K.I. proti Francii

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF K.I. v. FRANCE

(Application no. 5560/19)

JUDGMENT

Art 3 (procedural limb) • Order for deportation to Russia of Russian national of Chechen origin after refugee status revoked on grounds of terrorism conviction • Failure by authorities to take into consideration fact that applicant remained refugee and that non‑refoulement principle was applicable • No comprehensive ex nunc assessment of risks faced on his return in light of his being refugee and belonging to targeted group.

STRASBOURG

15 April 2021

FINAL

15/07/2021

This judgment has become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of K.I. v. France,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Síofra O’Leary, President,
Mārtiņš Mits,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Lado Chanturia,
Mattias Guyomar, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar;

Having regard to:

the application (no. 5560/19) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr K.I. (“the applicant”), on 25 January 2019;

the decision to give notice of the application to the French Government (“the Government”);

the decision not to give notice of the present application to the Russian Federation having regard to the Court’s findings in I v. Sweden (no. 61204/09, §§ 40‑46, 5 September 2013);

the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;

the decision to indicate an interim measure to the respondent Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;

the parties’ observations;​

Having deliberated in private on 15 April 2021,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The present application was lodged by a Russian national of Chechen origin who had been granted refugee status. Following the withdrawal of this status on account of a criminal conviction for acts of terrorism and the serious threat to French society represented by his presence in France, it was decided to deport him to Russia. The applicant alleged that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention if the measure were to be enforced.

THE FACTS

2. The applicant, a Russian national of Chechen origin, was born in 1994 and lives in Strasbourg. He is represented by Mr F. Zind, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg.

3. The French Government were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Alabrune, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

1. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
   1. Events in the Russian Federation as presented by the applicant
      1. Background to applicant’s departure from his country of origin

4. The applicant stated that his father, who was now deceased, had been an active fighter in the Chechen guerrilla movement during the first war from 1994 to 1996.

5. In the applicant’s submission, he was arrested on 20 November 2010 on the pretext of having witnessed an armed robbery. He was taken to a police station, where he was held in custody and beaten on the hand and jaw with an iron bar by two members of the operations / research division of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate General for the Southern Federal Region (ORB), who were guarding him, and he still bears the scars. The applicant was asked to infiltrate the rebels in order to pass on information to the authorities and was told that, if he failed to do so, violence would be used against his family. Despite these threats, the applicant did not make contact with the rebels and was forced to stop going to school.

6. In May 2011 he was arrested a second time by members of the ORB, then taken to a barracks where he was interrogated about his infiltration into the rebel movement, while being insulted and beaten up. Upon his release, his family hid him and obtained a Russian “external passport” in his name to enable him to flee. This type of passport is an identity document which allows Russian citizens to leave the country and travel abroad, as opposed to the “internal passport” which is an identity document allowing Russian citizens to travel within Russia.

7. On the day before he was to flee the country, the applicant was arrested for a third time, taken into custody, assaulted and threatened with death. He was released on the condition that he would cooperate with the authorities.

8. According to the applicant, a medical certificate was drawn up in France attesting to the physical consequences of the ill-treatment he had suffered in connection with his three arrests.

9. The applicant fled his country of origin in 2011. Before arriving in France, he transited through Poland where he left his Russian “external passport”.

10. On arriving in France the applicant was granted refugee status through a procedure described below.

2. Fears and threats alleged to remain extant in spite of the applicant’s departure

11. In subsequent proceedings before the French courts concerning the revocation of his refugee status (see paragraphs 31 and 53 below) and the assessment of the risk he would face if returned to Russia (see paragraph 48 below), the applicant stated that the threats directed against him at the time had not ended with his departure. According to him, several members of his family were confronted by the Russian police, who were still actively interested in him. He relied on an initial witness statement attached to his application form. The witness stated that after the applicant had left Russia in 2011, the law-enforcement authorities had come to his home to obtain evidence of his presence in Europe. The witness had given them the applicant’s telephone number, confirming that he was in France.

12. The Government disputed those assertions. They observed that the applicant had not provided sufficient proof of the witness’ identity and that the statement had been undated. The Government further noted that, although the applicant had indeed mentioned the events to which the witness had testified, during his interview by videolink on 19 May 2015 with an official of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in connection with the revocation of his refugee status (see paragraph 27 below), his statements had remained very imprecise. Lastly, the Government noted that although the applicant had mentioned that members of the Russian prosecutor’s office had contacted him by telephone in France and had attempted to talk to him via Skype in mid-2012 (see paragraph 27 below), he had not mentioned any attempt to contact him since then.

13. The applicant maintained that he still belonged to a targeted group because of his family ties to Chechen fighters and his refusal to collaborate with the authorities. He also pointed out that he hailed from a region of Chechnya on the border with Ingushetia and belonged to a “teip” (clan) notorious for being a hotbed of rebel movements against the current regime. In testimony dated 7 March 2019, it was stated that the “teip” to which the applicant belonged was called “melhi” or “mialki” and that it was an opponent of the regime in Chechnya. A “teip” is based on a family group whose members are connected by blood but also by economic ties.

14. The Government contested the applicant’s assertions, stating that he had not established the reality of the risks that he claimed to be facing on account of his family’s past links with the rebels and his refusal to collaborate with the Chechen authorities.

2. Events in France
   1. Events occurring before application was lodged

(a) Grant of refugee status to applicant

15. The applicant arrived in France in August 2011 at the age of 17.

16. He filed an asylum application on 13 March 2012 and was interviewed by a protection officer on 21 June 2012. The purpose of this kind of interview is to allow the asylum-seeker to fully explain the reasons for his or her application, to supplement or rectify his or her written account and to clarify any grey areas.

17. On 31 January 2013 the OFPRA granted the applicant refugee status on account of his family ties to individuals who had supported Chechen separatists and his refusal to cooperate with the authorities. In the applicant’s submission, this recognition of his refugee status meant that the events which had caused him to flee Chechnya had been established.

18. The Government noted that it could be seen from the record of the interview of 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 16 above) that the applicant had provided very little explanation of the steps taken by his family to obtain a Russian “external passport”, particularly in view of the surveillance to which he had allegedly been subjected. On this point, the Government also referred to a subsequent interview with an OFPRA official on 19 May 2015 in the context of the revocation procedure (see paragraph 27 below). Furthermore, in its decision the OFPRA had noted that “the individual [had] stated that he himself had no links with militants and had not taken part in any action in support of the separatists” and that “he [had] not provide[d] consistent or substantiated explanations as to why he was specifically targeted”. However, the OFPRA took the view that the reasons put forward by the applicant to justify the alleged persecution could be considered established since “he [had] nevertheless expressed himself in a clear and comprehensive manner as to the arguments put forward by law-enforcement officers to justify each arrest ... and [had given] details about alleged exchanges with his captors”.

19. The applicant was granted a residence permit, which was valid from 14 May 2013 to 13 May 2023.

(b) The applicant’s conviction in France

(i) Reasons for his conviction

20. A little over nine months after obtaining refugee status, the applicant was arrested on 19 November 2013 by the French authorities on the basis of a warrant issued in an investigation into a criminal conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism. On 23 November 2013 he was placed under judicial investigation with four compatriots and remanded in custody. He was accused in particular of having travelled to a combat zone in Syria for the purpose of undergoing military training in the handling of military weapons and of having fought as a member of a jihadist group composed of Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush fighters.

21. On 16 April 2015 the Paris Criminal Court sentenced K.I. to five years’ imprisonment for participation in a criminal conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism in France, and also in Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Turkey and Syria, between 1 September 2012 and 19 November 2013, by preparing and organising his departure together with an accomplice to the combat zone in Syria, with the help of their various contacts, and by travelling to that destination. The judgment recorded that the applicant’s arrest on his return from Syria had been made possible by the interception of telephone conversations relating to a terrorist conspiracy. The Criminal Court also established that the applicant had planned to travel to Syria from March 2013 onwards, together with an accomplice who belonged to an organised Chechen network which arranged passage to Syria. The court found that the applicant had left France at the beginning of August 2013 to go to a combat zone in Syria, where he had remained from 10 or 11 August to 20 or 25 September 2013. The judgment also found that in order to travel to Syria the applicant had passed through Germany, Poland (where he obtained his Russian “external passport”), Ukraine and Turkey.

22. The Government observed that it could be seen from the judgment that the applicant had used his Russian “external passport”, which had been issued to him by the Russian authorities on 13 July 2011, to travel to Turkey and then to Syria. They also noted that the applicant had gone to Syria with one of his compatriots whom he had met in Chechnya in 2011, having renewed contact with him in France via social media. The Government further pointed out that according to the case file the applicant had planned his departure from France to Syria after his interview with the OFPRA officer on 21 June 2012 but before his refugee status had been granted. They noted that the Criminal Court had sentenced the applicant’s accomplice to imprisonment in absentia and had issued a warrant for his arrest. The judgment also mentioned that the accomplice’s father had helped him leave the combat zone and return to Chechnya, where he was still to be found at the time of that judgment.

(ii) Alleged consequences of French judgment in Russia

23. The applicant submitted that after the publication of the 16 April 2015 judgment against him, the Russian authorities had renewed their pressure on members of his family who still lived in Chechnya. In that connection he produced two letters that had allegedly been written by a member of his family (see paragraphs 46 and 49 below) and a newspaper article (see paragraph 51 below).

(iii) Consequences of criminal conviction in France: withdrawal of the applicant’s refugee status and order for his deportation

24. Following the applicant’s conviction, the OFPRA considered revoking the applicant’s refugee status pursuant to Article L. 711-6 2o of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum (the “Immigration and Asylum Code” – see paragraph 56 below). On 19 May 2015 an OFPRA protection officer consequently interviewed the applicant. This interview was conducted by videolink as the applicant was in prison. The applicant was also invited to submit written observations. The relevant extracts from the record of the interview are as follows:

“Question (‘Q’): When was your Russian domestic passport returned to you by your family?

Answer (‘A’): When I was asked to present the original documents to the OFPRA, I asked my family to send it by post ..., after that my relatives got in touch with the ROVD [the District Law-Enforcement Directorate] and were able to purchase my domestic passport for 300 dollars.

Q: When did they get it?

A: Summer of 2013.

Q: What did you need your domestic passport for as you had an external passport?

A: I had applied for this passport six months before receiving it in order to present it to the OFPRA, after which I had no further use for it, but I kept it.

...

Q: Didn’t your relatives ... have any problems getting your documents from the ROVD, even for money?

A: You can get anything with money in Chechnya.

Q: Even when you are considered persona non grata?

A: It’s not difficult, my [relatives] contacted an acquaintance who knew the head of the ROVD ... who was able to recover my passport because he was no longer in the ROVD.

...

Q: What are your current fears in the event of your return ... ?

A: I was arrested several times, I was threatened, I was asked to collaborate, I ran away, that’s why I can’t go back.

