PUCKO PETROL IMPORT-EXPORT DOOEL proti Severní Makedonii

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF PUCKO PETROL IMPORT-EXPORT DOOEL v. NORTH MACEDONIA

(Application no. 6381/20)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

10 February 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Pucko Petrol import-export Dooel v. North Macedonia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Péter Paczolay, President,
Jovan Ilievski,
Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 6381/20) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 22 January 2020 by the applicant company, Pucko Petrol import‑export Dooel (“the applicant company”), established in 1999 with its registered office in Plasnica, and represented by Mr N. Dodevski, a lawyer practising in Skopje;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 20 January 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the non‑enforcement of a final and enforceable judgment in favour of the applicant company against a State‑run student residence (“the debtor”).

2. On 11 May 2016 the President of Skopje Court of First Instance no. 2, acting at the request of the debtor, held that a final decision against the debtor could be enforced only in respect of surplus assets exceeding the minimum indispensable assets necessary for the performance of the debtor’s duties, as established by an expert report (hereinafter “the surplus decision”). The applicant company was not a party to those proceedings. Subsequently, three surplus decisions with the same minimum of indispensable assets but in respect of other creditors concerning different sets of enforcement proceedings were adopted in 2018 and 2019.

3. On 6 December 2018 Skopje Court of First Instance no. 2 allowed the applicant company’s claim against the debtor in respect of unpaid invoices in the amount of 2,957,988 Macedonian denars ((MKD) – approximately 48,000 euros (EUR)) (“the debt in issue”). The judgment became final on 21 December 2018 and enforceable on 31 December 2018. As the debt remained unpaid, an enforcement order was issued on 26 February 2019 in accordance with that judgment.

4. On the date on which the enforcement order was issued (26 February 2019), a payment in the amount of MKD 121,120 (approximately EUR 2,000) was made to the applicant company in respect of the costs incurred in the above‑mentioned proceedings (see paragraph 3 above). On 8 July 2019 a second payment of MKD 11,946 (approximately EUR 200) was made to the applicant company in respect of an invoice mentioned in the judgment given in those proceedings (see paragraph 3 above).

5. On 22 July 2019 the applicant company was informed by a bailiff that the judgment of 6 December 2018 had not yet been executed owing to the surplus decision (see paragraph 2 above).

6. On 31 December 2019 the sum of MKD 166,074 (approximately EUR 2,700) was paid to the applicant company in respect of the costs incurred in a different set of enforcement proceedings.

7. On 27 April 2021 the applicant company and the debtor entered into a debt repayment agreement regulating the payment of the debt in issue and another debt arising from a different set of enforcement proceedings, together with related interest (“the first agreement”). On the basis of a financial report, the debtor’s total debt in respect of the applicant company was determined at MKD 7,830,205 (approximately EUR 127,000). On 3 June 2021 a payment in the amount of MKD 1,000,000 (approximately EUR 16,200) was made to the applicant company in accordance with the first agreement.

8. On 25 February 2022 the parties entered into a second agreement regulating the payment of the debts covered by the first agreement and two other debts arising from purchase agreements entered into by the parties, together with related interest (“the second agreement”). On the basis of a financial report, the debtor’s total debt in respect of the applicant company was now determined at MKD 9,399,333 (approximately EUR 152,000). On 1 March 2022 that agreement was approved by a notary public. The next day the applicant company withdrew its application for enforcement of 26 February 2019 (see paragraph 3 above).

9. The debtor subsequently made eight payments to the applicant company. One of those payments was made on the basis of the second agreement only and the remaining seven payments were all made on the basis of different invoices (not mentioned in the judgment of 6 December 2018) and an unspecified debt repayment agreement.

10. It appears that the applicant company was paid a total amount of MKD 5,732,250 (approximately EUR 93,000) by the debtor on the various grounds mentioned in paragraphs 4, 6-9. above.

11. The applicant company initiated a second set of enforcement proceedings on the basis of the second agreement. On 20 September 2022 a new enforcement order was issued. It appears that part of the debt concerned by the second agreement, including part of the debt in issue, remained unpaid on the date on which the parties’ latest observations were submitted to the Court (28 February 2024). On 28 September 2022 another surplus decision was adopted in respect of the applicant company concerning the second set of enforcement proceedings with the same minimum of indispensable assets as the decisions mentioned in paragraph 2 above. The applicant company did not appeal against that decision.

12. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the non‑enforcement of the judgment of 6 December 2018 concerning the debt in issue. It also complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the lack of an effective remedy to challenge the surplus decision and the lack of an effective remedy to ensure the enforcement of the judgment in its favour. Lastly, it complained that the non-enforcement had infringed its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

13. The applicant company, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, complained of the non-enforcement of the final domestic judgment in its favour.

