GALUASHVILI proti Gruzii

SECOND SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 40008/04
by Tamaz GALUASHVILI
against Georgia

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 24 October 2006 as a Chamber composed of:

Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Ms D. Jočienė, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 October 2004,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Mr Tamaz Galuashvili, is a Georgian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Tbilisi. He is represented before the Court by Mmes Lia Mukhashavria, Manana Kobakhidze, Maka Gioshvili, Natia Katsitadze and Mr Nikoloz Legashvili, lawyers practising in Tbilisi.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

At around 4 p.m. on 26 June 2004, the applicant was driving a car along one of the central avenues of Tbilisi. Two cars suddenly sandwiched him from the sides and another one barred his way. Neither those cars nor the armed men inside them were displaying any identification of the law-enforcement agencies. As the applicant was about to get out of his car, a police van appeared from which some 15 hooded men with machine‑guns jumped out and started shooting in the air and in the applicant’s direction. The bullets damaged the applicant’s car.

As disclosed by the case file, the police had planned this apprehension operation following an anonymous call informing them that heavily armed men were travelling around the city in the applicant’s car. The verbatim record of this call is included in the case file. The applicant contends that the police made up the story and fabricated that document in order to justify his arrest.

According to the applicant, he was not searched at the place of apprehension but immediately taken to the Central Police Department of Tbilisi (“the CPD”). He asked about the reasons for his arrest and requested the assistance of a lawyer, but to no avail. For several hours, he was not given the right to make a telephone call.

The same day, without the applicant’s knowledge, the police conducted a search of his domicile in the presence of his family. The minutes of that search, stating that firearms had been found, were not signed by the applicant’s wife, who later claimed that the police had planted guns there. However, the minutes were signed by several witnesses.

At the CPD, the applicant refused to sign the minutes of his search when being arrested, which were signed by several witnesses and allegedly drawn up ex post facto by the investigator. According to the minutes, the applicant had been found with a gun tucked in his belt.

The applicant claims that he first learnt about the nature of the charges levelled against him when glancing at the television in the interrogation room of the CPD. The evening news of 26 June 2006 reported, quoting the investigator in charge of the case, that the applicant, “aka the ‘Elephant of Tskhneti’, a well-known criminal and ... recidivist ... had been arrested for the unlawful carriage and storage of arms in large quantities.” Only later was the applicant presented with the investigator’s resolution, opening a criminal case and declaring him a suspect.

As the applicant suffers from insulin-dependent diabetes, he informed the CPD officers that he had to have an insulin injection at 7 p.m. and asked for the medication. Only at about 1 a.m. was he given the insulin.

On 27 June 2004, the Vake-Saburtalo District Court in Tbilisi legalised the search and seizure urgently conducted the previous day at the applicant’s domicile.

On 28 June 2004, charges were brought against the applicant, who pleaded “not guilty”, but promised to cooperate with the investigation. During the interrogation, the applicant declaimed the circumstances of his apprehension, describing, inter alia, the police shooting.

The same day, the investigator requested the court to remand the applicant in custody. He argued that “the applicant was not sincere before the investigative authorities...; he could interfere with the establishment of the truth...; he could abscond...” No specific arguments were put forward in support of these assertions.

During the in camera hearing of 29 June 2004, the applicant contended in reply that the fact that he had a permanent residence, a family and a job were guarantees that he would not abscond. He reiterated his willingness to cooperate with the investigation and, referring to his diabetes, expressed his fear that in detention his health would deteriorate. The Vake-Saburtalo District Court did not respond to these arguments. It ordered the applicant’s detention on remand for three months, reasoning as follows:

“The collected evidence ... discloses a reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed the incriminated offence... The evidence was gathered in conformity with procedural norms... The grant of the prosecution’s motion would be reasonable and lawful since the accused is charged with an offence punishable with more than five years’ imprisonment. Consequently, the suspicion that the accused might interfere with the establishment of the truth is substantiated. In view of the prospect of a severe punishment, the accused might abscond.”

The court did not put forward any reasons for its assertions.

The applicant appealed, requesting his release on the same grounds as had been previously put to the District Court. The prosecution replied that the applicant’s release would obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case, and noted that no medical certificate proving the applicant’s illness had been submitted. On 1 July 2004, the Regional Court dismissed the appeal considering that the arguments of the prosecution were “well substantiated”. No answer was given to the applicant’s arguments.

On 5 July 2004, the applicant’s lawyer requested an official expert medical opinion on the applicant’s condition. The request was dismissed by the investigator on 8 July 2004 on the ground that the applicant had the right to have himself examined by an independent medical expert.

On 26 July 2004, the applicant’s lawyer filed a motion for the written testimonies of 13 people, whom he had questioned himself, to be admitted to the file. Some of those witnesses had seen the applicant’s apprehension in the street on 26 June 2004, and submitted that the applicant had not been searched on the spot, but immediately put in a car which quickly drove away. The other witnesses were neighbours who testified that the police had planted the guns in the applicant’s house. The lawyer requested that these witnesses be interrogated by the prosecution.

On 28 July 2004, the investigator refused to admit these statements as evidence, or to interrogate their authors. He reasoned that, since all of the witnesses, who had allegedly eye-witnessed the applicant’s apprehension, were women, they would have been uninterested in what was happening in the street and their testimonies were therefore hardly credible. As to the other witnesses, all of them being the applicant’s neighbours, the investigator considered that they would lack impartiality.