Q: What news have you had about this from your family there?

A: Relatives tell me that there is still surveillance, people come to ask questions.

Q: People?

A: They don’t introduce themselves but they wear civilian clothes; when I arrived in France, I was contacted by the public prosecutor’s office.

Q: Which prosecutor’s office?

A: Russian, they said they were employees of the public prosecutor’s office.

Q: They came to France?

A: They were able to get my French number and that’s how they contacted me.

Q: When?

A: When I arrived in 2011.

Q: And since then?

A: Mid-2012 they asked me to go with them and to talk via Skype.

Q: About what?

A: I don’t know, I didn’t get in touch.

...

Q: Have you had any political, associative or religious involvement in the Chechen community in France?

A: No, I don’t know many people, I don’t have many contacts and I’ve only been here a short time.

Q: Do you still have contacts with Chechnya?

A: With my relatives, yes, by phone.

Q: Any contact with the Russian, Chechen authorities?

A: No, no contact.”

25. On 18 November 2015 the prefect of Essonne issued a deportation order against the applicant on the basis of the serious threat that K.I. represented for public safety (see paragraph 24 above) and further set directions as to the destination country.

26. On 14 January 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Versailles Administrative Court seeking to have the deportation order of 18 November 2015 set aside (see paragraph 25 above).

27. On 23 June 2016 the OFPRA revoked K.I.’s refugee status under Article L. 711-6 2o of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 below) on the grounds that he had been convicted with final effect in France for a terrorism offence and that his presence in France constituted a serious threat to society. The OFPRA found, in particular, that it was clear from the reasoning of the judgment of 16 April 2015 that, between 1 September 2012 and 19 November 2013, the applicant had participated, via a transnational network linked to the Chechen Islamist movement with branches in several European countries and in France, in fundraising for militant groups in Syria, and that, once he had arrived in that country, he had been supported, armed and trained. The OFPRA also found that he had taken up arms in the context of a radical religious commitment described by the applicant as “Salafist”. The applicant submitted that it could be seen from the record of his OFPRA interview on 19 May 2015 (see paragraph 24 above) that he had not been asked about his beliefs, his state of mind, any possible regrets or his religious practice.

28. On 14 December 2016 K.I. lodged an appeal with the National Asylum Court (CNDA), seeking the setting-aside of the OFPRA’s decision of 23 June 2016 (see paragraph 27 above). In its defence, the OFPRA submitted that this appeal should be dismissed. It argued, primarily, that the exclusion clause provided for in Article 1F (a) of the Geneva Convention should be applied to the applicant on the grounds that the actions attributable to the armed group that he had joined in Syria, at the time of the military offensive known as “operation coastal liberation” in August 2013, were comparable to crimes against humanity and war crimes, and that the acts of terrorism for which he had been convicted in France could be characterised as acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations within the meaning of paragraph (c) of Article 1F. In the alternative, the OFPRA argued that his presence in France constituted a serious threat to State security and to society within the meaning of Article L. 711-6 2o of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 below).

29. In a judgment of 7 March 2017, the Versailles Administrative Court set aside the decision specifying Russia as the country of destination (see paragraph 25 above) on the grounds, firstly, that it contained insufficient reasoning, particularly with regard to the risks of inhuman or degrading treatment to which the applicant could be exposed if he were returned to his country of origin and, secondly, that the applicant, who still had refugee status at the date of the impugned decision, could not therefore be legally removed to Russia.

30. Since his release from prison on 11 December 2017, the applicant has been placed under a compulsory residence order. According to him, he has been obliged to report to the police station three times a day.

31. On 11 January 2019 the CNDA confirmed the OFPRA’s decision to revoke the applicant’s protection (see paragraph 27 above). The CNDA ruled on the application of Article L. 711-6 2o of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 below). In particular, it found as follows:

“...

8. ... the Director General of the OFPRA revoked [the applicant’s] refugee status by a decision dated 23 June 2016. ... [This] decision also notes that it is clear from the reasoning of the judgment that the applicant had, during the period covered by the charges, taken part, within a transnational network linked to the Chechen Islamist movement, with branches in several European countries, in particular Poland and Belgium, and at several points in France, in fundraising for groups fighting in Syria, in particular Jaish Al-Muhajreen Wal Ansar (‘the army of emigrants and supporters’). Part of the funds collected were intended to finance his own departure for Syria in the company of another defendant ... which took place on 10 or 11 August 2013, and was facilitated by the same network, following meticulous and prolonged preparations ...

9. At the hearing, which was held in camera, [the applicant], while acknowledging that he had travelled to Syria in August 2013, maintained that it had been for humanitarian purposes. He acknowledged that he had gone to Poland to recover his passport, which he had left there before travelling to France in August 2011 to apply for asylum when he was seventeen years old. Without explaining in detail which Polish office he had gone to in order to obtain this document, he told the court that he had needed his passport in order to travel to Turkey and from there to Syria and to be able to move more freely. He then made confusing and insincere statements about the conditions of his entry into Syrian territory to join the Ansar Al Sham group, composed of Chechen, Dagestani and Ingush fighters, which was part of the jihadist conglomeration operating in Syria at the time and led by Aslan Alievitch Sigaouri, known as Djambulat or Khalid-Chechen. In the course of the judicial proceedings, the applicant stated that it was the same Djambulat who had picked him up at the Turkish-Syrian border. He confirmed his links with the Chechen leader, as he had already stated during his judicial hearings, indicating in particular that Djambulat knew the father of the other young jihadist accompanying him, as they came from the same village. [The applicant] thus stated that he had been easily accepted by the other fighters as a result. ...

10. Secondly, in addition to the seriousness of the offences constituting acts of terrorism, as highlighted by [the applicant’s] criminal conviction handed down in France after he had been recognised as a refugee, the regrets he expressed about those misdeeds appeared to be spurious, since, as already stated, he had attempted to conceal both the real circumstances that had led to his departure for Syria and the activities in which he had engaged after his arrival there. The criminal judgment in his file thus clearly highlights the ideological motivations behind his journey and, in particular, his desire to wage armed jihad. During the court proceedings, his aunt also indicated that he had begun to radicalise his religious practice a year after his arrival in France and that he was taking Arabic lessons several times a day ...

Consequently, the nature and seriousness of the acts for which he was convicted and all the elements relating to his career since his arrival in France lead to the conclusion that his presence now constitutes a serious threat to society within the meaning of Article L. 711-6, 2o of the Immigration and Asylum Code. Consequently, [the applicant] cannot validly argue that the Director General of the OFPRA wrongly revoked his refugee status pursuant to the provisions of Article L. 711-6, 2o of the above-mentioned Immigration and Asylum Code or request, as a result, that he continue to be recognised as a refugee ...”

2. Events occurring after the application was lodged with the Court

32. On 25 January 2019 the applicant asked the Court to indicate an interim measure, under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, to stop the French Government from deporting him to Russia.

33. On 28 January 2019 the duty judge decided to grant the applicant’s request for an interim measure on a temporary basis until 4 February 2019 and to ask the Government, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (a), to provide information. This information related to whether there was a new decision determining the destination country, to the timetable for his removal to Russia and to the consideration by the domestic authorities of the risks of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of his return to his country of origin.

34. On 28 January 2019, while still under a compulsory residence order, the applicant was arrested. The prefect of Seine-Maritime issued an order for his placement in the Lille Lesquin administrative detention centre in order to ensure the enforcement of the deportation order. The applicant was notified of this order at 9.15 a.m. He was placed in a “terrorism” wing in the centre.

35. On the same day, the prefect of Seine-Maritime wrote to the Russian ambassador in France to request that a consular laissez-passer be issued to the applicant. In this letter, she pointed out that the embassy had already been sent a request on 26 October 2017, by the prefect of Meurthe-et-Moselle, to identify the person concerned, together with a comprehensive file.

36. On 30 January 2019 the Government replied to the duty judge’s request for information. They stated that, in the absence of a decision on the country of destination, it was legally impossible to remove the applicant. The risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention would be assessed by the domestic authorities when adopting the decision and that, in any event, it would be possible to bring proceedings in the Administrative Court to seek interim relief or to have the decision set aside. The applicant, to whom this information was notified, emphasised that his removal had necessarily been scheduled, as placement in administrative detention was only possible under the first paragraph of Article L. 554-1 of the Immigration and Asylum Code “for the duration strictly necessary [for] departure”. He also pointed out that an appeal against a decision determining the country of destination did not have suspensive effect (see paragraph 69 below).

37. On 30 January 2019 the Liberties and Detention Judge of the Lille tribunal de grande instance ordered the extension of the applicant’s detention for a period of twenty-eight days and the order was upheld by the Douai Court of Appeal on 1 February 2019.

38. On 4 February 2019 the Court’s duty judge decided to discontinue the application of Rule 39, in the light of the information supplied by the parties (see paragraph 36 above), and informed the applicant that his request was premature because there was no enforceable decision on his removal, the deportation order not yet being accompanied by directions as to the destination country.

39. On 25 February 2019 the prefect of Seine-Maritime set directions determining the Russian Federation as the destination country, or any country to which the applicant would be legally admitted. The decision stated that the applicant had claimed that he did not wish to return to Russia because his life was in danger there, but that he had not provided any evidence to establish that he faced a real and serious personal risk of being exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

40. On 27 February 2019 the applicant filed a fresh request for an interim measure with the Court. On the same day, the duty judge decided to temporarily apply Rule 39 again, up to and including 8 March 2019.

41. On 1 March 2019 the urgent applications judge of the Lille Administrative Court dismissed an urgent application lodged by the applicant on 27 February 2019, under Article L. 521-2 of the Code of Administrative Justice (urgent applications for the protection of a fundamental freedom), seeking a stay of execution of the order of 25 February 2019 (see paragraph 39 above). The urgent applications judge held that the condition of urgency had not been met in so far as the Court had indicated to the Government that the applicant should not be removed before 8 March 2019. The judge added that, in any event, the Russian consulate had not yet issued a consular laissez-passer for the purposes of enforcing his removal.

42. On 5 March 2019 the Government replied to the duty judge’s request for information. They stated that the applicant’s request for interim measures was premature in that, despite the country of destination being determined by the order of 25 February 2019 (see paragraph 39 above), the Russian authorities had not yet agreed to readmit the applicant to their country.

43. In an email of 7 March 2019, which was forwarded to the Court by the applicant, one of his relatives alerted his lawyer to the fact that members of his family had been summoned the previous day by the authorities to the Grozny police station, where officers of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) had questioned them about his whereabouts. The officers had apparently explained their presence by the fact that the French authorities had asked their Russian counterparts to “fetch” the applicant. The Government noted that the applicant had not shown that he was connected to the author of the email and had not provided any information about his or her identity.

44. On 8 March 2019, in the light of the information provided by the parties, the duty judge decided to extend the application of Rule 39 while the application was being examined by the Court.

