PATAI A FARAGÓ proti Maďarsku

SECOND SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 49059/18
Mártonné PATAI and Elizabet FARAGÓ
against Hungary

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 October 2025 as a Committee composed of:

Gediminas Sagatys, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Stéphane Pisani, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 49059/18) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 10 October 2018 by two Hungarian nationals, Ms Mártonné Patai and Ms Elizabet Faragó (“the applicants”), who were born in 1966 and 1995 respectively, live in Makó and were represented by Ms B. Ivány, a lawyer practising in Budapest;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 8 of the Convention to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns a prison governor’s refusal to authorise the suspension of the prison sentence of the terminally ill Mr Csurár so that his family members, the first and second applicants, could spend his last days with him. It raises an issue under Article 8 of the Convention.

2. The first applicant was Mr Csurár’s long-term common-law wife. The second applicant is their daughter.

3. From 3 September 2015 to his death on 17 April 2018, Mr Csurár had been serving a sentence of five years and seven months in various strict‑regime prisons for theft, vandalism and other offences, including endangering a minor.

4. According to his medical records, Mr Csurár started feeling pain in his neck in October 2017. Following several medical examinations, on 13 February 2018 he was admitted to the prison hospital for a cancer screening test which revealed that he had cancer and that it had spread to several parts of his body, including the vertebrae, lungs, liver and abdomen.

5. He was informed that only a biopsy would be able to determine whether chemotherapy was possible in his case and, if so, what type. He refused to consent to the proposed biopsy on 12 March and again on 21 March 2018.

6. As a result, the prison hospital – where the applicant stayed until his death – could only provide symptomatic treatment to ease his pain. He was given opioid pain medication for pain relief. Subsequently, as of April 2018, he also received intravenous fluid therapy due to swallowing difficulties.

7. On 26 February 2018 the first applicant requested the National Commander of the Hungarian Prison Service Headquarters (Büntetés‑végrehajtás Országos Parancsnoksága) to authorise Mr Csurár’s transfer to house arrest or, alternatively, the suspension of the execution of his sentence. She referred to Mr Csurár’s serious health condition and to the fact that, at that point, he only had twelve months of his prison sentence left to serve. She argued that her partner did not have long to live and that they wanted him to die surrounded by his family. She undertook to ensure his full care and security if her request were approved.

8. On 5 March 2018 Mr Csurár also requested that the execution of his sentence be suspended.

9. The first applicant’s request was sent to Szeged Prison and on 6 March 2018 the prison authorities initiated suspension proceedings, having commissioned an assessment of the suitability of the environment into which Mr Csurár would potentially be released (környezettanulmány; hereinafter “the environmental assessment”).

10. In his report of 22 March 2018, the prison probation officer (pártfogó felügyelő) assessed the first applicant’s place of residence and noted that “although the living conditions of the detainee’s relatives are rather deprived, it can be assumed that the detainee can be cared for in his home with the help of his family”.

11. According to the Government’s observations, the Szeged Prison authorities also sought the opinion of the prison hospital. A medical opinion dated 27 March 2018 – which has not been submitted to the Court – stated that Mr Csurár “require[d] ongoing care, which [might have] require[d] significant financial support in addition to State support”. It was estimated that he would need medication, food, nutritional supplements and, potentially, transport.

12. In their observations, the Government submitted that on 27 March 2018 the governor of Szeged Prison had extended the original thirty-day decision deadline by an additional thirty days. The alleged reason had been to give medical staff time to properly determine the personal and financial burden that Mr Csurár’s family would have to bear if he were released and whether his medical care could be provided at home.

13. On 28 March 2018 Mr Csurár supplemented his request for the suspension of the execution of his sentence. He stated that if the suspension was granted he would reside with his common-law wife, who would provide him with the necessary care. His subsistence would be ensured by his family.

14. A second medical opinion, requested by the director of the prison hospital, was drawn up by the treating doctor on 5 April 2018. The treating doctor considered Mr Csurár’s request medically justified but stated that he could only be placed in a hospital setting.

15. In their observations, the Government referred to a further medical opinion dated 10 April 2018 – no copy of which has been submitted to the Court – stating as follows:

“According to the attached medical opinion from the central prison hospital, the detainee’s disease is not curable, to the best of their knowledge, and will lead to complete cancerous atrophy in the foreseeable future. I consider the detainee’s request for the suspension of his sentence to be justified on medical grounds. However, on the basis of the expert opinion of his treating doctor, I do not support his return home, since the opinion states that he needs to be hospitalised.”

