GHIȘOIU proti Rumunsku

FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 40228/20
Albert Mihai GHIȘOIU
against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 4 October and 29 November 2022 as a Chamber composed of:

Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President,
Tim Eicke,
Faris Vehabović,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc,
Yonko Grozev,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 August 2020,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant was born in 2006 and lives in Bucharest. He was represented by Ms G.E. Bârlă, a lawyer practising in Bucharest.

2. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms O. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

1. Background to the case

4. The applicant’s parents divorced in 2013; after that the applicant lived with his father, M.G., who had full custody of him, while the mother, F.-I.R., who had moved to France where she had started a new family, had visitation rights.

2. The alleged abuse

5. During the winter holidays of 2016, namely from 27 December 2016 to 5 January 2017, the applicant, who was then ten years old, spent a few days at the house of his aunt C.‑T.Z. (his mother’s sister) in Albota, Argeș, with his aunt’s family and his mother and her new family – her husband, T.R., of French nationality, and their five-month-old baby.

6. Upon his return from the holidays, the applicant told his father that T.R. had slapped him in the face and shouted at him in the presence of his mother and his six-year-old cousin, E., allegedly because he was making too much noise which had woken the baby. When he had told his mother that T.R. did not have the right to hit him, she had claimed that in France, parents had the right to “discipline” their children in that manner, and that in any event, T.R. knew how to educate a child better than the applicant’s father.

7. Following the incident, the applicant refused to see his mother or to talk to her on the telephone.

3. Criminal complaint relating to the incident

8. On 17 February 2017 the applicant’s father, in his capacity as the minor child’s representative, lodged a criminal complaint relating to the incident in question, copying the complaint to the Bucharest Child Protection Authority.

9. In that complaint, M.G. accused T.R. of having both physically and verbally assaulted the applicant during the winter holidays of 2016, as well as on other previous occasions when he had been visiting his mother in France; he relied on Articles 193 and 199 of the Criminal Code (acts causing bodily harm or injury to a family member, see paragraph 36 below), and on the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 40 below).

10. M.G. provided details of F.-I.R.’s telephone number, T.R.’s father’s telephone number, and the address indicated by the mother as her residence in France, possibly the same as that of T.R.

4. Criminal proceedings relating to the incident

11. The complaint was sent to the Bucharest Child Protection Authority (see also paragraph 8 above), which on 11 April 2017 issued “an intervention report” (see paragraph 30 below) and sent it to the criminal file opened into the incident.

12. In the following months, the file was sent from one investigative authority to another, in connection with matters of territorial jurisdiction (no specific or further details are provided in the case file documents). It was finally referred to the Police Station no. 22 in Bucharest District no. 6, which registered it on 24 February 2018.

13. On 5 July 2018 the police contacted F.-I.R. on the telephone, informing her of the criminal complaint lodged against her husband, T.R., and the legal implications of the charges against him. She submitted that during the 2016 winter holidays, the applicant had spent all of his time in the presence of her sister, C.-T.Z., and her sister’s husband, D.Z.; they could both confirm that there had been no assault of the child, and that T.R. had a protective, calm and normal attitude towards the minor.

14. On 24 August 2018 the police questioned the applicant. The child told the police that he believed that T.R. disliked him (repulsie) and had a reluctant attitude towards him and those around him. He reiterated his allegations of what had happened during the 2016 winter holidays, namely, that one time when he was playing with his cousin, E., T.R. had come in, grabbed E. by the mouth, and slapped the applicant in the face, blaming the two of them for being too loud and for having woken the baby. His mother, who had also been present, had asked T.R. to calm down. The applicant had cried for about ten minutes, after which T.R. had come back and apologised to him, but he had refused to forgive him.

The applicant also mentioned that during the time that he had spent at his mother’s house in France in the summer of 2016, T.R. had also slapped him once, also because he was playing too loudly.