45. On 21 March 2019 the legal aid board of the Conseil d’État awarded legal aid to the applicant in connection with his appeal against the CNDA’s decision of 11 January 2019 concerning the revocation of his refugee status (see paragraph 31 above).

46. According to a witness statement written by a member of his family and appended by the applicant to the application form received by the Court on 28 March 2019, Chechen law-enforcement officers had visited the witness’s home on several occasions since the applicant’s conviction in France in order to inquire about his possible return to Chechnya (see paragraph 23 above). The Government noted that the letter was undated and that the applicant had not shown any connection to its author.

47. On 30 April 2019 the Liberties and Detention Judge of the Paris tribunal de grande instance extended the applicant’s administrative detention for a further month. The judge found that the Russian consular authorities had recognised the applicant as one of their nationals, that a consular laissez-passer had been issued to him for the period from 12 April to 12 May 2019 and that the prefecture had, on 24 April 2019, requested a flight to the Russian Federation for 11 May 2019 at the latest.

48. On 16 May 2019 the Lille Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the directions of 25 February 2019 specifying Russia as the destination country (see paragraph 39 above) on the following grounds:

“6. ... However, [the applicant’s] refugee status was revoked by a decision of the same office dated 23 June 2016, confirmed by a decision of the National Asylum Court on 11 January 2019. [The applicant] was convicted by the Paris Criminal Court for acts committed as a result of his involvement with and support for a group of Chechen Islamist fighters in Syria.

7. It is for the applicant to adduce evidence to show that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to his country. ...

8. In the present case, [the applicant] entered France in 2011 and he no longer appears to have – and thus has not demonstrated – links with persons belonging to a group considered to be at risk in Chechnya. However, the report of the Swiss refugee aid organisation of 13 May 2016 on the human rights situation in Chechnya shows that individuals who have a link with insurgents, even if it goes back a long time, are considered to be at risk, that persons who are returned to Chechnya face an acute risk if they have previously been convicted there – which is not the case of the applicant – and that, lastly, Salafism is prohibited and persons linked to the Islamic State, acting on Chechen territory, are particularly liable to arrest. However, a more recent report of August 2018 by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) notes that those returning from Syria are monitored on their return by the Russian authorities but that the Chechen authorities have set up reception programmes for women and children but also for some fighters repatriated from Syria.

9. [The applicant], in order to show the real and personal risks he would face in the event of his return, confines himself to producing the testimony of a person whom he presents as his grandmother, but without proving that family relationship. He has also appended an email from a person he claims to be his cousin, but whose identity he has not proven, reporting what his grandmother and his aunt said. Moreover, these testimonies only attest to the fact that the Russian intelligence services had enquired about the applicant’s return. However, there is no evidence that the applicant, who used his Russian passport to reach Turkey and the Syrian combat zone, is wanted or has been charged in his country. It follows from the foregoing that, while it is possible that [the applicant] has been identified as being part of a group that is under surveillance in his country, he has not demonstrated, in the proceedings to date, that he would be subjected to ill-treatment of a real and personal nature if he is returned to that country. Consequently, the ground of appeal alleging an error of assessment must be rejected. Similarly, it does not follow from the foregoing, nor from the terms of the decision, that the administrative authority did not carry out a thorough examination of the applicant’s personal situation ...”

49. In a second statement (see paragraph 23 above) sent by the applicant to the Court on 3 January 2020, the witness in question claimed that since the applicant had been imprisoned in France, ORB agents working for the regime in Chechnya had visited his home. In this regard, he stated that in 2014-15 two police officers had come to his home to ask him questions about the applicant. They had allegedly accused the witness of complicity in terrorism for having sent money to the applicant in October 2013 and had threatened him with prosecution on that account. The witness further stated that around June 2017, six months before the applicant’s release, two police officers had come to his home to inform him that his extradition would be requested. The witness further stated that he and a relative had been summoned at the end of February 2019 to the District Security Directorate in the city of Grozny, where an agent of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) had made it clear to them that the applicant would be imprisoned as soon as he arrived on Russian soil. In addition, the Chechen police officers had questioned them about the applicant’s activities since his release from prison, his contacts and his possible plans to return to Russia. The witness also reported that a Chechen who had refugee status in Germany and who was allegedly one of the applicant’s friends had been arrested and imprisoned as soon as he arrived in Russia after going there to get married.

50. The Government noted that the statement sent to the Court on 3 January 2020 was undated.

51. The applicant also produced a newspaper article reporting on his friend’s trial (see paragraph 49 above) and stating that his confession had been obtained under torture. The Government noted that the newspaper article did not mention that other persons had been involved and that the applicant had not provided any explanation about his connection with the person whom he presented as one of his friends (see paragraph 49 above).

52. On 26 May 2020 the prefect of Dordogne issued a compulsory residence order against the applicant with a requirement to report to the police station three times a day.

53. On 29 July 2020 the Conseil d’État, under Article L. 822‑1 of the Code of Administrative Justice (see paragraph 70 below) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the CNDA of 11 January 2019 upholding the OFPRA’s decision to revoke his refugee status (see paragraph 31 above). In seeking to have that decision set aside, the applicant had alleged that it was vitiated by an initial error of law in so far as the CNDA had relied on the provisions of Article L. 711-6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, which incorrectly transposed Directive 2011/95/EU (see paragraph 73 below) “by equating the loss of refugee status with the fact of no longer being a refugee”, and by a second error of law in so far as the CNDA had ruled that the application of Article L. 711-6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code meant both that his refugee status was withdrawn and that he was no longer a refugee (see in this connection the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) cited in paragraphs 74 to 76 below and that of the Conseil d’État cited in paragraphs 61 and 62 below). In his submissions in respect of the decision of 29 July 2020, the public rapporteur before the Conseil d’État stated the following on the relevant ground of appeal:

“Contrary to what is maintained in the additional observations, the court did not fail in its judicial duty or commit an error of law with regard to this case-law, which only prohibits it, when it hears an appeal against a measure revoking refugee status taken on the basis of Article L. 711-6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, from automatically deciding that the applicant is no longer a refugee on the basis of Article L. 711-4 of the same Code. That is not what it did, although the OFPRA had asked it to do so. Although in its reasoning it awkwardly states, in fine, that [the applicant] is not justified in asking that he should still be regarded as a refugee, this is a defect that is not repeated either under the other grounds, which do not mention Article L. 711-4 at any point, or in the operative part, which simply rejects the appeal. The applicant can rest assured that he is still a refugee, and this observation remains valid without it being necessary to allow the appeal.”

54. The Government explained that the applicant, who was still under a compulsory residence order, had been granted accommodation and financial support by the State.

55. The applicant alleged that he only had two close relatives still in Chechnya and that the male members of his family had either died or were beneficiaries of international protection in Europe.

2. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
   1. DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
      1. Domestic law on cessation of refugee status under Article L. 711‑6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code

(a) Legislation

56. The Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 24 above), as then applicable, read as follows:

Article L. 513-2

“Where a deportation or removal order is in force against an alien, directions shall be given for his or her removal:

1 To a country of which he or she is a national, save where the French authority for the protection of refugees and stateless persons or the National Asylum Court has granted him or her refugee status or subsidiary protection, or where his or her asylum application is still pending;

2 Or, pursuant to a European Communities or bilateral readmission agreement or arrangement, to the country which has issued the alien with a currently valid travel document;

3 Or, with the alien’s agreement, to any country to which he or she may be legally admitted.

An alien may not be removed to a country if he or she has shown that his or her life or freedom would be threatened there, or that he or she would be exposed there to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950.”

Article L. 711-1

“Recognition as a refugee shall be accorded to any person who is persecuted on account of his or her activities in furtherance of freedom and to any person in respect of whom the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees exercises its mandate under the terms of Articles 6 and 7 of its Statute as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1950, or who meets the criteria laid down in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees. Such persons shall be governed by the applicable provisions concerning refugees laid down in the above-mentioned Geneva Convention.”

Article L. 711-4

“...

The authority [for the protection of refugees and stateless persons] may also revoke refugee status, at any time, of its own motion or at the request of the administrative authorities, where:

...

3 The refugee must, in view of circumstances arising after this status was granted, be excluded from such status pursuant to Article 1D, 1E or 1F of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951, cited above.”

Article L. 711-6

“A person’s refugee status may be denied or revoked:

1 Where there are serious reasons for considering that the person’s presence in France constitutes a serious threat to the security of the country;

2 The person concerned has been convicted in France by a final judgment of a serious crime [crime], or for a lesser offence [délit] constituting an act of terrorism or punishable by ten years’ imprisonment, and his or her presence constitutes a serious threat to society.”

57. Under Article L. 724‑1 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, the OFPRA informs in writing the person in respect of whom it envisages revoking refugee status pursuant to Article L. 711‑6 of that Code and sets out the grounds for initiating that procedure. In a judgment of 19 June 2020 (no. 425213), the Conseil d’État decided that the OFPRA was not required, in the context of the administrative proceedings, to provide the person concerned with all the preparatory documents relating to its decision before withdrawing the refugee status. The person concerned is entitled to submit written observations and the OFPRA may, if it considers it necessary, conduct an interview (Article L. 724‑2 of the Immigration and Asylum Code). The OFPRA’s decision, for which reasons must be given in fact and in law, is notified in writing to the person concerned (Article L. 724‑3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code).

58. Under Article L. 731‑2 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, the CNDA examines any appeal lodged against the OFPRA’s decision pursuant to Article L. 711‑6 of the Code. An appeal must be lodged within one month from the notification of the OFPRA’s decision.

59. In a judgment of 19 June 2020 (no. 425213), the Conseil d’État held that it was the role of the CNDA not to assess the legality of the OFPRA’s decision referred to it, but rather to give its own ruling on the person’s right to retain refugee status in the light of all the factual circumstances known to the court at the time of its ruling.

60. The CNDA’s decision may be appealed against on points of law to the Conseil d’État. The one-month time-limit for that purpose shall run from the time of the notification of the CNDA’s decision.

(b) Domestic case-law on the cessation of refugee status

(i) Case-law of the Conseil d’État

61. Under European Union (EU) law, member States may, in certain conditions, revoke the status granted to a refugee by a governmental authority. The consequences of such revocation gave rise to a judgment of 14 May 2019 of the CJEU as set out in paragraph 76 below. In judgment no. 416032 of 19 June 2020 concerning the revocation of refugee status under Article L. 711‑6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, the Conseil d’État, ruling in line with the CJEU’s judgment, found as follows:

“...

