EPIDAVR S.R.L. proti Moldavsku

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF EPIDAVR S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 29895/16)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

2 April 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Epidavr S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

María Elósegui, President,
Diana Sârcu,
Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 29895/16) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 May 2016 by a Moldovan company, “Epidavr” S.R.L. (“the applicant company”), which had its registered office in 1998, in Chișinău and was represented by Mr I. Arhiliuc, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their acting Agent at the time, Ms D. Maimescu;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 12 March 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The present case concerns a search of the applicant company’s commercial premises and seizure of its possessions. The applicant company relies on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2. The applicant is a company specialising in the sale of consumer goods. On 22 September 2015 a criminal investigation was initiated against it on charges of tax evasion by a criminal group. On an unspecified date, the investigator issued an internal report stating that the applicant company might be involved in criminal activity under investigation.

3. On 3 November 2015 the prosecutor issued four orders to search the applicant company’s headquarters, sales points and warehouses at four locations and submitted the search orders for authorisation by the investigating judge. The text of all four orders was identical except for the location of the authorised search. The relevant part of each read as follows:

“The evidence collected in the course of the criminal investigation indicates that an organised criminal group is operating on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. In an attempt to look as though it was running a business, and in order to enable tax evasion, the group either created or acquired a number of ‘ghost’ companies. Through these companies, the members of the group provided various services to other companies, including the apparent legalisation of smuggled goods, money laundering, withdrawal of cash, and other related services.

The investigating officers submitted a report saying that [the applicant company] might also have been involved in the above-mentioned criminal activity ... and that it had carried out suspicious transactions with ‘ghost companies’ between 2010-2015. ...

So that it can be established whether there has been any criminal offending and in order to identify possible accomplices, determine how illicit transactions were carried out and locate the places where the money obtained through clandestine business activities was held, by recording evidence of the offences, seizing the objects and documents used in the commission of the offences, and collecting other evidential material, as well as detecting objects and assets acquired as a result of the offences and other objects and documents relevant to the criminal case...located at [four specified locations] ... I order the following:

A search to be carried out at [four specified locations] of [the applicant company] with the aim of identifying and seizing accounting records relating to its economic and financial activity for the period 2010-2015, including audit reports and particular types of accounting documents (invoices, VAT declarations) for the period 2010-2015, additional documents (contracts, agreements, assignments, etc.) concerning economic transactions between the company and other resident and non-resident entities, records of cash flow in accounts 242 and 243 for the period 2010-2015, detailed information from account 123 regarding fixed assets, together with documents confirming their origin, the list of employees and their salaries from account 531 for the period 2010-2015, basic documents concerning the calculation and payment of salaries, information on cash and banking operations, electronic devices, processors, laptops, hard drives, and other digital storage devices on which accounting documents of the company may be recorded and stored, stamps and seals of companies registered in offshore zones, double-entry accounting records, financial resources obtained as a result of the offences, and other accounting documents and objects reflecting the company’s economic and financial activity, which were intended to be used or were used for the commission of the offences.”

4. On 5 November 2015 the Centru District investigating judge authorised all four searches. The search powers were set out in the warrants using the same wording as in the prosecutor’s orders.

5. Between 7-9 November 2015 the police searched the applicant company’s four locations, and seized all the accounting documentation and all the information carriers.

6. On 9 November 2015 the applicant company requested the return of the server used for accounting purposes. It argued that the seizure of the server had blocked the company’s economic activity.

7. On 10 November 2015 the applicant company appealed against all the search warrants, arguing that it had had no procedural standing in the criminal proceedings when the searches had been ordered; that there was no reasonable suspicion that it had committed a crime; that no reasons were stated on the search warrants, which were formulated in extremely broad terms giving the investigators unfettered discretion to search for anything they wanted; and that as a result of the search and seizure operation the company was unable to operate.

