GONŢ proti Rumunsku

FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 18269/20
Dorina GONŢ
against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 7 October 2025 as a Committee composed of:

Faris Vehabović, President,
Lorraine Schembri Orland,
Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 18269/20) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 30 April 2020 by a Romanian national, Ms Dorina Gonț, who was born in 1967 and lives in Cluj‑Napoca (“the applicant”) and was represented by Mr P. Lewisch, a lawyer practising in Vienna;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the alleged lack of impartiality of the trial panel which convicted the applicant in the first-instance level of the criminal proceedings against her.

2. In 2016 the applicant, at the time head of the Chamber of Judicial Enforcement Officers (the bailiffs’ professional body) in Bucharest, was committed for trial together with four other co-defendants before Judge C.S. of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. She was charged with forty-four counts of tax evasion, allegedly committed in her capacity as bailiff.

3. At the hearings of 1 and 29 September 2016 two of her co-defendants requested to benefit from the simplified procedure, applicable where an accused fully admitted his or her guilt. The applicant, represented by a lawyer of her choice, did not comment on this request. At the hearing of 27 October 2016 Judge C.S. began by addressing the issue of acknowledgment of guilt and informed the defendants that they could benefit from the simplified procedure and a reduction of their sentences if they were to recognise the charges in full. All of the defendants except the applicant opted for this procedure. The court heard statements from all defendants and their lawyers. The applicant’s request for a postponement of the hearing, in order to consult with her lawyer and decide whether to accept the simplified procedure, was granted by the court.

4. At the next hearing the applicant expressed her wish to contest the charges and the evidence gathered during the investigation. She requested that the court reevaluate the evidence and allow her to submit additional evidence (documents, an expert report and witness statements). The court allowed a discussion on the possibility of severing the proceedings in respect of the applicant from those concerning the other co-defendants who had acknowledged their guilt. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court took note that three of the defendants acknowledged their guilt, one defendant refused to admit the charges in full, and the applicant had pleaded not guilty. The court decided to continue the joint examination of the case, in order to ensure uniform treatment and in view of the close connection between the co‑defendants. The court also partially allowed requests from all the defendants, including the applicant, for evidence that it considered necessary to the case.

5. At the hearing of 19 January 2017 the applicant lodged an application for the recusal of Judge C.S. She submitted that by accepting the co‑defendants’ admissions of guilt and refusing to sever their cases, the judge had implicitly expressed her opinion that the evidence already submitted was sufficient to substantiate the charges and had stated that there was a close connection between the defendants. The recusal application was rejected in a reasoned decision by another judge of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, who, after verifying the case file, held that Judge C.S. had not expressed an opinion on the merits of the case and had not made any evaluation with regard to the charges or the guilt of any of the defendants.

6. On 29 June 2017, after hearing evidence from all parties, Judge C.S. decided to convict all of the defendants, including the applicant, as charged. The applicant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and barred from holding public functions and exercising the profession of bailiff for a subsequent period of five years.

7. The applicant appealed against that judgment, complaining, among other points, of the lack of impartiality of Judge C.S.

8. On 31 October 2019 the appeal was rejected with final effect by a panel of three judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the High Court”). After reviewing the case file, the High Court considered that, in deciding to allow the simplified procedure, the first-instance judge had merely acknowledged the relevant three defendants’ admission of the facts as established during the investigation and noted that the applicant and the remaining defendant contested those facts. The High Court found that the judge in question had subsequently carried out a full and thorough examination of the evidence, hearing all the defendants and several witnesses proposed by all parties, and noted that the applicant had not contested the statements given by her co-defendants. Citing the case-law of the Court on fair-trial guarantees and after examining all factual and legal aspects of the case, the High Court concluded that the applicant had received a fair trial before the first-instance court, which had complied with the principles of equality of arms and immediacy and respected the applicant’s right to defend herself, and had delivered a thoroughly reasoned judgment.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. Complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention

9. Relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, the applicant alleged before the Court that she had not had access to an impartial tribunal, on account of the acceptance by the first-instance court of the guilty pleas of her co-defendants, a fact which had also deprived her of a fair trial and breached her right to be presumed innocent.