6. The provisions of Article L. 711-6 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum must be interpreted in accordance with the objectives of Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011, objectives which secure its transposition in domestic law and seek to ensure, in compliance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol signed in New York on 31 January 1967, that all member States apply common criteria for the identification of persons in need of international protection and that a minimum level of benefits is accorded to such persons in all the member States. It follows from Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of that Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 14 May 2019 in cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17, that the ‘revocation’ of refugee status or the refusal to grant it, as provided in those provisions, cannot have the effect of depriving the third-country national or stateless person concerned, who qualifies as a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention, of his or her recognition as such. Furthermore, Article 14 § 6 of that Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a member State which avails itself of the options provided for in Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of that Directive must grant to a refugee falling within one of the situations referred to in the latter provisions, and who is in the territory of that member State, at least the benefit of the rights and protections enshrined in the Geneva Convention to which Article 14 § 6 expressly refers, in particular the protection against refoulement to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, and any rights under that Convention of which the enjoyment does not require lawful residence.

7. It follows from the foregoing that the provisions of Article L. 711-6 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Aliens and the Right of Asylum only allow the OFPRA to refuse to grant, or to terminate, the legal and administrative protection of a refugee, within the limits laid down by Article 33 § 1 of the Geneva Convention and Article 14 § 6 of the Directive of 13 December 2011, where there are serious reasons for considering that the person’s presence in France constitutes a serious threat to State security or where the person has been convicted in France by a final judgment of either a serious offence [crime] or a lesser offence [délit] constituting an act of terrorism or punishable by ten years’ imprisonment, and where his or her presence constitutes a serious threat to society. The loss of refugee status resulting from the application of Article L. 711-6 will therefore have no bearing on the fact that the person is a refugee, and her or she will continue to be recognised as such in the event that the OFPRA and, where applicable, the Asylum Court, applies Article L. 711-6, within the confines of Article 33 § 1 of the Geneva Convention and Article 14 § 6 of the Directive of 13 December 2011. It follows that there was no error of law in the National Asylum Court’s ruling that Article L. 711-6 of the above-mentioned Code was not intended to add new exclusion clauses and did not, in those circumstances, disregard either the Geneva Convention or the objectives of the Directive of 13 December 2011 ...”

62. In a judgment of 19 June 2020 (no. 428140), the Conseil d’État found that Article L. 711‑6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 above) provided as follows:

“... the possibility of refusing or revoking refugee status, this having no bearing on whether the person concerned is or remains a refugee as long as he or she meets the conditions, must meet two cumulative requirements. It is incumbent upon the OFPRA and, in the event of an appeal, the National Asylum Court, to verify whether the person concerned has been convicted of one of the offences referred to in the above-mentioned provisions and also to assess whether his or her presence on French territory is such as to represent, on the date of their decision, a serious threat to society within the meaning of those provisions, that is whether it is such as to affect one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account the criminal offence committed – which alone cannot legally justify a decision to refuse or revoke refugee status – and the circumstances in which the offence was committed, but also the time that has elapsed and the whole conduct of the person concerned since then, together with any relevant circumstances on the date of the ruling ...”

(ii) Opinions issued by the CNDA under Article L. 731-3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code

63. The CNDA may be called upon under Article L. 731‑3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code to issue an opinion on the maintaining or setting-aside of a deportation or removal order against an applicant who has been deprived of refugee status on the ground that his or her presence in France constitutes a serious threat to the security of the State (Article L. 711‑6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code). Article L. 731-3 of the Code provides as follows:

“The National Asylum Court shall examine applications that are addressed to it by refugees in the event that any of the measures provided for in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees have been taken against them and shall issue an opinion as to the maintaining or setting-aside of the measure. In such matters the application shall suspend the enforcement of the measure concerned. The right to lodge such an application shall be exercised within a period of one week subject to the conditions laid down in a decree after consultation of the Conseil d’État.”

64. An application for an opinion under Article L. 731‑3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code must be lodged with the CNDA within one week from the notification of the measure concerned. The CNDA must deliver a reasoned opinion.

65. In an opinion of 14 February 2020 concerning a decision of 16 January 2020 in which the prefect of Haute-Garonne had decided on the removal of a Russian national to the country of which he was a national or any other State where he would be legally admitted, the CNDA found as follows:

“5. Pursuant to Article L. 711-4 of the said Code, refugee status ends when the person concerned falls under one of the cessation clauses in Article 1C of the Geneva Convention, one of the exclusion clauses in Article 1F, or where recognition of this status has been obtained by fraud. Under paragraph 2 of Article L. 711-6 of the said Code, in the version applied [to the applicant], the ‘refugee status’ of any person convicted by a final judgment in France either for a serious offence [crime] or for a lesser offence [délit] constituting an act of terrorism or punishable by ten years’ imprisonment, and whose presence constitutes a serious threat to society, may be terminated. These provisions were adopted to ensure the transposition into French law of Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011, which provide for the possibility for member States to revoke or refuse refugee status where there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the State in which he or she is present, or where he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that State. Paragraph 6 of the same Article provides that persons to whom paragraphs 4 and 5 apply are entitled to the rights provided for in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention or similar rights, provided they are in the State in question. It follows from the provisions of Article 14, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Grand Chamber judgment of 14 May 2019 (Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C‑78/17), that although the Union is not a party to the Geneva Convention, Article 78 § 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union nonetheless require it to comply with the rules of that Convention. In this connection, Article 2(e) of Directive 2011/95/EU defines ‘refugee status’ as ‘the recognition by a Member State [of a third-country national or a stateless person] as a refugee’. As can be seen from recital 21 of that Directive, such recognition is declaratory and not constitutive of being a refugee for the purposes of Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU and Article 1A of the Geneva Convention. Thus, persons deprived of their refugee status pursuant to Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of Directive 2011/95/EU are, or continue to be, refugees within the meaning of Article 1A (2) of the Geneva Convention and consequently continue to satisfy the material conditions for being a refugee, namely the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin.

6. In the present case it is apparent, in particular, from paragraph 9 of the Court’s above-mentioned decision of 26 July 2019 that the recognition of the [applicant] as a refugee, and thus the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution in the event of his return to the Russian Federation on account of his political opinions, was not disputed by the OFPRA. Before the Court the fact that the applicant was a refugee was not called into question on the basis of one of the cessation clauses provided for in Article 1C of the Geneva Convention, or on the basis of one of the exclusion clauses provided for in Article 1F of that Convention, or on the basis that [his] recognition as a refugee had been obtained by fraud. Thus, [the applicant] is a refugee within the meaning and for the purposes of the afore-mentioned Article L. 731‑3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code ...

13. In the present case, [the applicant] is a refugee who, in that capacity, has demonstrated a well-founded fear of being persecuted for political reasons if he were to return to the Russian Federation, his country of nationality. Thus, the prefect’s decision of 16 January 2020 ..., in so far as it directs that [the applicant] be removed to the country of which he is a national, is at odds with France’s obligations arising from the right to protection of refugees against refoulement, as guaranteed by Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, Articles 4 and 19 § 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950.”

66. In an opinion of 16 December 2020 concerning a decision of 20 October 2020 in which the prefect of Hauts‑de‑Seine decided to remove a Sri Lankan national from France to the country of which he was a national or any other country to which he would be legally admitted, the CNDA found as follows:

“9. Accordingly, although [the applicant’s] refugee status was withdrawn by a decision of the OFPRA that has become final pursuant to Article L. 711-6, 2o, of the Immigration and Asylum Code, this withdrawal has no bearing on the fact that he remains a refugee and continues to enjoy the rights arising therefrom. The OFPRA’s decision of 29 May 2020, which terminated [the applicant’s] refugee status, pointed out his commitment to the Tamil cause within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and indicated that his fears in the event of his return to his country were still present and that there was no need to examine the application of Article L. 711-4, first paragraph, of the Immigration and Asylum Code, relating to the conditions of cessation of international protection, in particular owing to a change in the circumstances on the basis of which protection had been granted. [The applicant] is a refugee who, as such, has a well-founded fear of being persecuted on political grounds if returned to Sri Lanka, his country of nationality. Consequently, the decision of 20 October 2020 by the prefect of Hauts‑de‑Seine, in so far as it directs his removal to his country of nationality, is at odds with France’s obligations arising from the right to protection of refugees against refoulement, as guaranteed by Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, Article 4 and Article 19 § 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 ...”

2. Domestic law on deportation and appeals against a deportation order

67. Deportation (expulsion) is a measure taken by the Minister of the Interior or the prefect by which an alien is ordered to leave France because his or her presence in the country constitutes a serious threat to public order (ordre public), under Article L. 521‑1 of the Immigration and Asylum Code. The competent authority, for the purposes of such order, must establish the existence of a serious threat having regard to the alien’s conduct and the objective risks that he or she represents for public order (Conseil d’État, decision of 7 May 2015, no. 389959).

68. Certain categories of aliens who have particular links with France in principle enjoy a degree of protection from deportation (Article L. 521‑3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code). This protection is removed, however, where the alien’s conduct “is such as to harm the fundamental interests of the State, or is related to acts of terrorism, or expressly and deliberately encourages acts of discrimination, hatred or violence against a given person or group” (same Article).

69. Further details on the deportation procedure, the remedies against a deportation order and the directions as to destination country can be found in paragraphs 39 to 42 of the judgment in A.S. v. France (no. 46240/15, 19 April 2018).

3. Non-admission of appeal on points of law by the Conseil d’État

70. Article L. 822‑1 of the Code on Administrative Courts provided, at the material time, as follows:

“Appeals on points of law to the Conseil d’État must follow the preliminary admission procedure. Admission shall be refused by a court decision if the appeal on points of law is inadmissible or if there is no serious ground of appeal.”

2. EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND CJEU CASE-LAW
   1. European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights

71. The relevant Articles of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”) read as follows:

Article 18

“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.”

Article 19

“...

2. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

2. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

72. Article 78 § 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) reads as follows:

“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.”

3. Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

73. The relevant provisions of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), OJ 2011 L 337 p. 9, read as follows:

Article 14 – Revocation of, ending of or refusal to renew refugee status

“...

4. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the status granted to a refugee by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, when:

(a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present;

(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State.

...

6. Persons to whom paragraphs 4 or 5 apply are entitled to rights set out in or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention in so far as they are present in the Member State.”

4. Relevant CJEU case-law

74. The CJEU has found that, as provided in recital 3 of Directive 2011/95, the Common European Asylum System, encompassing that Directive, is based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and the guarantee that nobody will be sent back to a place where they again risk being persecuted (see, to this effect, the judgments of the CJEU of 21 December 2011 in N. S. and Others, Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraph 75, and of 1 March 2016, Alo, Joined Cases C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 30).

75. In its judgment of 13 September 2018 in Ahmed, C‑369/17, EU:C:2018:713, the CJEU found, at paragraph 51, as follows:

“Like the grounds for exclusion from refugee status, the purpose underlying the grounds for exclusion from subsidiary protection is to exclude from subsidiary protection status persons who are deemed to be undeserving of the protection which that status entails and to maintain the credibility of the Common European Asylum System, which includes both the approximation of rules on the recognition of refugees and the content of refugee status and measures on subsidiary forms of protection, offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection ...”