15. On the same day, the police also questioned M.G. He reiterated what his son had allegedly told him, namely that one day during the 2016 winter holidays, while the applicant and his cousin, E., were listening to music on headphones, T.R., who had been with his baby in the other room, had come in shouting at both children, and had then grabbed E. by his mouth and slapped the applicant in the face; he would probably have continued had the applicant’s mother, F.-I.R., not intervened.

16. M.G. also mentioned that after he had forwarded the criminal complaint lodged against T.R. to the Child Protection Authority, both he and the applicant were notified that they had to participate in a social inquiry. The Authority’s conclusion was that there was no need to take any measures, so long as the applicant stayed with his father and was no longer in T.R.’s presence (see also paragraph 30 below).

17. On 14 September 2018 the police questioned the two witnesses indicated by F.-I.R., namely C.-T.Z. and her husband, D.Z.

18. The two statements of those witnesses were identical; they stated that during the winter holidays, they had both taken leave from work, and for reasons of good hospitality, at least one of them had been present at all times around the guests. During the time the applicant had spent in their house, they had not seen any violent behaviour from anyone, and especially not from T.R., who was a “calculated, calm” person. They had not noticed any signs of assault of the applicant, who had never complained to them about being assaulted. On the contrary, when D.Z. had driven the applicant back to his father, the child had mentioned wanting to move to France for good, to stay with his mother and T.R. Concerning the latter, the two witnesses asserted that he was a calm, non-violent person, who had a great power of self-control; these were qualities which he had also developed throughout his professional career as “the manager of a large French company”.

19. The two witnesses also stated that on one occasion, after January 2017, D.Z. had accompanied F.-I.R. to the applicant’s home, where he lived with his father. The child had refused to see her, stating that he had been assaulted by T.R., and he had “reproduced the legal definition of the crime of beating and causing bodily injury”. In the opinion of the witnesses, that aspect alone indicated that the child was easily suggestible and was dragged by his father into the disputes that he had with F.-I.R.

20. C.-T.Z. and D.Z also mentioned having discussed the matter with their son E., who had denied having been assaulted by T.R. or having witnessed any assault of the applicant; they refused to allow their son to give any statements to the police, arguing that at the time of the incident, he was only six years old, hence he was too little to have anything relevant to say; furthermore, by giving a statement to the police, he would potentially be subjected to trauma.

21. On 19 September 2018 the police called F.-I.R., asking, and even “insisting”, that she give them “any identification details” concerning T.R. She refused.

22. T.R. was never questioned, nor was he ever notified or summoned to make a statement to the police.

23. On 26 September 2018, relying extensively on the two statements given by the witnesses C.-T.Z. and D.Z, the police proposed that the case be closed for lack of any evidence that supported the alleged victim’s allegations concerning the charge of beating or committing other acts of violence under Articles 193 and 199 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 36 below). It was argued that such allegations, if they remained uncorroborated by any evidence, had to be evaluated against the presumption of innocence from which the alleged perpetrator benefitted; that presumption could have been reversed only if strong, undisputable evidence to the contrary had been adduced, which was not the case.

24. On 29 October 2018 that proposal was confirmed by the prosecutor, who upheld in full the reasoning provided by the police.

25. M.G. challenged the prosecutor’s decision before the higher prosecutor. He complained that T.R. had not been questioned by the police, in spite of all the relevant identification and contact details that had been provided in the case; that the mother, F.-I.R., who had been a direct witness, had also not given a statement; he indicated that the witnesses could have given evidence through the use of letters rogatory, if it was otherwise impossible; that the case had not been assessed against the legal framework provided by the relevant law: Articles 4, 5 and 222 of Law no. 174/2018 on preventing and combating domestic violence (see paragraph 39 below); Articles 89 and 153 of Law no. 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of children’s rights (see paragraph 38 below); and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 40 below).

26. On 20 February 2019 the higher prosecutor dismissed M.G.’s complaint, finding that the decision of 29 October 2018 was well founded.

