ISMAYILOVA proti Ázerbajdžánu

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ISMAYILOVA v. AZERBAIJAN

(Applications nos. 44031/17 and 41494/20)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

7 April 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, President,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Vasilka Sancin, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 44031/17 and 41494/20) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court, on the dates indicated in the appended table, under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Ms Khadija Rovshan gizi Ismayilova (Xədicə Rövşən qızı İsmayılova – “the applicant”), who was born in 1976, lives in Baku and was represented by Ms R. Remezaite, Mr P. Leach, Ms J. Gavron and Ms J. Sawyer, lawyers based in the United Kingdom, and Mr F. Namazli and Mr J. Javadov, lawyers based in Azerbaijan;

the decisions to give notice of the applications to the Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov;

the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;

the comments submitted by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and Article 19 in respect of application no. 44031/17, which were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;

Having deliberated in private on 17 March 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns a travel ban imposed on the applicant, a well‑known journalist, following her conditional release from prison.

2. On 1 September 2015 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes found the applicant guilty under Articles 179.3.2 (large-scale misappropriation), 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (tax evasion), and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. She was sentenced to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. Furthermore, she was deprived of the right to hold any managerial and financial posts in public and local self-government bodies for a period of three years (see Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 30778/15, § 44, 27 February 2020).

3. On 25 November 2015 an appeal by the applicant against the judgment of the Baku Court of Serious Crimes was dismissed by the Baku Court of Appeal.

4. Following a further appeal, on 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court quashed the applicant’s conviction for misappropriation and abuse of power, and part of her conviction for illegal entrepreneurship. The Supreme Court upheld her conviction on the remaining charges of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. It reduced the sentence to three years and six months’ imprisonment, suspended on probation for a period of five years, and a ban on holding managerial and financial posts in public and local self-government bodies for a period of two years (ibid., § 46). Her release was subject to her not changing her permanent place of residence without notifying the Binagadi District Enforcement Department in advance.

5. In June 2016, during her first meeting with the bailiff from the Enforcement Department, the applicant was informed that a travel ban had been imposed on her for the period of her probation. On 19 June 2016 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Binagadi District Court, seeking to lift the travel ban. She noted that she received invitations to conferences from international organisations and NGOs and argued that attending such events was essential to her work as an investigative journalist. Additionally, she sought permission to accompany her mother to Türkiye for heart surgery, providing medical documentation as evidence.

6. On 28 June 2016 the Binagadi District Court dismissed the applicant’s application. It held that allowing her to leave Azerbaijan at will would limit the authorities’ ability to monitor her behaviour during the probation period and might hinder her rehabilitation (which was the aim of the punishment), thereby resulting in failure to execute the court’s decision. Moreover, the Binagadi District Court noted that there were no guarantees that the applicant would return to the country.

7. The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to address her reasoning or assess her situation, and had referred to arguments unrelated to her application. Furthermore, she contended that her behaviour following the Supreme Court’s decision of 25 May 2016 – including her regular self-reporting to the Binagadi District Enforcement Department, her clean record, and her reputation in professional and social circles – demonstrated that the first-instance court’s arguments regarding the lack of guarantees of her return and the impossibility of monitoring her behaviour were baseless.

8. On 15 August 2016 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, upholding the Binagadi District Court’s decision. It found that the restriction in question was necessary in order to oversee the execution of the applicant’s conditional sentence during the probation period.

9. On 8 December 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, reiterating its reasoning. The decision was served on the applicant on 16 December 2016.

10. On 7 July 2019 the applicant lodged a request with the Binagadi District Court seeking the revocation of her suspended sentence, the removal of her conviction, and the lifting of the travel ban imposed as a result of her sentence, arguing that more than half of the probationary period had elapsed. On 9 August 2019 the Binagadi District Court dismissed the applicant’s request, holding that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the applicant had been rehabilitated and that there was no opinion from the bailiff regarding the applicant’s rehabilitation.