76. In its Grand Chamber judgment of 14 May 2019 in M (Revocation of refugee status), Joined Cases C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403, the CJEU found in paragraph 92 that the fact of being a “refugee” was not dependent on the formal recognition of that fact through the granting of “refugee status”. It went on to explain in paragraph 94 that member States were precluded from removing, expelling or extraditing a refugee who had lost status under Article 14 § 4 of Directive 2011/95 where there were substantial grounds for believing that he or she would face a genuine risk, in the country of destination, of being subjected to treatment prohibited by Articles 4 and 19 of the Charter. In that eventuality the member State concerned could not derogate from the principle of non-refoulement (paragraph 95). Lastly, the CJEU found in paragraph 99 that where Article 14 § 4 of Directive 2011/95 applied, the third-country nationals concerned would be denied refugee status and thus all the rights and benefits set out in Chapter VII of that Directive, those rights and benefits being associated with that status. However, in so far as they continued to meet the asylum conditions, the people concerned would continue to be refugees and, as explicitly stated in Article 14 § 6 of that Directive, would be entitled to a certain number of rights laid down in the Geneva Convention.

77. That CJEU judgment was delivered two days before the judgment of 16 May 2019 in which the Lille Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order specifying the Russian Federation as his destination country (see paragraph 48 above).

78. In the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 21 June 2018 in M (Revocation of refugee status) – see paragraph 76 above), Joined Cases C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2018:486, Mr Wathelet found that a systematic and teleological reading of Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of Directive 2011/95 (see paragraph 73 above) had led him to consider that the application of those provisions did not amount to the cessation of, or exclusion from, the fact of being a refugee (paragraph 77 of his Opinion).

79. Mr Wathelet developed his reasoning as follows:

“78. ... it is apparent from the general scheme of that directive that the conditions for being a refugee, on the one hand, and the grant or withdrawal of refugee status, on the other, are two distinct concepts.

...

80. Chapter III [entitled ‘Qualification for being a refugee’] includes Articles 11 and 12 of Directive 2011/95, concerning cessation and exclusion, the content of which reproduces Articles 1C and 1F of the Geneva Convention. Those provisions lay down the situations in which a third-country national or a stateless person is not entitled to be a refugee and, consequently, is excluded from the scope of the international protection under that directive and that convention.

81. Those scenarios do not cover situations, such as those at issue in the cases in the main proceedings [C-391/16 and others – see paragraph 76 above], in which a refugee constitutes a danger to the community of the country of refuge because he has committed a particularly serious non-political crime in that country. The grounds for exclusion [in the Geneva Convention] were introduced not with the aim of protecting the security or the community of the country of refuge from the present danger that a refugee may pose, but with the aim of maintaining the integrity of the system for the international protection of refugees and of preventing the benefit of that protection from enabling those who have committed certain serious crimes to escape criminal liability. [NB The first case of exclusion concerns the scenario where there are serious reasons to believe that a third-country national or stateless person has committed a serious non-political offence outside the country of refugee before being admitted there as a refugee, that is, before the date on which the residence permit was issued on the basis of the grant of refugee status; while the second case of exclusion applies where the person has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.]

82. [The] situations [where the refugee represents a threat to the society of the country of refuge because he has committed a particularly serious non-political offence in that country], however, fall within the scope of the exception to the principle of non-refoulement and Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95. That provision is in a separate chapter, namely Chapter IV of that directive, entitled ‘Refugee status’.

...

84. In the second place, attainment of the objectives of Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 also presupposes that, as long as a person qualifies as a refugee, he shall continue to be a refugee and this will not be affected by the revocation of the status granted to him or by the refusal to grant such status.

85. The grounds for cessation of and exclusion from being a refugee are listed exhaustively in Articles 1C to 1F of the Geneva Convention – provisions in respect of which the Contracting States are not authorised to make reservations under Article 42(1) of that convention. Therefore, the introduction of additional grounds for cessation or exclusion in Directive 2011/95 would have undermined the objective of that directive, which is to ensure the full implementation of that convention.

...

132. For the sake of completeness, I would point out that the foregoing conclusion solely concerns the validity of Article 14(4) to (6) of Directive 2011/95, in so far as it introduces the possibility for the Member States to deprive certain refugees of the rights provided for in Chapter VII of that directive, in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and Article 78(1) TFEU. It is only on the validity in abstracto of that possibility in the light of those provisions that the Court is asked to give a ruling in the context of the present references for a preliminary ruling and, therefore, this is what the observations submitted to the Court concerned.”

3. INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
   1. Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees

80. Articles 1 and 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention provide as follows:

Article 1 – Definition of the term “refugee”

“A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who:

(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

...

(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

...”

Article 33 – Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”)

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

81. Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31 and 32 are cited in paragraph 62 of the judgment in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain ([GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 62, 13 February 2020).

2. Council of Europe treaties on terrorism

82. The Court would refer to paragraph 99 of the judgment in A. v. the Netherlands (no. 4900/06, § 99, 20 July 2010).

83. As regards, more specifically, the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, signed in Riga on 22 October 2015 (ETS no. 217), as mentioned in that judgment, it came into force on 1 July 2017 in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 § 2 of the said convention. That Protocol was ratified by France on 12 October 2017 and by the Russian Federation on 24 January 2020.

84. As regards the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism signed in Warsaw on 16 May 2005 (ETS 196), as also cited in the above-mentioned judgment, it was opened for signature by member States, non-member States which participated in its elaboration and the European Union, and for accession by other non-member States. In accordance with Article 23 § 3, it entered into force on 1 June 2007. This convention was ratified by France on 29 April 2008 and by the Russian Federation on 19 May 2006.

3. International documents concerning the situation in the North Caucasus region

85. Reference should be made to the international material enumerated in M.V. and M.T. v. France (no. 17897/09, §§ 23-25, 4 September 2014) and in I.S. v. France ((dec.), no. 54612/16, §§ 29‑31, 12 December 2017).

86. The material mentioned below concerns the developments that have taken place since 2018 and the situation of individuals who have been suspected or convicted of acts of terrorism. It confirms in particular that the situation in the North Caucasus region has remained very unstable on account of persistent conflicts between government forces and armed rebels of the Chechen resistance.

87. The information comes from reports by a number of international or governmental organisations, namely the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS-CEDOCA, Belgium, COI Unit), the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), and Freedom House.

88. In a report of August 2018, “Russian Federation – The Situation for Chechens in Russia”[1], EASO, which is an EU agency set up in 2010 with the role of implementing the Common European Asylum System and to provide expertise on asylum matters, noted as follows:

“7 Reception of Chechens returnees

According to the Russian authorities, in 2016 as many as 150 000 Russians repatriated to the Russian Federation from abroad. The number of either Chechens or people from the Northern Caucasus returning to the Russian Federation in 2017 is unknown.

7.2 Treatment of returnees by authorities

In a report by the German Foreign Office and cited by ACCORD, it is determined that there were in general no indications that Russian authorities systematically target Russian citizens either returning from abroad or applying for asylum. However, some specific social groups and high-profile asylum seekers were targeted and monitored by the authorities. Chechens in general were not targeted, but suspected insurgents are likely to be subject to repression upon return. In the case of voluntary returns, IOM Moscow did not receive any reports from returnees to Chechnya about any kind of problems or conflicts with local authorities upon return to Chechnya, according to information conveyed to DIS in 2014. Some sources however mention possible difficulties that Chechen returnees can encounter, even though there is a difference between non-voluntary and voluntary returnees, the latter who in general did not encounter any problems. Ekkehard Maass, Chairman of the German-Caucasian Society, have explained that the primary fear of Chechens in Germany was to be shipped back to Russia, where they could face violence and ill treatment from the authorities, for example the cases of re-education programmes for women.

Former Islamic State fighters were monitored by the authorities, even though there were no official figures for male returnees. Memorial stated in its 2016 report:

‘Overall, the small stream of “returnees” is still reasonably well monitored by the Russian security services. The number of Russian nationals who have been subject to criminal proceedings as a result of travelling to fight alongside radicalised Muslims is subject to a great deal of uncertainty, ranging from 477 to 800 depending on the officials cited.’

In contrast to neighbouring Dagestan and the Russian hardline policy, the Chechen government and local activists took some steps to rehabilitate children and women returning from Syria and to a limited extent some fighters although the Chechen authorities have been said to use the process to portray themselves as pacifistic and gather intelligence about the Islamic State. The number of returned children and women to Russia was 97 as of February 2018.

In general, the authorities encountered many technical and legal challenges related to the return of these persons, including the identity verification of children born in Syria or Iraq. The rehabilitation and returning process was not without potential risk for returnees from Syria, as they, their relatives or even friends might also be targeted by the Chechen authorities, according to an analysis by International Crisis Group. Nevertheless, with the tentative support from local authorities, a rehabilitation centre is to be built in Grozny to apply a more individual approach to returning women from Syria. However, women returning from Syria were allegedly required to sign a document promising to appear before a court, if charged with any criminal activity. Law enforcement agencies would make informal agreements with relatives and friends that the returnees would not be charged with a crime upon return, but despite these informal agreements there were cases of prosecution.

Since 2015, there have been several high-profile cases of returnees who disappeared after their return to the Russian Federation from Europe or suffered ill treatment or otherwise were considered to be at risk after returning ... Moreover, according to a non-public country report by the German Foreign Office, quoted in a ruling by the Austrian Federal Administrative Court, Chechen returnees could potentially be targeted by the authorities in falsified penal procedures, in order to improve the crime-fighting statistics or the returnees could be suspected of having participated in militant activities.”

89. The CGRS (see paragraph 87 above), an independent Belgian federal body set up to provide protection to people facing a risk of persecution or serious harm on return to their country, has noted as follows[2]:

“This document updates the COI Focus Tsjetsjenië. Veiligheidssituatie of 11 June 2018. Research was focussed on new developments in the period from June 2018 to 15 June 2019.

The research for this report was closed on 15 June 2019.

All sources indicate that since 2009, there have been no widespread and major human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law in Chechnya. However, violence still occurs, but it is more targeted in nature and has a limited impact. All sources mention human rights violations by the Kadyrov regime and attacks by rebels. Violence by state actors primarily targets members of the rebel movement and their relatives, but is not limited to this group. Rebels mainly carry out attacks against members of the security forces.

According to some sources, due to the strong control the regime exerts on society, only a limited amount of information on human rights violations and on the overall situation in Chechnya filters through.

Sources report that the rebel units of the Imarat Kavkaz were side-lined almost completely in 2015 and no longer play a significant role in the region. This is due to actions of the security services as well as to the emergence of IS in the North Caucasus. A number of potential recruits of the rebel movement in Chechnya have left the region in order to join the ranks of ISIS. Rebels who stay in Chechnya are developing a limited structure of independently operating cells under the IS flag. To this day, the activities and the impact of IS units in Chechnya remain limited, but it is not clear how this may evolve in the near future. At the same time, the number of fighters going to the Middle East is decreasing sharply.