27. On 15 March 2019 M.G. complained before the court against the higher prosecutor’s decision. He reiterated his previous arguments (see paragraph 25 above); he also complained that in their investigation, the police had not given any relevance to the conclusions of the Child Protection Authority’s “intervention report” of 11 April 2017 (see paragraph 30 below). He requested that the court put aside the statements given by the witnesses C.-T.Z. and D.Z. as they had been fabricated (in an identical manner) so as to exculpate T.R.

28. On an unspecified date M.G. submitted to the file a copy of the psychological evaluation of 8 October 2019 (see paragraph 31 below), and copies of newspaper articles concerning the legislation adopted in France which prohibited beating or slapping children.

29. Following a remittal of the case on 26 November 2019 to another court which was considered to have jurisdiction, on 26 May 2020 the Pitești District Court dismissed M.G.’s complaint and upheld the prosecutors’ decisions to close the file. The court’s reasoning largely reproduced that in the previous decisions given in the case (see paragraphs 23, 24 and 26 above), without any reference to the psychological evaluations or to the other specific requests made by M.G. (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above).

5. Psychological evaluations of the applicant

30. M.G. submitted to the file an “intervention report” setting out a brief psychological evaluation of the child, issued on 11 April 2017 by the Child Protection Authority. The report mentioned that from the very outset, the child had firmly stated his wish to see T.R. “serve a lifetime prison sentence” because he had assaulted him; the child appeared to classify the people around him as either “good people”, namely his father and those around his father, who loved and cared for him, and “bad people” – the mother and those around her, against whom the child felt anger and a desire to separate from them; concerning his mother in particular, the child felt anger and fury, stating that she “had never taken his side” in the conflicts with his stepfather.

The report recommended that further psychological counselling be given to the child, aiming to clarify why he was so angry and utterly refused to have contact with his mother. That recommendation was never pursued.

31. Another psychological report was issued on 8 October 2019, in the context of custody and alimony payment proceedings between the applicant’s parents, lodged in the course of 2017.

32. During the eleven meetings held between August and October 2019 with the minor, both alone and then with his mother and separately with his father, the psychologist interviewed all of the parties involved. One observation referred to the fact that the child did not seem to manifest “the aspirations and concerns specific to his age”, and that he preferred to spend his time alone rather than with others. When asked what he would do if he had a magic wand, the child said he wished that T.R. would live on a different planet, as far away from him as possible.

33. The psychologist also noted that during the sessions with his mother, the child had proved that he wanted to have a relationship with her, and even if he had been tense at the beginning, he had become more relaxed and a few times had even smiled in her presence; nevertheless, he had wanted to avoid contact with T.R., as he was angry with him.

34. The report concluded that the minor had mentioned the slapping incident on each occasion, “being concerned to make his mother confess that it had happened”; the mother had appeared to have admitted that T.R. had grabbed the child by the chin, while the child had insisted that it had been a slap. In any event, the child had admitted that what had happened did not prevent him from loving his mother. It was possible that the child’s aversion to T.R. could be explained by the fact that the child was going through an Oedipean phase, thus being in an unconscious rivalry with her mother’s current partner, T.R.

35. The psychologist concluded that the child was trapped in his parents’ conflict, which contributed significantly to his emotional instability.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. Relevant domestic law

36. Article 193 § 1 of the relevant Criminal Code provides that beating or committing any act of violence causing physical injury is punishable by three months to two years’ imprisonment or by a fine.

Article 199 provides for a harsher penalty (increased by one quarter) for the acts described under, inter alia, Article 193, if committed against a family member.

37. Article 124 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that the questioning of a minor witness aged fourteen or less must take place in the presence of one of the parents, or the guardian or other representative; if these cannot be present or if they themselves have the status of, inter alia, a witness, the questioning may take place in the presence of a representative of the guardianship authority or of a relative with full legal capacity, as established by the investigative authority. On request or of its own motion and if considered necessary, the criminal investigative authority or the court may order that a psychologist attend the questioning of the minor witness. In any event, during the questioning of a minor witness it must be ensured that any negative effect on his or her mental state is avoided.