11. The applicant appealed, requesting that the decision of the first‑instance court be overturned and her application for the revocation of her suspended sentence, the removal of her conviction and the lifting of the travel ban be granted. She also requested the court to find that there had been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. On 20 September 2019 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Binagadi District Court. It found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the applicant had been rehabilitated. On 6 February 2020 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, reiterating its reasoning.

12. The applicant complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention that her right to leave the country had been violated by the travel ban imposed on her and that she had no effective remedy at the domestic level in that respect. She also complained under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, and under Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, that the imposition of the travel ban had violated her right to respect for her private and family life and to freedom of expression, and that her Convention rights had been restricted for purposes other than those prescribed in the Convention.

• THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
  1. THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTION AS REGARDS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATION No. 44031/17

13. The Government raised an objection that application no. 44031/17 had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit for applying to the Court, which at the relevant time was prescribed by Article 35 of the Convention. They maintained that the time-limit had started running on 8 December 2016 (the date on which the Supreme Court’s decision had been delivered) and not on 16 December 2016 (the date on which it had been served on the applicant), because the applicant had been present before the Supreme Court on the earlier date.

14. The Court reiterates that where an applicant is entitled to be served automatically with a copy of the final domestic decision, the object and purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the copy of the written decision, irrespective of whether that decision was previously delivered orally (see Akif Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 7268/10, § 27, 19 September 2019, and Farhad Mehdiyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 36057/18, § 30, 18 March 2025).

15. Given that the applicant was served with a copy of the Supreme Court’s decision on 16 December 2016, she complied with the six-month time‑limit for lodging application no. 44031/17 with the Court.

16. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 TO THE CONVENTION

17. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

18. The Court further refers to the general principles established in its case-law and set out in De Tommaso v. Italy ([GC], no. 43395/09, § 104, 23 February 2017), which are equally pertinent to the present case.

19. The Court notes that the restriction on the applicant’s right to leave Azerbaijan amounted to an interference within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. It must therefore be examined whether the interference was “in accordance with law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 2 § 3 of Protocol No. 4 and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve such an aim.

20. The Court observes that the Supreme Court’s decision of 26 May 2016 imposed on the applicant the obligation not to change her permanent place of residence without notifying the Binagadi District Enforcement Department in advance, but did not impose any restriction on her right to leave the country. In that connection, while the Government asserted that Article 9.3.4 of the Migration Code (providing for the possibility of temporarily restricting the right of a person given a suspended sentence to leave the country) furnished a sufficient legal basis for the interference, the applicant contended that that Article merely provided for the possibility of restricting the right to travel abroad in certain situations – without defining the procedural and substantive conditions for its application – and therefore did not meet the “quality of law” requirements. However, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court does not find it necessary to determine whether the measure was “in accordance with law” as, for the reasons that follow, it considers that it was incompatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in other respects (see Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, nos. 51279/09 and 32098/13, § 30, 20 September 2016, and compare Aliyev v. Azerbaijan [Committee], no. 22365/18, § 17, 11 July 2024).

21. The Court accepts that a measure which seeks to restrict a convicted and not yet rehabilitated offender from travelling abroad may pursue the legitimate aims of maintaining public order and preventing crime. The question arises whether the travel ban in the present case was “necessary in a democratic society” for achieving those aims (see Kerimli v. Azerbaijan, no. 3967/09, § 49, 16 July 2015).

22. In that connection, the Court reiterates that the mere fact that an individual has been criminally convicted and has not yet been rehabilitated cannot justify the imposition of restrictions on his or her freedom to leave his or her country (see Nalbantski v. Bulgaria, no. 30943/04, § 67, 10 February 2011).