According to the sources, the Chechen security forces are under the direct control of Ramzan Kadyrov, which is exceptional in the region, where security forces are usually answerable to the central federal structures. The Chechen security forces commit numerous human rights violations in a climate of impunity. The sources report illegal arrests, fabricated lawsuits, disappearances and abductions, torture during detention, extrajudicial executions and collective retaliatory actions such as burning down the houses of family members of alleged fighters.

Figures about the number of violent incidents and the number of victims are scarce. According to various sources, the available figures are an underestimation but indicate a decrease of the number of victims among the security services, rebels and civilians. Since 2013, this evolution has continued almost without interruption until 2017, when an increase in the number of victims was observed. In 2018, the number of victims among the security forces decreased, while the number of victims among rebels and civilians remained more or less stable.”

90. In a public statement about the Russian Federation, concerning the Chechen Republic and other Republics of the North Caucasus, dated 11 March 2019[3], the CPT noted as follows:

“13. The information gathered by the delegation during the visit [in November / December 2017] suggests that persons suspected of offences related to terrorism and participation in illegal armed groups are at a particularly high risk of being ill-treated, but they were not the only alleged victims ...”

91. The report “Freedom in the World 2020 – Russia” by Freedom House, dated 4 March 2020[4], states as follows:

“Parts of the country, especially the North Caucasus, suffer from high levels of violence; victims include officials, Islamist insurgents, and civilians. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is accused of using abductions, torture, extrajudicial killings, and other forms of violence to maintain control. This activity sometimes occurs beyond Russian borders: Kadyrov is suspected of arranging the assassination of asylum-seekers and political opponents who have fled the country.”

THE LAW

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

92. The applicant argued that his removal to the Russian Federation would expose him to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. That Article reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

1. Admissibility

93. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

(i) General situation in the North Caucasus Region

94. The applicant referred to the November 2013 report by the non-governmental organisation Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). According to that report, the Russian authorities had resorted to ill-treatment and torture of Chechen fighters.

95. The applicant further cited Amnesty International’s Report for 2017‑18 (“The State of the World’s Human Rights”, 2017/2018, published on 22 February 2018), which indicates a further deterioration of the situation in Chechnya and reports enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, torture and other ill-treatment in custody, together with extrajudicial executions, in the North Caucasus region.

96. The applicant also relied on the report by the non-governmental organisation Memorial, according to which fundamental rights were not respected in Russia in criminal proceedings. He also pointed to a report entitled “L’évolution de la politique russe en matière de lutte antiterroriste” (“The Evolution of Russian Counter-Terrorism Policy”) published in 2018 by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), which is a research and discussion centre for the analysis of international issues. According to that report, Russian law prescribes harsher sentences for persons convicted of terrorism and extremism.

97. The applicant referred to a report entitled “Security and Human Rights in Chechnya and the Situation of Chechens in Russia”, published in January 2015 by the Danish Immigration Service. One part deals with fabricated criminal cases, confessions under torture and other ill-treatment.

98. The applicant further relied on a report by the Swiss Refugee Assistance Organisation (OSAR), according to which the Chechen police systematically tortured, first, persons who refused to cooperate with them as informers and, secondly, those who adhered to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. On this latter point, the applicant also cited a report by Dr Mark Galeotti, entitled “License to kill? The risk to Chechens inside Russia” published in June 2019. The author of this report is a researcher in the field of Russian security services at the Institute of International Relations in Prague.

(ii) The applicant’s personal situation

99. The applicant began by referring to the persecution to which he had been subjected before leaving Russia (see paragraphs 4 to 8 above). At that point the only thing that could be held against him by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and ORB agents was the fact that his father and paternal uncles had been fighters. He emphasised that the veracity of this situation had been established because the OFPRA had granted him refugee status (see paragraph 17 above).

100. The applicant stated that the threats made against him prior to his departure had not ceased after he had fled to France. For example, several of his close relatives had allegedly been approached by the Russian police, who were still actively interested in him (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above).

101. According to the applicant, his current profile would be an aggravating factor if he were to be deported to his country of origin. He pointed out that the CNDA had not addressed the risk he incurred as a result of his criminal conviction (see paragraph 31 above). In this regard, he stated that the Russian authorities were aware of the judgment of 16 April 2015 (see paragraph 21 above) and that, moreover, they had resumed their pressure on his family members living in Russia after its publication (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above). He argued that his refugee status had been wrongly revoked as he did not constitute a serious threat to French society.

102. The applicant submitted that, in view of the persecution to which he had been subjected prior to his departure from Russia (see paragraphs 4 to 8 above), his conviction for acts of terrorism in connection with his involvement in an armed group active in the Syrian conflict (see paragraph 21 above), and the treatment inflicted on terrorist suspects by the Russian authorities, he ran a real and serious risk of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment if returned to his country of origin.

(b) The Government

(i) General situation in the North Caucasus Region

103. At the outset, the Government observed that most of the reports by governmental and non-governmental organisations produced by the applicant were not recent ones, having been published between 2009 and 2015. Reports published in 2018 had also been submitted by him in evidence but they did not indicate any widespread practice of ill-treatment of individuals suspected of belonging to a terrorist movement.

104. The Government were of the view that the situation in Chechnya was not such as to preclude removal to that region, as the Court had previously held (they referred to R.K. and Others v. France, no. 68264/14, §§ 49-50, 12 July 2016; R.M. and Others v. France, no. 33201/11, §§ 50-51, 12 July 2016; I.S. v. France (dec.), no. 54612/16, §§ 47-48, 12 December 2017; and M.I. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 47679/17, §§ 45-46, 29 January 2019).

105. The Government also asserted that, to their knowledge, there were no reports from governmental or non-governmental organisations for the years 2017 and 2018 showing systematic practices of arbitrary detention and systematic ill-treatment of Chechens suspected or convicted of having fought for the so-called “Islamic State” organisation in Syria.

106. Lastly, the Government maintained that several Russian nationals of Chechen origin with links to a terrorist movement who had been suspected or convicted of terrorist offences and returned to Russia had not challenged the choice of that destination country and had not alleged, after their return, that they had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They explained that, at the time of their observations, fourteen such individuals had been deported by France since 2012.

107. The Government concluded that no generalised risk of ill-treatment facing all terrorist suspects had been proven and, therefore, that the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had to be examined on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) The applicant’s personal situation

108. The Government took the view that the applicant had not established the existence of a specific individual risk.

109. They first noted that, although the applicant had been granted refugee status, the OFPRA’s analysis following the applicant’s interview with a protection officer on 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 18 above) showed that he had been unable to explain why he had been instructed to contact rebels (see paragraph 5 above) or how his close relatives had obtained his Russian “external passport” from the authorities (see paragraph 6 above).

110. The Government further noted that the events that had led to the applicant’s departure from the Russian Federation and to the granting of his refugee status had occurred long ago and could not serve to substantiate the existence of any current fear of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention that the applicant might sustain if he were to be deported to his country of origin.

111. In that connection, the Government emphasised that the applicant’s statements during his interview with an OFPRA official on 19 May 2015 remained imprecise and inconsistent as to the surveillance to which he and his close relatives were allegedly still subject and as to the conditions in which his Russian “domestic passport” had been recovered from the authorities (see paragraph 24 above). The Government also disputed the probative value of the witness statements and the press article produced by the applicant (see paragraphs 23, 46, 49 and 51 above).

112. The Government submitted that the applicant had used his Russian “external passport” to travel to Turkey and then to Syria (see paragraph 22 above), even though it was well known that the authorities in both countries were cooperating with Russia, and Turkey had in fact sent back jihadists of Chechen origin. The Government further noted that, by using such a travel document, the applicant, who was then claiming to be a refugee, had demonstrated his allegiance to his country of origin.

113. The Government noted that the applicant’s accomplice with the same profile as him, who had also been convicted on 16 April 2015, had left Syria and returned to Chechnya (see paragraph 22 above). They emphasised that there was no allegation that he had been ill-treated.

114. Lastly, the Government noted that the Russian authorities had not requested the applicant’s extradition or carried out the threats they had allegedly made against his relatives (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above). The Government also pointed out that the applicant had not explained how the Russian authorities had been informed of his criminal conviction on 16 April 2015. Lastly, the Government stated that, if the deportation order were to be enforced, the applicant would be sent to Moscow.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

(i) Preliminary observations on the nature of interim measures

115. As a preliminary matter, the Court considers it useful to clarify the purpose and nature of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the present case on 8 March 2019 for the duration of its examination of the application. It reiterates that where there is plausibly asserted to be a risk of irreparable damage to the enjoyment by the applicant of one of the core rights under the Convention, such as that provided for in Article 3, the object of an interim measure is to preserve and protect the rights and interests of the parties to a dispute before the Court, pending its final decision. The power to indicate to the respondent State the interim measure or measures that it should adopt is exercised only in limited spheres and, as indicated above, where there is an imminent risk of irreparable damage (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 104, ECHR 2005-I). The Court has previously emphasised the special importance and vital role of interim measures in the Convention system (see, among other authorities, Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806/05, § 86, 10 March 2009, and Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, §§ 211-13, ECHR 2013). Where a respondent State has deported an applicant despite the application of an interim measure, the Court may conclude that the State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention (see, for example, M.A. v. France, no. 9373/15, § 71, 1 February 2018).

116. However, it follows from the general scheme of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that a decision on whether it should be applied in a given case will generally be made within a very short lapse of time, in order to prevent an imminent risk of irreversible harm, and often on the basis of limited information. Consequently, the full facts of the case will often remain undetermined until the Court’s judgment on the merits of the complaint to which the measure is related. Where this is possible in view of the urgency of the matter, however, the Court may invite the respondent State to provide further information before taking a decision on the request for interim measures or decide to apply Article 39 temporarily pending the receipt of such information from both parties, as it has done in the present case (see paragraphs 36 and 42 above). In any event, it is precisely for the purpose of preserving the Court’s ability to render such a judgment after an effective examination of the complaint that such measures are indicated. Until that time, it may be unavoidable for the Court to indicate interim measures on the basis of facts which, despite making a prima facie case in favour of such measures, are subsequently added to or challenged to the point of calling into question the measures’ justification (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, §§ 104 and 125, and Paladi, § 89, both cited above).

(ii) Application of Article 3 in expulsion cases

117. In the present case the Court would reiterate that the Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 111, 23 March 2016, and A.M. v. France, no. 12148/18, § 113, 29 April 2019).

(iii) Absolute nature of Article 3 obligations

118. The Court would emphasise that it is acutely conscious of the scale of the threat that terrorism represents for the community and it does not therefore underestimate the importance of the fight against terrorism. It is well aware of the immense difficulties currently faced by States in protecting their populations from terrorist violence (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 137, ECHR 2008; and A.M. v. France, cited above, § 112). Faced with such a threat, the Court has considered it legitimate for Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist acts, which it cannot condone in any circumstances (see Daoudi v. France, no. 19576/08, § 65, 3 December 2009; Boutagni v. France, no. 42360/08, § 45, 18 November 2010; Auad v. Bulgaria, no. 46390/10, § 95, 11 October 2011; A.M. v. France, cited above, § 112; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, § 46, 10 October 2019).