10. The general principles on the impartiality of a tribunal are summarised in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 144-50, 6 November 2018). Those relating to impartiality and the presumption of innocence in the context of a judge’s participation in previous decisions on the same subject matter have been set out in Gorše v. Slovenia (no. 47186/21, §§ 49-52, 6 March 2025). The Court would nonetheless note that in applying the subjective test, it has consistently held that the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary (see Alexandru Marian Iancu v. Romania, no. 60858/15, § 57, 4 February 2020). Regarding the objective test, an issue as to the judge’s impartiality may arise where he or she has made previous decisions concerning the same offence and the earlier judgment already contains a detailed assessment of the role of a person who has been charged in relation to an offence committed by several persons but who has not yet been tried (see Gorše, cited above, § 50).

11. Given that the complaints raised by the applicant about the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge C.S., the absence of a fair trial and the breach of the presumption of innocence are based on the same facts, the Court considers that they are interconnected and will examine them together (see Gorše, cited above, § 54).

12. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints arise from the following facts: the judge who convicted her and her co-defendants in the first‑instance proceedings had already accepted guilty pleas in respect of three of her co‑defendants, who had taken part in committing the same criminal offences as the applicant. Having examined all the material before it, the Court finds that there is nothing to suggest that Judge C.S. displayed personal bias against the applicant in such a way as to raise doubts regarding her subjective impartiality. The case must therefore be examined from the perspective of the objective impartiality test (compare Alexandru Marian Iancu, cited above, § 66).

13. As to the objective test, the Court observes, on the basis of the case file, that the procedure in the applicant’s case was conducted in accordance with the law. Indeed, when accepting the co-defendants’ guilty pleas, Judge C.S. did not make any statements or findings as to the facts, whether there existed a reasonable suspicion of a crime committed by the applicant or her guilt (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). The mere fact that Judge C.S. stated that there was a close connection between the defendants, when assessing whether they should be put to trial together for considerations of better administration of justice, is not sufficient grounds to consider that she had expressed an opinion on the applicant’s guilt in the circumstances of the present case (contrast Gorše, cited above, §§ 62 and 63, where the domestic court had severed the proceedings and, in a first judgment concerning the co‑defendants, had described the applicant’s role in the commission of the offence and referred to him as the person who had committed the offence).

14. The Court also notes that the applicant lodged a challenge for bias against Judge C.S. before the Bucharest Court of Appeal (see paragraph 5 above). This challenge was examined and rejected in a reasoned decision, made in compliance with the provisions of the law. The judge examining the challenge concluded, after reviewing the case file, that there was no proof to support the idea that Judge C.S., in accepting the guilty pleas of the co‑defendants, had expressed an opinion on the merits of the case or on the charges or the guilt of any of the defendants (compare Alexandru Marian Iancu, cited above, § 70).

15. Furthermore, the applicant also raised her concerns regarding Judge C.S.’s alleged bias in her appeal against the first-instance decision. The appeal panel, formed of three judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, examined the applicant’s arguments and considered that, when accepting the guilty pleas in respect of three co-defendants, Judge C.S. had merely noted that those defendants had accepted the facts as established during the investigation (contrast Gorše, cited above, § 65). Moreover, the appeal panel reviewed the case file and concluded that the applicant had received a fair trial before the first-instance court (see paragraph 8 above).

16. In view of the above, the Court considers that there is no indication of any subjective or objective lack of impartiality on the part of Judge C.S. Similarly, there is nothing in the case file that would enable it to doubt the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant before the domestic courts. The applicant was present in court and was represented by a lawyer of her choice; she had an opportunity to submit evidence and to present her legal and factual arguments before the courts, both in writing and orally at the hearings; and the domestic courts gave thorough reasons for their decisions (see paragraphs 3-8 above).

17. Lastly, on the basis of the above considerations, the Court also finds that there is nothing in the file to support the conclusion that Judge C.S.’s decision to accept the guilty pleas was prejudicial to the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent or to her right to a fair trial.

18. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. Remaining complaints

19. The applicant also raised other complaints under Articles 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d), 7 and 34 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

20. The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

21. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.

Valentin Nicolescu Faris Vehabović
Acting Deputy Registrar President