1. Admissibility

14. The Government submitted that the applicant company had failed to inform the Court of certain relevant factual developments regarding payments made to the applicant company that had occurred before and after the present application had been lodged (see paragraphs 4 and 6-11 above). According to the Government this had amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application. They contended that the information withheld by the applicant company concerned the very core of the application and that the Court should reject the application under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

15. The applicant company contended that it had not withheld relevant information from the Court. It argued that only one of the payments in the amount of MKD 11,946 (approximately EUR 200) had been made for the debt in issue (see paragraph 4 above) while the remaining payments had been unrelated to it. Furthermore, the first and second agreement (see paragraphs 7 and 8) had never been executed.

16. The Court refers to the general principles concerning abuse of the right of individual application set out in its case‑law (see Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 49270/11, § 149, 9 June 2022, and the case‑law cited therein). In the present case, it is indeed unfortunate that the applicant company failed to inform the Court of certain facts, in particular the payments referred to in paragraphs 4, 7 and 9. above. However, solely the payments mentioned in paragraph 4 above were directly related to the debt in issue. Those payments (approximately EUR 2,200) concerned only a minor part of the debt in issue (EUR 48,000; contrast Bihorac Hajdaragić v. Serbia (dec.) [Committee], no. 34929/16, 6 November 2018, relied upon by the Government). The Court cannot establish with certainty whether the remaining payments concerned the debt in issue. Hence, it cannot find that the applicant company failed to disclose to it information concerning the very core of the present case, or that it had intended to mislead the Court. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection concerning abuse of the right of individual application.

17. The Government further argued that the applicant company failed to challenge by way of a length remedy before the Supreme Court the length of the enforcement proceedings that according to them would have resulted in an acceleration order. In this regard, the Court recalls that in order for a remedy to be effective it must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs (see Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) ([GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, § 74, 25 March 2014). In the present case, the Court notes that even if the applicant company was to make use of the length remedy resulting in an acceleration order by the Supreme Court, the enforcement of the judgment would only be possible when and if the debtor’s assets would exceed the threshold established in the above-mentioned surplus decisions (see paragraphs 2 and 11) which depended exclusively on its operation. Accordingly, the Court is not convinced from the Government’s submissions that the length remedy before the Supreme Court could have remedied directly the impugned state of affairs. The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of the domestic length remedy.

18. The Government finally argued that the applicant company had not complied with the six-month time-limit. In this regard, the Court refers to the general principles concerning the six-month time-limit, applicable at the relevant time, set out in its case‑law (see Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, § 282, 30 January 2025). The Court notes that in the present case the applicant company lodged the application with the Court within six months from the date on which it was informed of the impossibility to enforce the judgment in its favour (see paragraph 5 above). The Court further notes that, as argued by the Government itself, the surplus decisions (see paragraphs 2 and 11) did not legally preclude the enforcement and the applicant company could still have had a reasonable expectation that the judgment could be enforced. However, it could not anticipate whether and when the debtor’s assets would exceed the threshold established in the surplus decisions. Accordingly, the present case concerns the non-enforcement, to the present day, of a final domestic judgment which amounts to a continuous situation (compare Lolić v. Serbia, no. 44095/06, § 23, 22 October 2013). It follows that the Court must dismiss the Government’s objection in this regard.

19. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

20. The relevant general principles regarding the compliance with Article 6 of the Convention in the context of the non-execution of final and binding court judgments have been summarised in Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) (no. 33509/04, §§ 65-70, ECHR 2009, and the cases cited therein).

21. In the present case, the judgment in the applicant company’s favour was delivered by the domestic court on 6 December 2018 and was enforceable since 31 December 2018, awarding it MKD 2,957,988 from the debtor, which was a State-run institution (see paragraph 3 above). The Court observes that it was not disputed between the parties that to date that judgment had not been fully enforced.

22. The parties disputed how much of the debt in issue had actually been paid. In that regard the Court notes that it appears from the parties’ submissions that only two payments, in the amounts of MKD 121,120 and MKD 11,946 (see paragraph 4 above), were clearly linked to the debt in issue.

23. The Government submitted that the total amount which the debtor had paid to the applicant company in respect of its various debts had surpassed the amount of the debt in issue (see paragraphs 4 and 6-10 above). However, the Court notes that the Government did not argue that the debt in issue had been repaid in full. Indeed, some of those payments were made on the basis of the State’s other debts owed to the applicant company. While it cannot be ruled out that some or part of the payments may have been intended to cover part of the debt in issue, the parties did not make clear submissions in that regard.