23. In the present case, the domestic courts failed to carry out the requisite assessment of the proportionality of the restriction on the applicant’s right to travel abroad and to provide justification for it (see paragraphs 6-9 above). In particular, they gave no specific explanation as to why they believed that the travel ban was necessary in order to oversee the execution of the applicant’s conditional sentence during the probation period or why her absence on a trip abroad should have prevented her from complying with the obligation not to change her permanent place of residence without notifying the Binagadi District Enforcement Department in advance (compare Vlasov and Benyash, cited above, § 35, and Aliyev, cited above, § 20). Additionally, there was no review of the applicant’s request for the lifting of the travel ban during the proceedings concerning her request for the revocation of her suspended sentence and the removal of her conviction by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 10-11 above).

24. Accordingly, the domestic courts did not make any genuine attempt to consider the specific reasons advanced by the applicant to justify the need to go abroad, or to assess whether the restriction on her right to leave Azerbaijan was a proportionate measure and struck a fair balance between the public interest and the applicant’s right to freedom of movement. Such a rigid and automatic approach cannot be reconciled with the obligation imposed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to ensure that any interference with an individual’s right to leave his or her country is, from the outset and throughout its duration, justified and proportionate in the light of the circumstances (see Vlasov and Benyash, cited above, § 36).

25. In the light of the foregoing, the Court does not consider that the automatic imposition of a travel ban without any regard to the individual circumstances of the applicant can be described as “necessary in a democratic society”.

26. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.

3. REMAINING COMPLAINTS

27. As concerns the applicant’s complaints under Articles 8, 10, 13 and 18 of the Convention (see paragraph 12 above), having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above (see paragraph 26), as well as the Court’s findings in Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2) (no. 30778/15, §§ 105-20, 27 February 2020), the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints (compare Aliyev, cited above, § 25, and Ganbarova and Others v. Azerbaijan [Committee], nos. 1158/17 and 2 others, § 19, 21 September 2023).

• APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
  1. DAMAGE

28. The applicant claimed 12,500 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage in application no. 44031/17 for loss of earnings resulting from the travel ban imposed on her. In support of her claim, she submitted a letter dated 15 September 2017 confirming her selection for a 2017 teaching fellowship in Riga, Latvia. The offer included accommodation, board and remuneration of EUR 12,500, and required her to reside in Riga.

29. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed EUR 35,000 (application no. 44031/17) and EUR 25,000 (application no. 41494/20). She also argued that the most appropriate form of individual redress would be the lifting of the travel ban imposed on her and that, as a general measure, the domestic laws concerning travel bans should be amended in order to eliminate the vagueness in their wording.

30. The Government submitted that the claim in respect of pecuniary damage was unsubstantiated and irrelevant to the present application. They noted that the applicant’s initial domestic complaint had concerned her inability to participate in an international conference in 2016 and to travel to Türkiye with her mother for health reasons, whereas her present claims in respect of pecuniary damage related to her participation in a 2017 fellowship programme in Latvia. As to the claims in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, the Government argued that they were excessive and unsubstantiated.

31. The Court accepts that the applicant suffered pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found in the present case. However, in view of the information and documents submitted to it in the present case, the Court cannot speculate on the exact amount of earnings which she would have received if the violation of the Convention had not occurred (compare Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 191, 23 June 2016; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, § 193, 17 March 2016; and Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, § 128). Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 10,000 in respect of both pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

32. Moreover, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court does not consider it appropriate to indicate the need for any general or individual measures in respect of Azerbaijan (compare Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 1/16, § 81, 13 July 2023, and Aliyev, cited above, § 30).

2. COSTS AND EXPENSES

33. The applicant claimed EUR 3,307.63 and 7,204.23 pounds sterling (application no. 44031/17) and EUR 2,800 (application no. 41494/20) in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court, consisting of legal fees to be paid to her lawyers in connection with both sets of domestic proceedings and certain administrative expenses.

34. The Government contested those amounts as excessive and unsubstantiated.

35. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the total sum of EUR 2,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

• FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints;
5. Holds
   1. that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
      1. EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;
      2. EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
   2. that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Olga Chernishova Canòlic Mingorance Cairat
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applications