119. It must be observed, however, that the protection secured by Article 3 of the Convention is absolute in nature. For a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by Article 3, even where the person is regarded as representing a threat to the Contracting State’s national security (see Saadi, §§ 140‑41; Auad, § 100; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, § 46, all cited above). In other words, it is not necessary for the Court to examine allegations about an applicant’s terrorist activities because they are not relevant for its analysis under Article 3, according to its current case-law (see Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 126, 24 April 2008; Auad, cited above, § 101; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 46). Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999‑V, and J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, § 77, 23 August 2016). This is also true even where, as in the present case, the applicant has links with a terrorist organisation (see A.M. v. France, cited above).

(iv) Principle of the ex nunc assessment of the risk

120. If the applicant has not already been deported, the material point in time for the assessment must be that of the Court’s consideration of the case. A full and ex nunc assessment is required where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see Chahal, cited above, § 79; F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 115; A.M. v. France, cited above, § 115; and D and Others v. Romania, no. 75953/16, § 62, 14 January 2020).

(v) Principle of subsidiarity

121. Where domestic proceedings have taken place concerning the matter in dispute, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it will usually be for those courts to assess the evidence before them. In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Refugee Convention (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 117). As a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned (see A.M. v. France, cited above, § 116). The Court must be satisfied, however, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State concerned is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic material as well as by material originating from other reliable and objective sources (see X. v. the Netherlands, no. 14319/17, § 72, 10 July 2018).

(vi) Relationship between Convention law, European Union law and the Geneva Convention

122. The Court notes that EU law enshrines in primary law the right to asylum and the right to international protection (Article 78 TFEU and Article 18 of the Charter, cited in paragraphs 71 and 72 above). Furthermore, under Article 14 §§ 4 and 5 of Directive 2011/95 (see paragraph 73 above) the principle of non-refoulement, and certain rights enshrined in EU law on the basis of the Geneva Convention (Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of that convention – see paragraphs 80 and 81 above), are applicable, unlike the other rights enumerated in those two instruments, to any person present in the territory of a member State who fulfils the material conditions to be considered a refugee, even if he or she has not formally obtained refugee status or has had it withdrawn (see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, , § 183, 13 February 2020, and see paragraphs 74-76 above).

123. The Court would emphasise, however, that under the terms of Article 19 and Article 32 § 1 of the Convention it is not competent to apply or examine alleged violations of EU rules unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Furthermore, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, such as on the question whether a person remains a refugee following the withdrawal of refugee status, the CJEU, unlike the national courts and this Court, may be called upon to rule on the validity in abstracto of the possibilities offered by the provisions of EU law (see paragraph 79 above). More generally, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EU law, the Court’s role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention (see N.H. and Others v. France, nos. 28820/13 and 2 others, § 166, 2 July 2020). More specifically, the Court has not, to date, ruled on the distinction made in EU and domestic law between refugee status and the fact of being a refugee. The Court would emphasise that neither the Convention nor the Protocols thereto protect, as such, the right to asylum. The protection they afford is confined to the rights enshrined therein, including particularly the rights under Article 3 of the Convention, as restated above. In that connection, Article 3 embraces the prohibition of refoulement under the Geneva Convention (see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, cited above, § 188).

(vii) The risk assessment

124. The assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that an applicant faces a real risk requires the Court to examine the conditions in the destination country in the light of the standards of Article 3 of the Convention. These standards entail that the ill-treatment an applicant alleges he or she will face if returned must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this level is relative, depending on all the circumstances of the case (see F.G. v. Sweden, § 112, and A.M. v. France, § 114, both cited above). Although assessment of that risk is to some degree speculative, the Court has always been very cautious, especially where public security concerns are also at issue, and has examined carefully the material placed before it in the light of the requisite standard of proof, before indicating an interim measure under Rule 39 (see paragraphs 115 and 116 above) or finding that the enforcement of removal from the territory would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Saadi, cited above, § 142).

(viii) Distribution of the burden of proof

125. It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see, as regards asylum-seekers, F.G. v. Sweden, § 112, and J.K. and Others v. Sweden, § 91, both cited above). In this connection it should be observed that a certain degree of speculation is inherent in the preventive purpose of Article 3 and that it is not a matter of requiring the persons concerned to provide clear proof of their claim that they would be exposed to proscribed treatment (see X. v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 74). Nevertheless, it is for such persons to prove that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if they were deported to the destination country, they would be exposed to a real risk. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts that it may raise (see Saadi, 129; M.A. v. France, § 51; and A.M. v. France, § 118, all cited above).

(b) Application of those principles to the present case

(i) The general situation in the North Caucasus region

126. As regards the general situation in the North Caucasus region, the Court has previously found that, although there have been reports of serious human rights violations in Chechnya, the situation has not been such that any return to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see I v. Sweden, no. 61204/09, § 58, 5 September 2013; M.V. and M.T. v. France, no. 17897/09, §§ 39-40, 4 September 2014; R.K. and Others v. France, cited above, §§ 49-50; R.M. and Others v. France, cited above, §§ 50-51; I.S. v. France, cited above, §§ 47-48; and M.I. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, §§ 45-46). In the light of the above-mentioned international reports (see paragraphs 85 to 91 above), the Court sees no reason to revisit this conclusion and considers that the protection afforded by Article 3 of the Convention can only come into play if the applicant is able to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing that his return to the Russian Federation would, in the particular circumstances of the present case, give rise to a real risk of treatment that is prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.

127. In this connection the Court notes that, according to international reports, certain categories of the population of the North Caucasus, and more specifically of Chechnya, Ingushetia or Dagestan, may be particularly at risk, such as members of the armed Chechen resistance, individuals regarded by the authorities as such, their close relatives, those who have assisted them in any way, civilians forced by the authorities to collaborate with them and anyone suspected or convicted of acts of terrorism (see paragraphs 85 to 91 above). The Court therefore takes the view that the assessment of the risk to the applicant must be made on an individual basis, bearing in mind that persons with a profile corresponding to one of the above-mentioned categories may be more likely than others to attract the attention of the authorities.

(ii) The applicant’s personal situation

128. As is clear from the general principles set out above, while it is primarily for the applicant to produce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the impugned deportation order were enforced, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, when such evidence is submitted it is for the respondent State to dispel any doubts that may be raised by it. In the present case, the Court notes the general nature of the arguments put forward by the applicant to challenge the enforcement of the deportation (see paragraphs 94-102 above) but observes that his fears appear to be based on two points. The first point made by the applicant related to allegations that he had been detained and tortured in Russia because of his family ties to individuals who had taken a stand in favour of the Chechen rebels and to his refusal to cooperate with the authorities; he claimed that he was still wanted in that connection. According to him, this was the justification for the OFPRA’s decision to grant him refugee status (see paragraph 17 above). The second point made by the applicant was that the Russian and Chechen authorities had become aware of his criminal conviction in France (see paragraph 21 above) and that they were interested in him because of his links with a jihadist group in Syria (see paragraphs 23, 46 and 49 above).

129. The Court observes that, in cases concerning removal to the Russian Federation, it is the first time that it has been called upon to consider the merits of a complaint under Article 3 of the Convention by a Russian applicant of Chechen origin who claims that he would be at risk of treatment contrary to that provision on account of his criminal conviction for acts of terrorism in the respondent State. In addition, the situation is one where the applicant’s refugee status in the respondent State has been revoked (see paragraph 27 above).

130. With regard to the first point made by the applicant (see paragraph 128 above), the Court would observe, at the outset, that its task is not to draw the appropriate conclusions from the Geneva Convention, EU law or French law concerning the revocation of the applicant’s refugee status under Article L. 711-6 2o of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraph 56 above). However, it considers that, for the purposes of examining the present case, it must take into account the factors that led to the granting of refugee status to the applicant by the OFPRA and the information then available to the French authorities (see paragraph 17 above; see, mutatis mutandis, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, §§ 8, 9 and 82, 22 September 2009, and M.G. v. Bulgaria, no. 59297/12, § 88, 25 March 2014). At the time he was granted this status, the French authorities considered that there was sufficient evidence that he would be at risk of persecution in his country of origin if returned there. The Court is of the view, however, that this is only a starting-point for its analysis of the applicant’s current situation and that it must proceed therewith solely in the light of Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, M.G. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 88).

131. The Court first observes that a certain period of time has elapsed since the events which justified the granting of refugee status to the applicant (see paragraphs 5 to 9 above). The applicant himself has argued that only two of his close relatives still reside in Chechnya and that the male members of his family have died or are beneficiaries of international protection in Europe. Furthermore, as is apparent from the statement of facts, the applicant organised his departure from France to Syria in March 2013 (see paragraph 21 above), shortly after his interview with the OFPRA officer on 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 16 above) and the granting of refugee status on 31 January 2013 (see paragraph 17 above). It is also clear from the facts that he travelled there in early August 2013 via Germany, Poland (where he collected his Russian “external passport”), Ukraine and Turkey (see paragraph 21 above).

132. The Court notes, moreover, that in order to prove the authorities’ continuing interest in him, the applicant produced a witness statement which was appended to his application form (see paragraph 11 above). The Court agrees with the Government that this testimony is undated and that the applicant has not established a family relationship with its author. Furthermore, although during the interview with an OFPRA official on 19 May 2015 the applicant stated that the Russian prosecutor’s office had tried to contact him (see paragraph 24 above), the Court notes that he was very evasive in this regard and that there is nothing in the file to indicate that the Russian or Chechen authorities are still interested in him in connection with the events that occurred in 2011. Throughout the proceedings before the asylum authorities and the French courts, it was observed that the applicant’s statements remained vague and inconsistent.

133. The Court further notes that the applicant was issued with a Russian “external passport” which he used to leave Russia (see paragraph 6 above) and then to travel in 2013 from Poland to Turkey and Syria (see paragraph 21 above). In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant has provided no explanation for the inconsistencies in his account identified by the Government, failing to explain how, in his alleged situation in 2011, he managed to obtain a Russian “external passport”. The Court reiterates that the issuance of an international travel document to a person whose activities had already attracted the attention of the Russian authorities would appear highly unlikely (see K.Y. v. France (dec.), no. 14875/09, 3 May 2011, and R.K. and Others v. France, cited above, § 54).

134. The Court further notes that in the summer of 2013, that is after the OFPRA’s decision granting the applicant refugee status (see paragraph 17 above), his close relatives living in Chechnya collected the Russian “internal passport” in his name for which they had applied (see paragraph 24 above). The applicant has not alleged that his relatives had problems with the Russian authorities on account of applying for and obtaining this passport.