8. On 19 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal heard and dismissed the applicant company’s appeal against the search carried out at the first location, endorsing the reasoning advanced by the prosecutor and the investigating judge. The court also observed:

“We cannot agree with the defence’s argument that the prosecutor’s request was vague and merely formal, as the prosecuting authority based its request on the decision to initiate criminal proceedings of 22 September 2015 and on the report drawn up by the investigating officer.”

9. On 24 and 30 November 2015 a differently-constituted panel of judges of the Chișinău Court of Appeal heard the applicant company’s appeals against the searches carried out at the second and third locations. The appellate court allowed the appeals, quashing the investigating judge’s decisions authorising the searches, and rejected the prosecutor’s search as unfounded. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied on the following arguments:

“The search warrant does not include the reasons it was made and fails to take into account other points necessary for obtaining it. ... the judge relied solely on the report of the investigating officer.

... [T]he investigating judge failed to check the supporting documents from the Cadastral Office and/or the Tax Authority confirming the ownership of the buildings referred to in the search request. The mere indication of an address in the prosecutor’s request was not sufficient for the investigating judge to authorise that step, in the absence of documents establishing that the property in question belonged to [the applicant company].

The case file submitted by the prosecutor did not include convincing evidence that it was necessary to authorise the search, namely that the requested location might contain evidential material, and documents which the prosecution was seeking. No evidence was given as to the ownership of the premises to be searched or as to the identity of the persons carrying out activities there.

The prosecutor did not submit any evidence to the court to demonstrate that the information being searched for in the present case could not have been obtained by other means, such as document seizure, audit reports, or tax inspection reports.

... [T]he investigating judge failed to take into account and did not provide reasoning in respect of the overly broad and imprecise list of the premises for which search authorisation had been requested. Nor was given any consideration to the excessively vague and wide-ranging nature of the objects and documents to be identified and seized.”

The prosecuting authority neither stated nor substantiated any causal link between [the applicant company] and the criminal proceedings. ... Following the decision to initiate criminal proceedings on 22 September 2015, several entities were mentioned in the case, but no reference was made to [the applicant company]. ... [T]the investigating judge ought to have specified which companies were connected to [the applicant company], so that the prosecuting authority could seize any specific documents necessary for the criminal proceedings.

The court considers that, since the prosecuting authority was aware of the objects and documents relevant to the present case and of their location, it should have considered taking action under Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the seizure of objects or documents [ridicare de obiecte sau documente] - an investigative measure which does not require authorisation by an investigating judge.”

10. On 14 December 2015 the same panel of judges of the Chișinău Court of Appeal that had previously upheld the authorisation for the search at the first location (see paragraph 8 above) heard the applicant company’s appeal against the search carried out at the fourth location. This time, the appellate court allowed the applicant company’s appeal, quashed the investigating judge’s decision authorising the search, and rejected the prosecutor’s search request as unfounded. The court gave the same reasons as had previously been set out in the decisions of 24 and 30 November 2015 (see paragraph 9 above).

11. In their submissions, the Government informed the Court that all the documents and objects seized during the searches had subsequently been examined and duly returned to the applicant company, although no specific date for that return was given.

12. It appears from the material in the Court’s case file that following the searches there were no further proceedings concerning the applicant company.

13. The applicant company complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the search warrants were unlawful and about the restriction of its operations after its assets had been unlawfully seized.

• THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
  1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

14. The applicant company complained that the search conducted at its premises had breached its rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company also complained that the courts had given insufficient reasons for authorising the search of its premises.

15. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and bearing in mind the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court finds it appropriate to examine the complaint raised under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as part of the complaint under Article 8 (see recently BRD – Groupe Société Générale S.A. v. Romania, no. 38798/13, § 77, 18 March 2025).

16. The Government argued that the application had been lodged out of time, referring to the presence of a representative of the applicant company at the hearing of 19 November 2015, during which the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed its appeal (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant company submitted that on 19 November 2015 the appellate court delivered only the operative part of the decision and that the judgment giving reasons was served only on 27 November 2015, the date from which the time-limit had started to run.