38. Law no. 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of children’s rights forbids corporal punishment as follows:

Article 33

“(1) A child has the right to respect for his or her personality and individuality and may not be subjected to physical punishment, or humiliating or degrading treatment.

(2) Measures of punishment may only be taken if they respect the child’s dignity; under no circumstances may corporal punishment or punishment which affects the physical or psychological development or the emotional state of the child be permitted.”

Article 89

“(1) A child has the right to be protected against abuse, neglect, exploitation, trafficking, illegal migration, abduction, violence, internet pornography, and any form of violence, irrespective of the child’s environment: family, school, medical institution ...”

Article 94

“(1) Abuse of a child is any voluntary act perpetrated by a person in a position of responsibility, trust or authority towards the child, whereby the child’s life, physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, corporal integrity, or physical and psychological health are put at risk; it can be classified as physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, and economic abuse.”

Article 95

“Any act of violence or of deprivation of a child’s rights which threatens the child’s life, physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, corporal integrity, or physical and psychological health, perpetrated within the family, is forbidden ...”

Articles 98-103 of the Law provide that the Child Protection Authority has an obligation to verify any information concerning allegations of abuse and must have the support of the police in its undertakings.

Article 153 of the Law provides that the provisions of the Law are complemented by the relevant national or international legal framework relating to the rights of the child.

39. Law no. 174/2018 amended Law no. 217/2003 on preventing and combating domestic violence; Article 3 of Law no. 174/2018 defines domestic violence as:

“any failure to act or intentional action of physical, sexual, psychological, economic, social or mental violence that occurs in the family or domestic environment ... regardless of whether the abuser lives or has lived with the victim”.

Article 4 of the Law defines each type of domestic violence, as enumerated in the preceding Article, including defining verbal violence as a type of action characterised by the use of offensive, brutal or humiliating language.

Article 5 defines the notion of “family member”, which includes all “persons who have established relationships similar to those between spouses or between parents and children, current or former partners, irrespective of whether or not they lived with the perpetrator”.....

Article 222 of the Law sets out the rights and obligations of the police in investigating any acts of alleged domestic violence; in particular, those concerning the collection of evidence, which include obtaining statements from all those who were involved or who assisted in an alleged act of violence.

2. Relevant international standards concerning domestic abuse against children

40. The relevant international, namely Council of Europe, United Nations and European Union material concerning domestic abuse against children is comprehensively set out in D.M.D. v. Romania (no. 23022/13, §§ 25-35, 3 October 2017).

COMPLAINTS

41. The applicant complained that the authorities (the police, the prosecutor’s office and the court) had failed to investigate promptly and effectively the allegations of ill-treatment inflicted on him, despite the evidence brought before them. He relied on Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention.

THE LAW

42. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant or a government (see, mutatis mutandis, Radomilja and others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). When communicating these complaints, it therefore considered that they would be more appropriately examined under Article 3 and/or Article 8 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, read as follows:

Article 3 (prohibition of torture)

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...”

1. The parties’ submissions

43. The Government argued that there had been no evidence, including of a psychological nature, to support the allegations of ill-treatment by confirming that there really had been a slap to the applicant’s face, or the existence of any other trauma relating to the alleged slap. Indeed, neither the intervention report of 11 April 2017 by the Child Protection Agency (paragraph 30 above) nor the psychological report issued in 2019 (paragraphs 31‑35 above) confirmed that the applicant had suffered ill‑treatment at the hands of T.R. or been the victim of any acts of aggression or abuse by him. In any event, such ill‑treatment did not attain the threshold of severity necessary to come within the sphere of Article 3 of the Convention.

44. They also indicated that in so far as there had been no clear evidence against T.R., he could not have been questioned as a suspect; also, if he had been questioned only in his capacity as a witness, any statement thus given could not have been used against him. Hence, questioning him had not been either possible, or necessary, given the lack of appropriate evidence incriminating him.