16. On 10 April 2018 the governor of Szeged Prison rejected the first applicant’s request. He argued that, based on the probation officer’s findings regarding Mr Csurár’s proposed living environment, the property tentatively designated as his residence would not guarantee an improvement in his health and his livelihood would remain precarious if he were released. Furthermore, in the governor’s view, the medical opinion supported Mr Csurár’s release only on the condition that he continued to be treated in hospital.

17. The decision was served on Mr Csurár on 11 April 2018.

18. The prison authorities gave the applicants the opportunity to say farewell to Mr Csurár during a one-and-a-half-hour personal visit. The first applicant submitted that she had visited Mr Csurár on 6 April 2018. The visit lasted less than an hour on account of Mr Csurár’s weak physical condition.

19. Mr Csurár passed away on 17 April 2018. The first applicant was notified of his death two days later, on 19 April 2018. The decision rejecting her suspension request was also served on her that day.

20. On 30 September 2024, in reply to the Court’s request for further information from the parties, the applicants informed the Court that they had lodged a civil claim with the Szeged High Court on 14 April 2023. They alleged that their human dignity, their right to respect for their private and family life and their right to mental health under Article 2:42 of the Civil Code had been undermined by the acts and omissions of the prison governor and they claimed damages for these infringements under Article 2:52 of the Civil Code.

21. On 15 May 2024 the Szeged High Court dismissed the applicants’ claim. The court noted that the prison governor had exercised the discretionary power conferred on him by the domestic legislation. Even though the reasoning of the decision was concise and did not assess the evidence collected in depth, the prison governor had nevertheless given reasons for his decision. Concerning the length of the governor’s decision‑making process, the court noted that it had been reasonable in view of the need to collect evidence, which had taken time.

22. On 8 November 2024 the Szeged Appeal Court upheld the first instance judgment. The Appeal Court noted that the suspension request had been expressly aimed at the deceased’s placement at home. However, the treating doctor (and later the specialist) had considered hospitalization as the only acceptable alternative, even in the light of the fact that Mr Csurár had refused treatment. It also referred to the fact that, based on the findings of the environmental assessment, Mr Csurár’s livelihood and care had been uncertain if released. The Appeal Court thus concluded that the prison governor’s decision had been based on decisively relevant circumstances and could not be considered unreasonable. The applicants’ constitutional complaint is pending before the Constitutional Court.

23. The applicants complained that the refusal to authorise the suspension of the imprisonment of their terminally ill family member had violated their right to respect for their private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

24. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in that they could have claimed damages under Article 2:52 of the Civil Code in respect of the alleged interference with their right to private and family life. The applicants disagreed.

25. The Court does not find it necessary to rule on this objection, as the complaint is, in any event, inadmissible for the following reasons.

26. The applicants argued that the suspension of Mr Csurár’s sentence would have allowed them to spend the last days of their terminally ill family member with him and to bid him a dignified farewell. Therefore, the prison governor’s refusal amounted to a violation of their right to respect for private and family life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

27. The Court notes that detention, like any other measure depriving a person of his or her liberty, entails inherent limitations on that person’s private and family life (see Moiseyev v. Russia, no. 62936/00, § 246, 9 October 2008). However, any such restriction must be “in accordance with the law”, must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2 of Article 8 and, in addition, must be justified as being “necessary in a democratic society” (ibid.). Moreover, in cases where the prison authorities’ measures had similar repercussions on the family life of both prisoners and their family members, the Court examined the complaints of family members about a breach of their right to respect for their private and family life by those measures on an equal footing with those of prisoners, applying the same principles to family members as to prisoners (see, in the context of family visits, Polyakova and Others v. Russia, nos. 35090/09 and 3 others, §§ 81-83, 7 March 2017; and Lorsé and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 52750/99, §§ 78‑86, 4 February 2003).

28. In the present case, it is not in dispute between the parties that the prison governor’s decision not to authorise Mr Csurár’s transfer to house arrest or, alternatively, the suspension of the execution of his sentence represented an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion.

29. As to whether the governor’s decision had been “in accordance with the law”, the Government submitted that the prison authorities had acted pursuant to sections 116(1) and (5) of the Act no. CCXL of 2013 on the Enforcement of Punishments, Measures, Certain Coercive Measures and Detention for Regulatory Offences (hereinafter “the Enforcement of Punishments Act”). The applicants argued that the legislation did not define the criteria for granting a suspension request with sufficient precision. The Court notes that section 116(1) a) of the Enforcement of Punishments Act authorises the prison governor to allow for the suspension of a prison sentence for important reasons, in particular on account of a convict’s personal or family circumstances or health status. When dealing with a request for such a suspension, the prison governor needs to give a reasoned decision (section 116(6) of the said Act). In addition, in order to verify the justification for the suspension request, section 116(5) of the Enforcement of Punishments Act provides for the possibility of obtaining an environmental report from the police or the probation officer. In light of the above, the Court is of the view that the domestic law described in sufficiently clear terms the circumstances in which a compassionate release could be granted.