135. As to the second point put forward by the applicant (see paragraph 128 above), the Government submitted that several other individuals who had been convicted in France for their involvement in terrorist activities had been returned to Russia without having invoked any risk under Article 3 of the Convention before the domestic authorities or the Court. The Court cannot conclude from these facts alone (which are devoid of any details enabling their scope to be assessed) that the applicant would not personally be subject to a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Russia. It notes, however, that the applicant does not contest the Government’s finding that one of his accomplices who previously returned to Chechnya from Syria has not had any problems with the authorities (see paragraph 22 above).

136. The Court notes that the applicant’s main argument consists in the allegation that the Russian and Chechen authorities are aware of his criminal conviction in France (see paragraph 21 above) and are interested in him because of his involvement with a jihadist group in Syria. The Court certainly does not entirely rule out the assumption that the Russian authorities might have become aware of the judgment delivered on 16 April 2015 by the Paris Criminal Court (see paragraph 21 above). However, there is no evidence that the Russian authorities have shown any particular interest in the applicant in connection with an alleged investigation in his country of origin on account of his links with a jihadist network in Syria. The Court notes in particular that Russia has never requested the applicant’s extradition from France or sought a copy of the judgment convicting him of terrorism-related offences. Nor does the case file show that he would be liable to arrest in Russia for offences committed on Russian soil or elsewhere. In any event, in view of the nature of the applicant’s conviction in France together with the national and international contexts, profoundly and durably marked as they are by the fight against terrorism, it cannot be ruled out that he might be subject to checks and surveillance on his return to Russia, without these measures necessarily constituting treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention (see A.S. v. France, no. 46240/15, § 62, 19 April 2018). As the Court has previously found, the issue to be decided in a case such as the present one is not whether the applicant would be detained and questioned, or even subsequently convicted, by the authorities of the destination country, since this in itself would not contravene the Convention. Its concern is whether or not the applicant would be ill-treated or tortured, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, upon returning to that country (see X v. Sweden, no. 36417/16, § 55, 9 January 2018).

137. The Court further reiterates that the national authorities are best placed to assess the applicant’s credibility since they have had an opportunity to see and hear him and to assess his demeanour (see R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827/07, § 52, 9 March 2010; M.E. v. Sweden, no. 71398/12, § 78, 26 June 2014; and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 118).

138. In the present case, the Court observes that on 16 May 2019 the Lille Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the prefect’s directions specifying the Russian Federation as the destination country (see paragraph 48 above) after analysing, in terms of Article 3 of the Convention, the risks that he would allegedly face if the deportation were enforced. However, the Court notes that it is still necessary to determine, in view of the facts that led the OFPRA to grant the applicant refugee status (see paragraph 17 above), whether the procedure before the French authorities was appropriate and allowed for a full examination of his personal situation. The Court observes that, as can be seen from paragraph 29 above, the Versailles Administrative Court, which had previously been asked to set aside the directions specifying Russia as the country of destination, had considered that the first decision taken in that regard had not been sufficiently reasoned, particularly in view of the applicant’s refugee status at that time.

139. As to the principles governing the distribution of the burden of proof (see paragraph 125 above), the Court reiterates that they apply to all expulsion cases. The Court has previously indicated that for asylum-seekers it may be difficult, if not impossible, to supply evidence within a short time, especially if such evidence must be obtained from the country from which he or she claims to have fled. Owing to the special situation in which asylum-seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility of their statements and any supporting documents (see, in particular, J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, §§ 92-93).

140. In the light of the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s situation is not that of an asylum-seeker who has just fled his or her country and who could therefore be considered vulnerable because of everything he or she might have been through during the migration (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 232, ECHR 2011; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, § 192, 21 November 2019; and N.H. and Others v. France, cited above, § 162, 2 July 2020). The Court observes that the applicant arrived in France in 2011, that he was granted refugee status in January 2013 and that this status was revoked in 2016 following his criminal conviction in 2015 for acts committed in France, and also in Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Turkey and Syria, between 1 September 2012 and 19 November 2013, particularly for having spent almost two months in a combat zone in Syria very shortly after he was granted refugee status (see paragraph 21 above). Furthermore, as the CNDA held in its decision of 11 May 2019 rejecting the appeal against the OFPRA’s decision revoking his refugee status (see paragraph 31 above), the departure of the applicant and his accomplice for Syria had been “preceded by thorough and lengthy preparation” (see paragraphs 21 and 31 above). The Court therefore considers that it cannot be concluded from the facts of the case that the applicant should be characterised as “vulnerable” having regard to the meaning given thereto by the Court in apportioning the burden of proof in cases concerning Article 3 of the Convention, a characterisation which would have made it necessary to give him the benefit of the doubt.

141. Without prejudice to the burden of proof, the Court reiterates that a full and ex nunc assessment of the applicant’s complaint is required where account must be taken of factors which have arisen since the domestic authorities adopted the final decision (see paragraph 118 above).

142. In the present case the Court would observe, first, that on 14 May 2019, that is to say, two days before the Lille Administrative Court ruled on the risks which the applicant allegedly faced in the event of his return to Russia, the CJEU had held that the revocation of refugee status in the event of a threat to the security or society of the host member State did not mean that the person concerned was no longer a refugee (see paragraphs 74 and 76 above). Furthermore, in its judgment of 19 June 2020 (see paragraph 61 above), the Conseil d’État applied the case-law of the CJEU (see paragraph 76 above). The Court notes that although, in his appeal on points of law against the CNDA’s decision, the applicant pleaded that it had erred in law by holding that the revocation of his refugee status de facto meant that he was no longer a refugee (see paragraph 53 above), it is clear from both the case-law of the CJEU and that of the Conseil d’État (see paragraphs 61 and 62 above), which in this case did not allow the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 53 above), that despite the revocation of his status on the basis of Article L. 711-6 of the Immigration and Asylum Code, the applicant remained a refugee, as the CNDA had not accepted the OFPRA’s conclusion that the exclusion clause should be applied.

143. The Court further notes that the applicant has not appealed against the judgment of the Lille Administrative Court refusing to set aside the prefectoral order of 25 February 2019 (see paragraph 39 above) and that this judgment has become final. Without prejudice to the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the applicant could therefore be deported to the Russian Federation or to any country to which he could be legally admitted under the provisions of that order.

144. As is clear from the Court’s case-law, the fact that the person concerned is a refugee is an element which must be taken into particular account by the domestic authorities when examining the reality of the risk he or she would allegedly face in the event of expulsion (see, mutatis mutandis, Shiksaitov v. Slovakia, nos. 56751/16 and 33762/17, §§ 70-71, 10 December 2020, and Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France, nos. 40324/16 and 12623/17, § 141, 25 March 2021). In the light of what has been stated in paragraphs 142 to 143 above, the Court notes that the fact that the revocation of the applicant’s refugee status has no bearing on whether or not he remains a refugee was not taken into account by the French authorities in the context of the decision to deport him to the Russian Federation and the subsequent review of that order. The Court concludes that the French authorities and the domestic courts did not assess the risks that the applicant allegedly faced if the deportation order were to be enforced in the light of that situation and the fact that, at least when he arrived in France in 2011, the applicant had been identified as belonging to a group that was, at that time, considered to be targeted.

145. The Court does not rule out the possibility that, following a thorough and complete examination of the applicant’s personal situation and verification as to whether or not he was still a refugee, the French authorities might reach the same conclusion as the Lille Administrative Court, namely that there is no risk to him under Article 3 of the Convention if he is deported to Russia. However, the Court notes that the CNDA had issued a decision on the basis of Article L. 731-3 of the Immigration and Asylum Code (see paragraphs 63 and 64 above) and that it has in similar cases issued opinions advising against the removal of individuals to the country of their nationality on the grounds that, while they had lost refugee status, they had remained refugees (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above), including in the case of the expulsion to Russia of a Russian national of Chechen origin with a profile similar (though not identical) to that of the applicant (see paragraph 65 above). The Court further notes that in both opinions the CNDA found that a decision specifying the country of destination had breached France’s obligations arising from the right of refugees to protection against refoulement (Article 4 and Article 19 § 2 of the Charter and Article 3 of the Convention – see paragraphs 65 and 66 above).

146. In conclusion, and in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect if the applicant were returned to Russia without an ex nunc assessment by the French authorities of the risk he claims to face if deported.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

147. The applicant argued that his removal to the Russian Federation would expose him to treatment in breach of Article 2 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”

148. The Court reiterates that it is the master of the legal characterisation of the facts in the case (see M.G. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 59‑62; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 114, 20 March 2018; and Ilias and Ahmed, cited above, § 176) and that it may decide not to examine a particular complaint separately, considering that it is subsumed or otherwise closely linked to a complaint that has already been dealt with.

149. Having regard to the facts of the present case, to the parties’ arguments and to the conclusion reached by the Court under Article 3 of the Convention, it considers that it has examined the main legal question raised by the application. The Court concludes that it does not need to examine the admissibility or merits of the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, R.M. and Others v. France, cited above, § 58).

3. RULE 39 OF THE Rules of Court

150. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.

151. It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 44 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part below).

4. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

152. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

1. Damage

153. The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) for the non-pecuniary damage that he claimed to have sustained as a result of the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention. He added that his isolation in the administrative detention centre and periods spent under a compulsory residence order, away from his family, had exacerbated his feeling of anguish and worry about being deported to Russia.

154. The Government disputed those claims.

155. The Court observes that a violation of Article 3 of the Convention has not yet occurred in the present case. In this situation it takes the view that its finding to the effect that the deportation, if it were to be implemented without a prior ex nunc assessment of the reality of the risks faced by the applicant in the event of his return to Russia, would constitute a violation of that Article, represents sufficient just satisfaction.

2. Costs and expenses

156. The applicant also claimed EUR 3,750 for the costs and expenses that he had incurred in the proceedings before the Court. He explained that he had already paid the sum of EUR 750 that he had been charged in respect of the interim measures and that he could not afford to pay the remaining EUR 3,000 for the proceedings on the merits of his application.

157. The Government considered that this sum was duly justified and that the applicant’s clam did not call for any particular observation on their part.

158. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 3,750, to be paid to the applicant, in respect of all costs and expenses.

3. Default interest

159. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention admissible;
2. Holds that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect if the applicant were to be returned to Russia without a prior ex nunc assessment by the French authorities of the alleged risk that he would face in that country;
3. Decides to continue to indicate to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that it is desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings not to lift the interim measure until such time as the present judgment becomes final or until further order;
4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,750 (three thousand seven hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 15 April 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

{signature_p_2}

Victor Soloveytchik Síofra O’Leary
Registrar President

[1] https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1442027/4792_1535636056_chechens-in-rf.pdf

[2] https://www.cgra.be/en/country-information/tsjetsjenie-veiligheidssituatie-0

[3] https://rm.coe.int/16809371ef

[4] https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2025879.html