45. The duration of the proceedings of some three years was reasonable, partly in view of the fact that it had occurred during the start of the pandemic period, and partly because the case had been referred between jurisdictions on the basis of the place where the incident had occurred versus the applicant’s residence (see paragraph 29 above).

46. The applicant referred to the failure of the authorities to take into account the fact that he had been a vulnerable person and a minor who had been subjected to domestic abuse; the Child Protection Authority had not been properly consulted or involved in the proceedings; no psychological evaluation had been ordered by the authorities, either immediately after the incident or at least at a further point during the investigation, which had lasted an excessively long time; and the reports which did exist, which had been drawn up in specific circumstances, had been completely ignored by the authorities when reaching their conclusion to dismiss the complaint.

47. He also submitted that the investigation into his complaint had been altogether ineffective, mainly in view of the authorities’ failure to question all of the persons involved, in particular T.R., his mother and his cousin E., and in view of the fact that the authorities had relied solely on the statements given by the two witnesses, namely the child’s uncle and his wife, who had given identical and fabricated statements.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

48. The relevant principles concerning State’s positive obligation to investigate cases of alleged ill-treatment, and in particular abuse committed by private individuals, specifically concerning children or other vulnerable individuals, are set out in X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC] (no. 22457/16, §§ 184‑192, 2 February 2021. For the State’s positive obligation to investigate to arise, an applicant must claim on arguable grounds to have suffered acts contrary to Article 3 (ibid., § 184). The relevant principles the Court relies on to assess whether alleged ill-treatment attains the minimum level of severity so as to fall within the scope of Article 3, are set out in M.C. and A.C. v. Romania (no. 12060/12, §§ 107-108, 12 April 2016), and reiterated in D.M.D. v. Romania (cited above, §§ 40-41 and all the references therein).

49. In the context of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has previously held, in various contexts, that the concept of private life includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity. Under Article 8, States have a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons. To that end they are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see Remetin v. Croatia, no. 29525/10, § 90, 11 December 2012, with further references). In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to respect for one’s private life (see F.O. v. Croatia, no. 29555/13, §§ 57-59, 22 April 2021 and the references cited therein).

(b) Application of these principles to the present case

50. In the present case the applicant alleged that one day during the winter holidays of 2016, and during a previous holiday spent in France, he had been physically and psychologically abused by his stepfather, T.R. who had slapped him in the face and shouted at him (see paragraphs 9 and 14 above).

51. The Government, for their part, asserted that there was no evidence to support the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment and that, in any event, the alleged treatment did not reach the threshold of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.

52. The Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether the alleged slap falls to be examined under Article 3 or Article 8 of the Convention, as the present case is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

53. However, at this juncture, the Court must emphasise once more that there can be no compromise in condemning violence against children, whether accepted as “tradition” or disguised as “discipline”; assuring basic dignity to the child means that no act of violence against him or her is to be tolerated (see, mutatis mutandis, D.M.D. v. Romania, cited above, § 50, as well as the relevant international standards concerning domestic abuse against children, paragraph 40 above).

54. Turning back to the present case, at the very outset, the Court has to satisfy itself that the applicant’s claims as to the alleged ill-treatment inflicted upon him were based on arguable grounds (see in respect of Article 3 of the Convention, X. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 184; similarly, a certain level of substantiation is required under Article 8 to bring into play the State’s positive obligation to apply the legal framework affording protection against acts of violence or abuse, see for instance F.O. v. Croatia, cited above, §§ 9 and 60).

55. In that connection, the Court notes that there is no medical evidence in the case – neither in the domestic proceedings, nor in the material before it – to support the veracity of the allegations concerning the physical abuse allegedly perpetrated against the applicant.