24. Having regard to the fact that the Government did not argue that the debt in issue had been repaid, either in full or at least to a large extent, and on the basis of the material submitted to it, the Court concludes that the judgment of 6 December 2018, which forms the subject matter of the present case, has not been enforced and that a substantial part of the debt in issue (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above) has remained unpaid to date.

25. The Government submitted that the surplus decision as well as the subsequently adopted decisions (see paragraphs 2 and 11 above) had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the public interest and ensuring the continued operation of the debtor, which was a State-run institution. They further contended that those decisions had only delayed enforcement but had not rendered it impossible.

26. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, according to its established case‑law, it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt (see Burdov, cited above, § 70). Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances. However, it may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, § 74, ECHR 1999‑V).

27. In the present case, the judgment of 6 December 2018 had still not been enforced to a large extent by 28 February 2024, the date on which the parties’ latest observations were submitted to the Court. Even accepting the Government’s arguments as to the legitimacy of the aim pursued, the Court considers that the delay in the execution of the judgment was such as to impair the very essence of the applicant company’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

28. The Court finds that the enforcement in question was not of any complexity (see Burdov, cited above, § 66), in so far as the judgments required only the payment of a sum of money. Moreover, there is no indication that the applicant company itself impeded the enforcement process in any way.

29. The Court further notes that the debtor, a State‑owned student residence which was a party to the domestic proceedings, had an obligation to take all necessary measures to ensure that the necessary funds were made available so as to honour the State’s debt (compare ibid., §§ 69-70). However, instead of honouring the debt, it repeatedly sought decisions from the domestic court to establish the level of indispensable assets required for the performance of its duties (see paragraphs 2 and 11 above). The Court considers that doing so was at odds with the State’s obligation under the Convention to guarantee the applicant company’s right to have a binding and enforceable judicial decision enforced in full within a reasonable time.

30. The Court concludes that the State authorities have failed to take the necessary measures to enforce the judgment in the applicant company’s favour in full and in a timely manner. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 to THE CONVENTION

31. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor, having regard to its findings above (see paragraphs 14-18) is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

32. The Court considers that the failure of the State to enforce the final judgment delivered in favour of the applicant company constitutes an interference with its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, as provided for in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (compare Burdov, cited above, § 87, and the cases cited therein).

33. For the reasons set out above in respect of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court considers that the above‑mentioned interference was not justified in the circumstances of the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, R. Kačapor and Others v. Serbia, nos. 2269/06 and 5 others, §§ 119-20, 15 January 2008).

34. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

3. REMAINING COMPLAINT

35. The applicant company also complained under Article 13 of the Convention of the lack of an effective remedy to challenge the surplus decision (see paragraph 2 above) and the lack of an effective remedy to ensure the enforcement of the judgment in its favour.

36. Having regard to the facts of the case, the parties’ submissions and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the applicant company’s remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

37. The applicant company claimed 74,598 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, a sum that allegedly corresponded to the amount of the remaining unpaid debt plus the interest accumulated on that amount between 23 April 2021 and 25 January 2024 (the date on which the observations were submitted).

38. It also claimed EUR 1,969 in respect of costs incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR 1,439 for the costs incurred before the Court.

39. The Government submitted that the amounts requested were excessive and not sufficiently substantiated. It further submitted that reaching a settlement between the parties was possible.

40. As regards the pecuniary damage claimed, the Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress in non‑enforcement cases is to ensure full enforcement of the domestic judgments in question (see, for example, Maria Mihalache v. Romania, no. 68851/16, § 80, 30 June 2020). It further recalls that it is primarily for the respondent State to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see Shofman v. Russia, no. 74826/01, § 53, 24 November 2005, with further references). In the present case, the respondent State has an outstanding obligation to enforce the final judgment in respect of which the Court found violations of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court therefore considers that the Government must secure, by appropriate means, the enforcement of the outstanding judgment (compare, for example, Kunić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 68955/12 and 15 others, § 37, 14 November 2017).

41. The Court notes that the applicant failed to make any claims as regards non-pecuniary damage. Accordingly, it makes no award in this respect.

42. As to the amount claimed in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings, this amount had been paid to the applicant company on 26 February 2019, as confirmed by the Government’s submissions (see paragraph 4 above). Accordingly, the Court does not make any award in this respect.

43. Lastly, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full amount requested by the applicant on account of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, that being EUR 1,439, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant company.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
4. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13 of the Convention;
5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State shall ensure, by appropriate means, within three months, the enforcement of the final domestic judgment and, in addition, is to pay, within the same period, EUR 1,439 (one thousand four hundred and thirty nine euros) to the applicant company, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant company, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; and

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points,

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant company’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President