VOLOZHANIN A ZNAKOVAN proti Ukrajině

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Applications nos. 19951/21 and 31160/21
Dmytro Mykolayovych VOLOZHANIN against Ukraine
and Ruslan Mykhaylovych ZNAKOVAN against Ukraine

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 3 March 2026 as a Chamber composed of:

Kateřina Šimáčková, President,
María Elósegui,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Gilberto Felici,
Diana Sârcu,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the above applications lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 8 April and 7 June 2021 respectively,

the decision to give notice of the applications to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”);

the parties’ observations,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

• INTRODUCTION

1. The case concerns the applicants’ complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that the conditions of their detention were inadequate and that they did not have an effective domestic remedy in that regard.

• FACTS AND procedure

2. The applicant in application no. 19951/21, Mr Dmytro Mykolayovych Volozhanin (“the first applicant”), is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1983. On 23 March 2021 he signed a power of attorney authorising Mr S. Kulbach, a lawyer residing in Limoges (France), to represent him before the Court. On the same day Mr Kulbach signed a completed application form and dispatched it to the Court from Limoges on 8 April 2021.

3. The applicant in application no. 31160/21, Mr Ruslan Mykhaylovych Znakovan (“the second applicant”), is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1986. On 7 June 2021 he signed a power of attorney authorising Mr O. Vavrenyuk, a lawyer practising in Pyatykhatky (Ukraine), to represent him before the Court. On the same day Mr Vavrenyuk signed a completed application form and dispatched it to the Court from Pyatykhatky.

4. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. Facts submitted by the applicants at the time of the lodging of the applications
   1. The first applicant

6. In his application form, the first applicant complained of the poor conditions of his detention in the Kyiv pre-trial detention facility (“the Kyiv SIZO”) from 11 February 2020 until 6 January 2021 – the date on which he had been released.

7. The relevant part of the application form reads as follows[1]:

E. Statement of the facts

“...

The applicant was placed in the Kyiv pre-trial detention facility on 11 February 2020, where he remained until 6 January 2021, after which he was released, having served the maximum sentence.

The applicant alleges that he was held in conditions that were degrading to human dignity [принижують людську гідність] in the Kyiv pre-trial detention facility from 11 February 2020 until 6 January 2021 (11 months).

...

As regards the length of stay in each cell: no. 330 – 34 days, no. 131 – 3 months, no. 10 – the remaining time.

...”

F. Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments

“The applicant alleges that he was held in conditions that were degrading to human dignity in the Kyiv pre-trial detention facility from 11 February 2020 until 6 January 2021 (11 months).”

8. The application form was accompanied by a certificate issued by the Kyiv SIZO in reply to a request submitted by the first applicant’s representative. The certificate indicated that the first applicant had been transferred to that facility “in accordance with the ruling of the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv of 11 February 2020”.

2. The second applicant

9. In his application form, the second applicant complained of the poor conditions of his detention in Vinnytsya Prison no. 1 (“Vinnytsya Prison”) from 9 August 2018 until the date on which the application was submitted – namely 7 June 2021.

10. The relevant part of the application form reads as follows:

E. Statement of the facts

“... [F]rom 9 August 2018 up until the present time (7 June 2021), the applicant has been held in custody in [Vinnytsya Prison], in cells of the same type. At present, the applicant is held in cell no. 65.

...

At present (7 June 2021), the applicant continues to be held in [Vinnytsya Prison].”

F. Statement of alleged violation(s) of the Convention and/or Protocols and relevant arguments

“The applicant complains that in the period from 9 August 2018 until the present (7 June 2021) (over 2 years and 11 months), he has been held in custody in [Vinnytsya Prison].”

11. The application form was accompanied by a certificate issued by Vinnytsya Prison on 29 April 2021 in reply to a request submitted by the second applicant’s representative. The certificate indicated that the second applicant had been held in that facility since 9 August 2018.

2. Facts submitted by the Government after receiving notice of the applications

12. The Government provided records from the two detention facilities which indicated that the periods of the applicants’ detention differed from those specified in their application forms. According to those records:

(i) the first applicant had been held in the Kyiv SIZO from 4 October 2020 until 6 January 2021 (not, as he had submitted, from 11 February 2020 until 6 January 2021);

(ii) the second applicant had been held in Vinnytsya Prison from 17 August 2018 until 11 May 2021 (not, as he had submitted, from 9 August 2018 until at least 7 June 2021).

• COMPLAINTs

13. The applicants complained that the conditions of their detention had been inadequate and that they had had no effective remedy in that connection. They relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention.

• THE LAW

14. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.