17. In the present case the alleged violation of the Convention concerns specifically the reasoning of the disputed decision. The date from which time runs therefore cannot be the date of the delivery of the operative part of the final decision. The Court finds that the six-month time-limit started to run on 27 November 2015, when the full judgment was served on the applicant company. It follows that the Government’s objection must be dismissed.

18. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

19. The applicant company submitted that it had had no procedural standing in the criminal proceedings when the search had been ordered; that there was no reasonable suspicion that it had committed a crime; and that no reasons were given in the search warrant for the first location and it was formulated in extremely broad terms, giving unfettered discretion to the investigators to search for anything they wanted.

20. The Government disagreed and submitted that the warrant had been issued according to law, pursued the legitimate aim of defending public order and preventing crime, and was proportionate. They submitted that the search warrant had been sufficiently precise and that a more precise description of the objects to be seized would have unnecessarily limited the search powers.

21. The general principles concerning searches and seizures on the premises of commercial companies were recently summarised in Italgomme Pneumatici S.r.l. v. Italy (nos. 36617/18 and 12 others, §§ 95-98, 6 February 2025). The Court has held, in particular, that in cases concerning searches and inspections which are carried out on the premises of legal entities, points to be taken into consideration are whether the search was based on a warrant issued by a judge and was based on reasonable suspicion; whether the scope of the warrant was reasonably limited, and in particular whether it specified the evidence that the authorities expected to find in connection with the offences being investigated; and whether domestic law limited the type of information that the authorities could seize or copy (ibid.).

22. The Court notes that it does not appear from the case file, nor has it been submitted by either party, that the applicant company was a suspect in the criminal investigation opened on 22 September 2015 on charges of tax evasion. The only ground relied upon to authorise the search was the investigator’s internal report, which suggested that the applicant company might have been involved in those activities (see paragraph 2 above).

23. The text of the search warrant issued for the search of the first location, which was a sales point, was taken word for word from the prosecutor’s search request and did not give any information about why it was believed that the applicant company was involved in the criminal activity or how a search of its premises would enable evidence to be obtained. Moreover, the search warrant was formulated in such broad terms that it covered almost every aspect of the financial activity of the applicant company and allowed the seizure of any documents and information carriers. Although the internal investigation report referred to “ghost companies”, the investigating judge ought to have specified which entities were allegedly connected with the applicant company, so that the prosecuting authority could seize documents that were both relevant and necessary specifically in relation to those companies.

24. The Court notes that of the four searches authorised by the four warrants issued on the same day and for identical reasons, only the search of the first location was upheld by the appellate court, while the other three were quashed on the grounds that the wording of the search request had been imprecise and insufficient. What is even more striking is that the very same panel of judges which upheld the search at the first location had rejected an identical request for a warrant to search other locations giving contradictory reasoning and not giving reasons distinguishing the situations.

25. A search warrant giving a wide discretion in determining the scope of the search was previously criticised by the Court for its vagueness and excessively broad terms (see Bagiyeva v. Ukraine, no. 41085/05, §§ 52-56, 28 April 2016 and further cited references). The search warrant concerning the first location in the present case was also framed in broad terms. The Court finds that neither the prior judicial authorisation of the search nor the subsequent judicial review of it were appropriate safeguards against possible abuses of power during its execution. The Court finds that the search of the applicant company’s premises constituted an interference which was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

26. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

2. OTHER Complaints

27. The applicant company also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the remaining complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

• APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

28. The applicant company claimed 5,900 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 600 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The applicant company did not submit any documents in support of its claim for costs and expenses.

29. The Government argued that the claims were excessive and unsupported by any evidence.

30. Having regard to the violation found above, the Court awards the applicant company EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant company.

31. The applicant company failed to provide any supporting documents that it had actually incurred the costs and expenses claimed. The Court therefore dismisses its claim in respect of costs and expenses.

• FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
4. Holds
   1. that the respondent State is to pay the applicant company, within three months, 4,500 EUR (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
   2. that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant company’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President