WIDAWSKA proti Polsku

FOURTH SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 26250/02
by Katarzyna WIDAWSKA
against Poland

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 5 December 2006 as a Chamber composed of:

Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović, judges,
and Mrs F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 June 2002,

Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,

Having regard to the partial decision of 5 January 2006, in which the complaint of the second applicant, Ms Jadwiga Widawska, was declared inadmissible,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Ms Katarzyna Widawska is a Polish national who was born in 1980 and lives in Warsaw. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

1. The proceedings initiated upon the applicant’s motion

On 27 July 1999 the applicant lodged an action against her father with the Warsaw District Court. She sought an increase of the amount of maintenance to be paid by her father, who was partially incapacitated.

On 18 August 1999 the first hearing was held.

On an unknown date the court requested the case file of the proceedings for annulment of the marriage of the applicant’s parents.

On 25 August 1999 the applicant supplemented her action by seeking maintenance also from her grandfather.

On 25 October 1999 the court was informed by the Warsaw Court of Appeal that in the proceedings for annulment of the applicant’s parents’ marriage the court had not ruled on the issue of the applicant’s maintenance.

On 20 July 2000 the applicant amended her claim as she no longer wished to claim maintenance from her grandfather and changed the amount of maintenance claimed from her father.

On 29 September 2000 the Warsaw District Court gave a judgment. The applicant’s father was ordered to pay the applicant monthly maintenance in the amount of 200 PLN in place of the previous amount of 80 PLN per month. The court made the judgment immediately enforceable.

On 10 October 2000 the applicant’s father lodged an appeal.

On 13 October 2000 the court requested the guardian of the applicant’s father to confirm his appeal as the applicant’s father was partially incapacitated.

In a letter of 22 October 2000 the legal representative of the applicant’s father stated that he did not support the appeal.

On 22 January 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected the applicant’s father’s appeal of 10 October 2000 on formal grounds.

2. The proceedings initiated upon the applicant’s father’s motion

On 23 January 2001 the applicant’s father lodged a motion for exemption from court fees, which was subsequently granted by the Warsaw District Court.

On 20 April, 24 May and 25 June 2001 the District Court held hearings in the case.

By a judgment of 18 July 2001 the Warsaw District Court reduced the amount of maintenance from 200 PLN to 120 PLN. The court-appointed guardian lodged an appeal on behalf of the applicant’s father. It was rejected on 6 September 2001 by the Warsaw Regional Court for non-compliance with the prescribed time-limit.

On 3 December 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 18 July 2001. The applicant was served with the decision on 11 February 2002.

At a hearing held on 2 April 2002 the applicant’s father withdrew his motion for annulment of the alimony decision.

COMPLAINT

The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the length of the maintenance proceedings.

THE LAW

A. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government contested that argument and argued that the length of the proceedings, seen as a whole, was reasonable. They argued that the case consisted of two sets of proceedings; one lodged by the applicant against her father and a second lodged by the father against the applicant. According to the Government, the merits of the judgment in the first proceedings depended on the court’s ruling in the second proceedings.

The Court observes, notwithstanding the Government’s argument concerning the relationship between the proceedings, that the applicant’s complaint refers solely to the length of the impugned proceedings. As one set of the proceedings was lodged by the applicant against her father and the second one by the father against the applicant, the Court will examine their length separately.

1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted remedies available under Polish law. They maintained that from 17 September 2004 when the 2004 Act came into force, the applicant had a possibility of lodging with the Polish civil courts a claim for compensation for damage suffered due to the excessive length of proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code read together with section 16 of the 2004 Act. They argued that the three-year prescription period for the purposes of a compensation claim in tort based on the excessive length of proceedings could run from a date later than the date on which a final decision in these proceedings had been given. The Government further argued that the possibility of lodging a claim for compensation for damage suffered due to the excessive length of proceedings under Article 417 of the Civil Code had existed in Polish law even before the entry into force of the 2004 Act, namely since the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 4 December 2001.

The applicant did not contest the Government’s arguments.

The Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government are the same as those already examined and rejected by the Court in previous cases against Poland (see Malasiewicz v. Poland, no. 22072/02, §§ 32-34, 14 October 2003; Ratajczyk v. Poland; (dec.), 11215/02, 31 May 2005; Barszcz v Poland, no. 71152/01, 30 May 2006) and the Government have not submitted any new elements which would lead the Court to depart from its previous findings.

It follows that the Government’s plea of inadmissibility on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.

2. Compliance with the six-month time limit with respect to the proceedings lodged by the applicant against her father

The Court recalls that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote security of the law, to ensure that cases raising Convention issues are dealt with within a reasonable time and to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see among many other authorities, P.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.) no. 6638/03, 24 August 2004). It also marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and state authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (Tahsin İpek v. Turkey (dec.), no 39706/98, 7 November 2000).

The Court observes that the present case is in fact related to two sets of proceedings for alimony: one lodged by the applicant against her father on 27 July 1999 and terminated by the decision of 22 January 2001 and the second lodged subsequently by her father on 23 January 2001 and terminated by the judgment of 3 December 2001, served on the applicant in February 2002.

The Government does not raise the issue of the expiry of the six-month time-limit with respect to the first set of the proceedings. Nevertheless, the six-month rule is a mandatory one which the Court has jurisdiction to apply of its own motion (Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 160, ECHR 2004-II).

It follows that as the proceedings lodged by the applicant against her father were terminated on 22 January 2001 and the complaint about their length was lodged on 26 June 2002, that complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

3. Length of the proceedings lodged by the father against the applicant

The second set of proceedings was lodged by the applicant’s father on 23 January 2001 and was terminated by the judgment of 3 December 2001. It has accordingly lasted for almost 1 year before one judicial instance.

The Government submitted that the case was complex and difficult, having regard to the relationship between the two sets of proceedings. As to the conduct of the authorities, they stressed that the court had to obtain a substantial amount of evidence. The court listed hearings at short intervals and there were no significant periods of inactivity attributable to it.

The Government further submitted that what was at stake for the applicant was of a pecuniary nature.

The applicant maintained that the length of the proceedings was unreasonable.

There is no indication that any undue delay occurred in the course of the proceedings or that the applicant was deprived of her means of subsistence during the proceedings.

In view of the foregoing and having regard to the overall length of the proceedings (one year) the Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, the length of the proceedings complied with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

F. Elens-Passos Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President