1. The parties’ submissions

15. The Government submitted that the applicants had deliberately misled the Court by misrepresenting essential facts in their applications. In particular, the first applicant had asserted that he had spent a much longer period in allegedly inadequate conditions of detention in the Kyiv SIZO than had actually been the case; the second applicant had submitted his application form – complaining of his continuing detention – one month after he had in fact left the facility in question. The Government contended that the applicants could not have been unaware of their own whereabouts. On that basis, they requested that the Court dismiss the applications as an abuse of the right of individual application.

16. The applicants did not comment on the Government’s objection or explain the discrepancy at issue. The first applicant’s representative submitted a brief reply maintaining the complaint alleging inadequate conditions of detention. The second applicant’s representative submitted generic observations – which were largely identical to those that he had submitted on behalf of other applicants that he had previously represented before the Court – addressing arguments that had not been raised by the Government; however, he did amend the statement of facts to reflect the dates of detention submitted by the Government.

2. The Court’s assessment

17. Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention provides:

“The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:

(a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application ...”

18. The Court reiterates that an application is likely to be dismissed as constituting an abuse of the right of individual application if, among other reasons, it has been established that (a) it is knowingly based on untrue facts and false declarations, or (b) significant information and documents have been deliberately withheld – either where they were known from the outset or where new significant developments have occurred during the proceedings (see Taşdemir v. Turkey (dec.), no. 79549/16, § 39, 25 March 2025, and the cases cited therein). As regards the latter ground – the deliberate withholding of significant information – the Court in Huttner v. Germany ((dec.), no. 23130/04, 19 June 2006) set out additional factors to be taken into account – namely whether the incomplete and therefore misleading information concerned the very core of the case and whether a sufficient explanation had been given for the failure to disclose that information (see also Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), no. 41701/16, §§ 35-40, 4 July 2024). In Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy ([GC], no. 38433/09, § 97, 7 June 2012) the Court also added that the applicant’s intention to mislead it always had to be established with sufficient certainty.

19. While the present case concerns the initial submission of allegedly false information, which normally warrants a stricter response from the Court and arguably the application of a lower standard of proof than the mere withholding of information (compare Kongresna Narodna Stranka and Others v. Bosnia Herzegovina (dec.), no. 414/11, §§ 13 and 15-19, 26 April 2016), the criteria applicable to the latter remain to some extent useful. The Court will therefore draw inspiration, when deciding the present case, from those criteria and will examine whether (i) the facts in question are indeed untrue and relate to the very core of the case, (ii) any sufficient explanation has been provided, and (iii) the applicants’ conduct may be regarded as intentional.

20. The Court begins by noting that the first applicant’s alleged stay in the Kyiv SIZO from 11 February until 4 October 2020 and the second applicant’s alleged continued detention in Vinnytsya Prison after 11 May 2021 had no basis in any supporting documents or evidence, apart from the applicants’ bare statements. While the Court is mindful of the objective difficulties experienced by detained persons in gathering evidence to substantiate their claims, it notes that the applicants were represented by professional lawyers from the outset of the proceedings. There was no allegation of any undue restriction on communication between the applicants and their representatives. Moreover, those representatives made official enquiries into the applicants’ individual situations prior to lodging the respective applications (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above). Nevertheless, the allegations made in the application forms cannot be reconciled with the information submitted by the Government. Specifically, convincing evidence in the form of prison records shows that the first applicant was in fact detained from 4 October 2020 until his release on 6 January 2021 – a period nearly eight months shorter than that initially claimed. As to the second applicant, he left Vinnytsya Prison on 11 May 2021 – almost a month before the application form (in which he complained of his continued detention) was signed and lodged on 7 June 2021. Ultimately, the second applicant’s representative implicitly acknowledged that fact.

21. The Court therefore regards the periods of detention indicated by the Government as conclusive and finds the applicants’ factual allegations in this respect to be false.

22. The question that must be addressed next is whether the false allegations in question were of substantive relevance for the Court’s examination of the applications – that is to say (to employ the Court’s established terminology) whether they formed part of the “very core of the case”. In its case-law to date, the Court has not defined the precise scope or meaning of that notion, determining it instead according to the context of each particular case.

23. The Court has found that misleading information forms part of the very core of a case where it pertains to the fact that the matter in dispute was resolved after the lodging of an application, such as the fact that: a court decision against public authorities in a case concerning its non‑enforcement was enforced in full (see Streltov v. Moldova (dec.), nos. 13272/07 and 13278/07, 30 November 2010); criminal proceedings of an allegedly excessive length were discontinued (see Berger v. Germany (dec.), no. 10731/05, 17 March 2009); domestic proceedings in a case concerning the lack of access to a court were reopened (see Tatalović and Dekić v. Serbia (dec.), no. 15433/07, 29 May 2012); an applicant who had complained of her inability to obtain the drug which she wished to use to take her own life had eventually obtained the required prescription and died by suicide (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 35, ECHR 2014); a person’s gender reassignment was legally recognised after an earlier refusal which had formed the subject matter of his complaint before the Court (see Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), cited above, § 37).