30. The applicants also argued that the impugned decision was not in accordance with the law as the prison governor had failed to consider the request within the thirty-day time-limit prescribed by law pursuant to section 20(3) of the Enforcement of Punishments Act. The Government submitted that on 27 March 2018 the prison governor extended the deadline for the examination of the request by an additional thirty days pursuant to section 20(3) of the said Act (see paragraph 12 above). Furthermore, contrary to the applicants’ claim, the Government considered that the preparation of the environmental assessment was a necessary procedural step.

31. The Court notes that according to section 20(4) of the Enforcement of Punishments Act the time necessary for the preparation of expert opinions, opinions by probation officers or environmental assessments does not count towards the thirty-day time-limit. Considering that the first applicant’s complaint was pending before the governor of the Szeged Prison between 6 March and 11 April 2018 and the environmental assessment was ordered on 6 March 2018 and the last medical opinion was provided on 10 April 2018 it appears to the Court that most of the period between 6 March and 11 April 2018 does not count towards the thirty-day time-limit. In any case, on 27 March 2018 the governor extended the original deadline with another thirty days, therefore it cannot be said that the prison governor violated the decision-making deadlines prescribed by domestic law.

32. In light of the above, the Court concludes that the impugned interference was in accordance with the law.

33. The Court further considers that the measure can be regarded as having pursued the legitimate aim of prevention of crime. Even if Mr Csurár was terminally ill and the likelihood of his reoffending was little, the Court nevertheless recognises the importance attached to the due enforcement of prison sentences, as a matter of general prevention. Moreover, taking into account the opinion of Mr Csurár’s doctors according to which he still needed hospitalisation even though he had refused any curative cancer treatment, but has been receiving treatment to ease his pain, the Court accepts that the measure also served the protection of health.

34. In determining whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” the Court notes that domestic law does not guarantee a detained person an unconditional right to be released from prison on humanitarian grounds. It is up to the prison authorities to assess each request on its merits considering all the relevant circumstances of the case. Nor does the Convention lay down a general obligation to release detainees on compassionate grounds (see, in the context of Article 3, Enea v. Italy [GC], no. 74912/01, § 58, ECHR 2009, with further references). The Court’s scrutiny is limited to consideration of the impugned measure in the context of the applicants’ Convention rights, taking into account the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States in the ways and means of combating crime (see in the context of the right to prison leave to attend the funeral of a relative Płoski v. Poland, no. 26761/95, § 38, 12 November 2002, and Császy v. Hungary, no. 14447/11, § 21, 21 October 2014).

35. In determining whether the domestic authorities, in the proceedings at issue, duly balanced the competing interests, the Government stressed that Mr Csurár had not been allowed to return home because his rapidly deteriorating physical condition and the difficulty of feeding him had required hospital care. The Court notes that as Mr Csurár refused all further medical tests and any oncological treatment, only measures to ease his pain were applied. All medical staff involved in his care considered that, given his terminal illness, his request to suspend his sentence was reasonable on compassionate grounds, but they were of the opinion that he needed to be hospitalised. For the Court, the domestic authorities were better positioned to assess what level of care Mr Csurár would have needed in his last days and in what setting. When reaching his decision, the prison governor balanced the applicants’ interest in spending the last days of their partner and father respectively with him, and Mr Csurár’s corresponding interest, as expressed in their requests for a suspension of the sentence, against Mr Csurár’s interest in being provided with adequate medical care. The latter included notably measures to ease his pain and to ensure his nutrition and hydration, which he had agreed to and which he had been receiving and which, in the specific circumstances of the case, could be better provided in prison. The prison governor considered the unanimous medical opinions as well as the environmental assessment in this regard; and there is no indication that his decision was unreasonable and thus fell outside the margin of appreciation afforded to the domestic authorities in this area. The Court further observes in this context that the prison authorities gave the applicants the opportunity to bid farewell to Mr Csurár in a personal visit and that the first applicant could avail herself of this opportunity (see paragraph 18 above). Contrary to the applicants’ view, having regard to the fact that an environmental assessment report, a police report and several medical reports were obtained, the Court further does not find the proceedings to have been excessively long.

36. In view of these circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention can be considered as “necessary in a democratic society”. It follows that the application is manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.

Dorothee von Arnim Gediminas Sagatys
Deputy Registrar President