance” requires that where an issue in the general interest is at stake it is incumbent on the public authorities to act in good time, in an appropriate manner and with utmost consistency (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 120, ECHR 2000-I, and Megadat.com S.r.l. v. Moldova, no. 21151/04, § 72, 8 April 2008).
12. The parties agreed that the judgment of the High Administrative Court of 19 July 2017, which discontinued the payments of the applicant’s pension, amounted to an interference with her possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
13. That interference was based on law, namely section 14(3) of the Pension Insurance Act which provided that a person who was granted the parent-carer status was compulsorily insured under the social insurance scheme, and section 99 (1) of the same Act which provided that the payment of a pension was to be discontinued for a person who becomes employed or begins performing an activity on the basis of which there was compulsory social insurance.
14. The Court further accepts that the interference with the applicant’s property rights pursued a legitimate aim submitted by the Government, namely the protection of the public purse (compare Moskal, cited above, § 63).
15. As to whether an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in the present case struck a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the public and the requirements of the protection of the applicant’s rights, the Court notes that under domestic law parent carers have the right to an allowance, to pension and health insurance and unemployment rights as an employed person under special regulations (section 67(1) of the Social Welfare Act). Although, as the Government explained, this by no means involved a traditional employment relationship, the competent Ministry nonetheless registered the beginning and the end of every carer’s insurance status and paid their compulsory insurance contributions similar to those of employed persons. What is more, the period in question was included in the pensionable service of the person having parent-carer status and formed the basis of the calculation of their old-age pension. Consequently, and contrary to the applicant’s position, under domestic law it was not possible to receive at the same time both the allowance as parent carer and a pension. It would further appear, as shown by the Government, that there was consistent case-law of the administrative authorities in favour of such an interpretation.
16. It is true that the allowance the applicant was entitled to as parent carer was slightly lower than the amount of her old-age pension (about EUR 50 per month). However, the Court cannot but note that the applicant opted for such a status in full knowledge of the consequences it would have on the payment of her pension, of which she had been informed beforehand by the Social Welfare Centre (see paragraph 3 above). Moreover, she could at any time opt to terminate her carer status and resume her pension payments, which she eventually did (see paragraph 9 above). It is also of importance that the payment of her pension was resumed immediately after the termination of her parent-carer status and she was never left without any source of income (contrast Moskal, cited above, § 74).
17. Finally, the Court cannot but note that as of July 2025 and the entry into force of the new Pension Insurance Act, the payment of pension is no longer discontinued for a person who had been granted the status of parent carer, which must have mitigated any perceived injustice in the law at the time of the facts of the present case.
18. In light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate, and she cannot be said to have suffered an excessive individual burden in the circumstances.
19. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
- Other complaints
20. Under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant chiefly complained about the misinterpretation of domestic law by the national courts.
21. However, the Court should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). A domestic judicial decision cannot be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings unless no reasons are provided for it or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a “denial of justice” (see Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, § 85, 11 July 2017), that is, an error so “evident” that no reasonable court could ever have made it (see Bochan, cited above, § 62).
22. The Court notes that the applicant’s case was carefully examined before two administrative bodies and subsequently by two court instances, followed by a review by the Constitutional Court. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the High Administrative Court in its judgment of 19 July 2017 gave convincing reasons for its decision, which the Court does not consider arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
23. Finally, as regards the applicant’s discrimination complaint, the Court agrees with the Government that the applicant neither complained about discrimination in the impugned administrative proceedings nor did she bring an action pursuant to the provisions of the Prevention of Discrimination Act, either of which would have been an effective remedy to be exhausted in her case (see Đorđević v. Croatia, no. 41526/10, § 162, ECHR 2012). It also notes that this part of her constitutional complaint was rejected for the same reasons (see paragraph 8 above). Accordingly, her discrimination complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 February 2026.
Liv Tigerstedt Frédéric Krenc
Deputy Registrar President