24. The Court has also held that misleading information relating to the financial or temporal aspects of an alleged violation may fall within the “very core of a case”, such as in cases where: the applicant’s allegations exaggerated the material damage at issue and were therefore relevant to the determination of victim status under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Safaryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 16346/10, §§ 28‑29, 14 January 2020); the actual duration of the applicant’s deprivation of the right to education for the purposes of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 had been shorter than claimed (see Taşdemir, cited above, § 43); and the applicant claimed an award in respect of damage sustained over a ten-month period owing to rent-control regulations, despite having received market rent for six of those ten months (see Šumbera v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 36687/09, 17 September 2013).

25. The existence of a domestic decision finding a violation of an applicant’s Convention rights and affording compensation was likewise found to be directly relevant to that applicant’s victim status and to any just satisfaction to be awarded under Article 41 (see Buzinger v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 32133/10, §§ 21‑22, 16 June 2015).

26. Lastly, the failure to inform the Court that two separate applications stemmed from the same set of domestic proceedings and that the applicants were married – omissions which could have doubled the amount of any just satisfaction awarded under Article 41 – amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application, even though the Court did not explicitly refer to the “very core of the case” (see Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), no. 56297/11, §§ 13-15, 21 January 2014).

27. By contrast, the Court did not consider the misquotation of a Constitutional Court decision (see Çağil v. Türkiye, no. 19085/18, § 24, 21 January 2025) or the use of value judgments which could not be regarded as “untrue” (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, § 118, 22 December 2008) to form part of the “core of the case”. It had come to the same conclusion with regard to other information which was not capable of altering the Court’s reasoning: the subsequent sale of the apartment at issue in an application alleging a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Rahmanova v. Azerbaijan, no. 34640/02, § 41, 10 July 2008); the enforcement of domestic decisions after the lodging of an application concerning delays in their enforcement (see Vartic and Others v. Moldova, nos. 12674/07 and 4 others, § 18, 20 September 2011); the failure to inform the Court of the applicant’s release from prison two months after the submission of the application (see Bulea v. Romania, no. 27804/10, § 37, 3 December 2013); and the fact that the applicant had given birth to children after the submission of an application concerning an ineffective investigation into forced abortions and forced contraception (see G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 44394/15, § 61, 22 November 2022).

28. The general approach that follows from the majority of the above‑mentioned cases, with the precise boundaries to be determined in each particular case, may be summarised as follows: a fact forms part of the “very core of the case” where it is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the Court’s judgment, whether as regards the admissibility, the merits, or any potential award of just satisfaction.

29. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the duration of the applicants’ detention, among other factors, undoubtedly plays a key part in determining whether the conditions of their detention satisfied the guarantees of Article 3 (see Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 103, 20 October 2016). Moreover, the facts as submitted by the applicants would have a significant impact on any award in respect of non-pecuniary damage which the Court might make. In this regard, the Court notes that, had the Government failed to detect the falsity of the allegation, the amount of any just satisfaction award made to the first applicant would have been determined on the basis of the fact that he spent 11 months in allegedly inadequate conditions, rather than 3 months. As to the second applicant, the end date of his allegedly continued detention, for the purposes of any just satisfaction award, would have been the date of the Court’s judgment – which, given the minimum time necessary for the exchange of observations and for the deliberations, would have been well after his actual transfer from the facility in question (see, for example, the appendix to Gerburt and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 26877/23 and 9 others, 9 October 2025).

30. Accordingly, the Court finds that the periods of the applicants’ detention – as submitted in their respective application forms – were misstated to such an extent that they affected the very core of the case.

31. It is also necessary to note under this head that the dates of detention at issue do not form part of the dispute between the parties as to the adequacy of the conditions of detention and therefore cannot justify affording the applicants a broader latitude in their submissions. While it is true that parties can submit arguments and counter-arguments relating to their case – which the Court can accept or reject without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application (see Hoti v. Croatia, no. 63311/14, § 92, 26 April 2018, and the cases cited therein, and Prenča v. Serbia, no. 48725/12, §§ 53‑56, 7 October 2025) – nothing in the present case suggests that the applicants were held in unrecorded detention or otherwise raises an issue under the Convention in relation to the difference in the periods of detention as submitted by the parties.

