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Datum rozhodnutí
28.4.2026
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FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 19146/23
Maria Alice LIMA OLIVEIRA LOUREIRO SILVA
against Portugal

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 28 April 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Anne Louise Bormann, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 19146/23) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 May 2023 by a Portuguese national, Ms Maria Alice Lima Oliveira Loureiro Silva (“the applicant”), who was born in 1961, lives in São João da Madeira and was represented by Ms S.R. Almeida, a lawyer practising in São João da Madeira;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the applicant’s alleged lack of access to a court on account of the rejection of an appeal she had lodged with the Supreme Court. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. Following criminal proceedings instituted against her and others, on 16 November 2020 the applicant was convicted of document forgery and aggravated fraud. She was sentenced to a fine of 1,950 euros (EUR) and ordered to pay damages to the civil party in the proceedings (“the victim”), jointly with the remaining defendants, in the amount of EUR 121,267.16, plus interest.

3. On 23 June 2021 the Porto Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction and the amount of the applicable fine, but reduced the amount of damages she was to pay the victim to EUR 10,115.

4. On an unspecified date four of the applicant’s co-defendants and the victim sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court for the judicial review of the decision awarding damages. Leave was granted on 18 October 2021.

5. On 13 September 2021 the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, sought leave to lodge an extraordinary appeal to ensure the consistency of case-law (recurso para fixação de jurisprudência) with the Supreme Court under Article 437 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the grounds that the legal interpretation by the Porto Court of Appeal concerning her conviction had contradicted prior judgments from other courts of appeal.

6. On 18 October 2021 the Porto Court of Appeal decided not to grant the applicant leave to appeal on the grounds that such an appeal would be premature, given that the relevant judgment was not yet final. The applicant did not lodge an objection against that decision under Article 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. On 4 April 2022, following a decision of the Supreme Court in respect of the appeal for judicial review of the decision awarding damages (see paragraph 4 above), the applicant – still represented by her lawyer, and relying on the same grounds – again sought leave to lodge an extraordinary appeal to ensure the consistency of case-law with the Supreme Court in respect of her criminal conviction. To substantiate her appeal, she relied on two judgments of the Coimbra and Lisbon Courts of Appeal, which she alleged were in contradiction with the judgment given against her. Leave was granted by the Porto Court of Appeal.

8. On 16 February 2023 the Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible for having been lodged out of time, pursuant to Article 414 § 2, Article 438 § 1 and Article 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that the applicant’s criminal conviction had become final despite the appeal for judicial review lodged by the codefendants and the victim in respect of the decision awarding damages (see paragraph 4 above). It further noted that it was not bound by the assessments of lower courts, and that the applicant had not lodged an objection against the decision of the Porto Court of Appeal of 18 October 2021 (see paragraph 6 above).

9. The Supreme Court further determined that, even if the appeal had been admissible, it would nevertheless have been rejected in accordance with the court’s well-established case-law, as the applicant had not complied with the requirement set forth in Article 437, Article 438 § 2, and Article 440 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that written submissions should refer to only one contradictory judgment. The Supreme Court quoted, by way of example, its judgment of 21 September 2016.

10. Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court declaring inadmissible her appeal in respect of alleged inconsistency in the case-law had infringed her right to an effective remedy, her right to a fair trial and her right to mount a defence.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), considers that the applicant’s complaints are to be examined from the standpoint of her right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

12. The relevant principles on access to a court and, in particular, on access to superior courts were summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 7699, 5 April 2018) and Albuquerque Fernandes v. Portugal (no. 50160/13, § 70, 12 January 2021). In that regard, the Court reiterates that the manner in which Article 6 § 1 applies to courts of appeal or of cassation depends on the special features of the proceedings concerned and account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal order and the court of cassation’s role in them; the conditions of admissibility of an appeal on points of law may be stricter than for an ordinary appeal (see Zubac, cited above, § 82, and the references therein). In addition, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court’s role is limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 49, 20 October 2011).

13. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint concerns an appeal she had lodged on the grounds of inconsistency in the case-law (see paragraph 7 above). It observes that, under domestic law, this is an extraordinary appeal within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in accordance with Article 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 5 above).

14. In the Court’s view, the assessment conducted by the Supreme Court appears well-reasoned and foreseeable in the light of its prior, consistent caselaw, notably regarding the applicable time-limits and formal admissibility requirements for lodging an appeal on the grounds of conflicting decisions, as set forth in Article 437, Article 438 § 2 and Article 440 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 8 above).

15. The applicant was represented throughout the proceedings by a qualified lawyer who was responsible for the technical aspects of the case and who could and should have been expected to know the procedural requirements for lodging an appeal under Article 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court’s consistent case-law (see paragraphs 8-9 above, and Zubac, cited above § 111).

16. The reasons given in the judgment at issue allow the Court to conclude that a fair balance was struck between the right of access to a court and the interests of legal certainty and proper administration of justice. In particular, the Court finds it acceptable that the Supreme Court conducted a particularly rigorous analysis at the highest level of the judicial hierarchy of the admissibility requirements of an appeal such as the one at stake in the present case. The decision at issue therefore ensured legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, and the Court does not find that the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court has been impaired.

17. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 21 May 2026.

Simeon Petrovski Anne Louise Bormann
Deputy Registrar President