56. The Court also notes that the present case differs from the cases it has already examined on the issue of physical (domestic) violence between private persons, in which at least some medical or clinical evidence had been submitted in support of the applicant’s allegations of physical abuse; that evidence contributed significantly to the conclusion that the allegations which, unlike those in the present case, concerned instances of repeated and/or more severe forms of ill-treatment, were arguable and hence in the circumstances of the case, sufficient to render the alleged ill-treatment serious enough so as to reach the threshold of severity required for Article 3 of the Convention (see for instance Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564/11, §§ 53, 28 May 2013; M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161/13, §§ 134-35, ECHR 2015 (extracts); and A.P. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 41086/12, § 31, 26 October 2021). Similarly, in a case concerning an isolated act of physical violence by an adult against a minor, the Court considered, on the basis of the medical evidence and witness statements given in that case, that there was sufficient substantiation of the applicant’s allegations so as to trigger the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Remetin, cited above, § 92).

57. At the same time, in another case the Court has held that the applicant’s allegations of having been sexually abused by her father fell without a doubt within the scope of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, despite the lack of any medical evidence or conclusive psychological evaluations of the victim (see R.B. v. Estonia, no. 22597/16, §§ 9, 12, 15 and 85, 22 June 2021), having regard to the fundamental values and essential aspects of private life which were at stake.

58. The Court considers it important to point out that in cases such as the present one, involving allegations of isolated acts of domestic violence, in particular one-off occurrences involving a slap in the applicant’s face, perpetrated by one of the family members in the close family circle, the evidentiary opportunities available to the alleged victim may not be as straight-forward as in cases revealing situations of protracted psychological and/or physical abuse against the minor victim, in respect of which the clinical and psychological identification of the harm may be easier to trace and substantiate in time. Indeed, the Court has already underlined that the issue of domestic violence, which can take various forms ranging from physical to psychological violence or verbal abuse, is a general problem which does not always surface since it often takes place within personal relationships or closed circuits, children being often casualties of the phenomenon, whether directly or indirectly (see, mutatis mutandis, Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, § 132, ECHR 2009).

59. Turning, however, to the arguability of the applicant’s allegations that he was slapped by T.R., the Court observes that the applicant’s father, acting as his representative, reported the incident of the 2016 winter holidays to the police authorities six weeks after (see paragraphs 5-6 and 8 above). During the interview with the police that took place many months later, the applicant stated that his stepfather had slapped him in the face and mentioned another previous instance of domestic violence (see paragraph 14 above). Such allegations, however, were unsupported by any evidence on file; on the contrary, they were firmly contradicted by the testimonial evidence further taken in the case (see paragraphs 13 and 18-20 above).

60. The applicant repeated the incriminating allegations before various authorities, in particular psychologists, who concluded that he suffered from feelings of anguish, rejection and isolation (see paragraphs 30 and 32 above), without, however, linking those feelings with any particular incident, whether violent or not, but rather to the overall conflictual situation existing between the parents after divorce (see in particular paragraph 34 in fine and 35 above; and contrast F.O. v. Croatia, cited above, §§ 9 and 60, in which evidence from a medical practitioner and a psychologist showed that the applicant’s emotional disturbance was related to the insults to which he had been subjected by a teacher).

61. To conclude, the Court finds that the domestic authorities took a number of steps to verify the applicant’s allegations. On the basis of the adduced evidence, they had considered that the veracity of such allegations could not be confirmed (see paragraphs 23, 24, 26 and 29 above).

62. The Court reiterates that it is not its task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic authorities, and in particular the courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see, among many authorities, Radomilja and others, § 150). Even if the Court does not discern cogent elements in the case to lead it to depart from the findings reached by the domestic courts, it must nevertheless underline that its task is not to assess whether the alleged acts have actually taken place but whether, on the basis of the material in the file and its relevant case-law, the applicant’s allegations may be considered as arguable.

63. The Court considers that, in spite of the applicant’s repeated statements referring to alleged slap inflicted by T.R., those allegations have not been corroborated with any other relevant evidence (see paragraph 61 above) sufficient to render them arguable for the purposes of either Article 3 or Article 8 of the Convention.

64. Consequently, no procedural obligations of the domestic authorities (whether under Article 3 or under Article 8) were triggered.

65. It follows that the applicant’s complaints are manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 December 2022.

Ilse Freiwirth Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer
Deputy Registrar President