32. Turning to the question of whether a sufficient explanation has been provided for the provision of inaccurate information, the Court notes with regret that, in their comments on the Government’s observations, the applicants did not address the matter at all – thereby preventing the Court from assessing their account of the events. It reiterates in this regard that such an explanation may be important, if not decisive, for the purposes of establishing whether there has been an abuse of the right of application (see G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 173, 28 June 2018). The overall conduct of the parties throughout the proceedings may also be relevant in this context; for example (albeit in different circumstances), the Court continued its examination of a case after the chairperson of the applicant party apologised for his conduct and pledged to show due respect towards the Court (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia (dec.), no. 9103/04, 22 May 2007).

33. In assessing whether the impugned conduct in the present case was intentional, the Court takes into account various factors.

34. It firstly draws strong unfavourable inferences from the applicants’ failure to provide any explanations.

35. Furthermore, regard must be had to the fact that the applicants were represented by professional lawyers throughout the proceedings, a situation which entails higher expectations as to the quality of the submissions, given those lawyers’ professional duties and commercial interests (see Kowal v. Poland (dec.), no. 2912/11, § 33, 18 September 2012; also compare Červeňáková v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 26852/09, § 27, 23 October 2012; Lukarev v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (dec.), no. 3172/07, § 24, 15 January 2013; and Komatinović v. Serbia (dec.), no. 75381/10, 29 January 2013). Indeed, professional representation should reduce the likelihood of a mere mistake or negligence arising from a lack of legal knowledge or drafting skills. In that connection, the Court notes that the false allegations in the present case concern a simple question of fact.

36. Another important element in this assessment is whether the applicants had anything to gain by making such allegations (see, for example, Balsamo v. San Marino, no. 20319/17, § 48, 8 October 2019). The Court has found above (see paragraph 29 above) that, had the Government not corrected the detention periods as submitted by the applicants, the latter would likely have been awarded substantially higher amounts by way of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention. The applicants’ lawyers can be considered well aware of the way such assessments of damage normally operate, having regard to their extensive experience before the Court, where Mr Kulbach has represented hundreds and Mr Vavrenyuk dozens of applicants – mainly in cases concerning inadequate conditions of detention.

37. The general context of the case is of particular relevance. Cases of this kind, stemming from a structural problem in Ukraine (see Sukachov v. Ukraine, no. 14057/17, § 137, 30 January 2020), place significant strain on the Court’s capacity to administer justice effectively, given their large number. Since the adoption of the pilot judgment in Sukachov (cited above), that problem has lain behind the violations of the Convention found by the Court in over 800 applications concerning Ukraine. Since 1 January 2025 alone, over 300 further similar applications have been registered with the Court. The situation is further aggravated by the absence of an effective domestic remedy (ibid., § 125), which places on the Court evidential difficulties comparable to those faced by a first-instance tribunal of fact. The processing of such complaints also places a significant burden on the Government, which should not be expected to bear sole responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of the facts in the face of applicants’ submitting misleading information – particularly given that, in view of its well‑established case-law on the matter, the Court does not systematically request observations in cases of this type.

38. In such circumstances, the Court relies to a considerable extent on the applicants and their representatives, expecting them to demonstrate a high level of prudence and genuine cooperation at every stage of the proceedings. It would undermine the authority and proper functioning of the Convention system if applicants and their representatives were allowed to take advantage of the large volume of cases submitted and to profit unduly at the expense of the public purse.

39. Lastly, in view of the fact that all communication with the applicants in the instant case took place exclusively through their representatives, the Court considers it necessary to reiterate its approach to the allocation of responsibility between applicants and their representatives. It has previously held that a representative is deemed to act in the applicant’s interests and that the representative’s actions are normally considered to reflect the applicant’s instructions and wishes; consequently, an applicant bears the adverse consequences arising from his or her representative’s conduct of the case before the Court (see Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08, § 75, 30 March 2017, and Taşdemir, cited above, § 41).

40. The actions or omissions attributable to an applicant’s representative have, on several occasions, led to the rejection of an application as an abuse of the right of individual application (see, for example, Bekauri v. Georgia (preliminary objection), no. 14102/02, § 24, 10 April 2012; Martins Alves, cited above, § 17; and Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), cited above, § 37). It is then for the applicant, where appropriate, to seek damages in domestic proceedings arising from his or her representative’s malpractice. For its part, the Court reserves the right to exclude such a representative from participating in proceedings before it under Rule 44D of the Rules of Court, should the conduct be systematic or otherwise aggravated (see Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 2394/22 and 18 others, § 66, 16 May 2023). As provided in Rule 44D, this procedure is reserved for exceptional circumstances.

41. In the light of the above-noted considerations, the Court concludes that the submission, in the application forms, of untrue facts of substantive relevance, in the absence of any subsequent explanation and in the particular context of the present case, amounted to an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It accordingly upholds the Government’s objection.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 2 April 2026.

Victor Soloveytchik Kateřina Šimáčková
Registrar President

[1] Translation by the Registry.