The applicant’s lawyer challenged that decision before the prosecutor, complaining, inter alia, that the investigator was discriminating against female witnesses. The prosecutor dismissed the appeal on 2 August 2004 and instead ordered the interrogation of the police officers having participated in the applicant’s apprehension and the search of his house.

On 29 July 2004, the applicant was transferred to Tbilisi Prison No. 7 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The cell, which he shared with another inmate, was about 7 m2. It was extremely damp and hot, without any window. The only source of light was a dim lamp lit far down the corridor. The lavatory was located in a corner of the cell, without being partitioned. Prisoners were given no food by the administration. They depended on food parcels sent by their relatives. The supply of drinking water was limited.

The alternative expert medical opinion of 3 September 2004 confirmed that the applicant was suffering from a progressive type of diabetes and needed intensive insulin treatment. The opinion concluded that the risk of hypoglycaemia was high which, in the absence of urgent intervention, could lead to the applicant’s death.

The following week, the applicant was transferred, upon his request, to the prison hospital where he stayed until his release (see below).

On 25 September 2004, the investigation ended and the case was sent to the Vake-Saburtalo District Court for trial. During the trial, which opened on 18 November 2004, the applicant’s lawyer complained of the prosecution’s refusal to admit to the file the above-mentioned 13 testimonies. He also emphasised that the witnesses for the prosecution, who had signed the minutes of the search, were testifying in favour of the defendant. In fact, interrogated during the trial, those witnesses confirmed that they had not seen the actual process which had revealed the guns. They saw the guns in the hands of the police officers who were explaining to them where those weapons had been found.

By a verdict of 22 November 2004, the Vake-Saburtalo District Court convicted the applicant of the unlawful carriage and storage of arms. The court did not accept the above-mentioned testimonies, considering that they had been influenced by the applicant. As disclosed by the minutes of the hearing, the prosecution submitted that the court should consider the applicant’s “donation” of GEL 100.000 (EUR 41.135) to the “Development Fund of the Law-Enforcement Agencies” to be a mitigating factor. The applicant was therefore sentenced to only one year’s imprisonment, suspended, and was immediately released.

On 3 December 2004, the applicant challenged that verdict before the Tbilisi Regional Court, seeking an acquittal on the grounds that the lower court had failed to hear the relevant witnesses. However, on 22 December 2004, he informed the Regional Court in writing that he had lost interest in the appellate proceedings “for certain reasons” and withdrew his appeal.

According to the applicant, he did so for fear of being prosecuted again. He also contends that the relevant authorities had advised him to withdraw his appeal, which he did in order to protect the security of his family.

B. Relevant domestic law

1 Constitution

Article 18 § 3

“The arrest of a person is permissible in the circumstances determined by law and by an official specifically authorised for that purpose. The person who has been arrested or whose liberty has been restricted should be brought before a competent court no later than 48 hours after the arrest. If, within the next 24 hours, the court does not decide on the question of detention or another measure restricting liberty, the person should be immediately released.”

2. Law on the Police of 27 July 1993, as it stood at the material time

Article 13 defines the rules and limits for the use of firearms by the police. Articles 33 to 35 refer to the mechanisms of protection that persons could resort to, in case of a violation of their rights by the police.

Article 33 – “The right of appeal against an act of a police officer”

“Every person has the right to challenge a police officer’s acts before a superior official, prosecutor or court.”

3. Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), as it stood at the material time

a) Arrest and pre-trial detention

Article 140 § 17

“Before the end of the preliminary investigation, the parties have the right to lodge an application with the court which had imposed a measure of pre-trial restraint ... requesting the annulment or modification of that measure. ... The parties can exercise this right only when new circumstances ... require that the merits of the restraint measure be reviewed.”

Article 145 § 1

“When the police officer, or other competent official, decides that the grounds prescribed by this Code for an arrest exist, he should inform the suspect thereof in understandable terms. Namely, the officer should explain to the suspect what are the charges leveled against him ... and convey him to a police station or other law‑enforcement office.”

Article 146 § 7

“Charges should be preferred no later than 48 hours after the arrested person is brought before an inquiry officer. If, within the following 24 hours, the court does not determine the issue of detention on remand or another measure of restraint, the arrested person should be immediately released.”

Article 151 §§ 1, 2 and 3

“A restraint measure shall be applied to ensure that the accused cannot avoid the preliminary investigation and trial, that his further criminal activity is prevented, that he cannot interfere with the establishment of the truth in a given criminal case, or that the court’s verdict is implemented.

The application of a measure of restraint is justified if the evidence collected in the case file sufficiently substantiates the assumption that it is necessary to secure the aims mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article.

The ground for the imposition of pre-trial detention may be the reasonable suspicion that the accused might abscond, interfere with the establishment of the truth in a given criminal case, or if a serious or grave crime has been committed.”

Article 159 § 3

“Detention on remand shall be imposed only with regard to the person who is charged with an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years is envisaged ...”

b) Trial

Pursuant to Article 417 § 3 of the CCP, the court decides on the question of a restraint measure pending trial at its first preparatory hearing.

Articles 519 and 547 provide respectively for an appeal against the verdicts of a District Court before a Regional Court and for a further appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

COMPLAINTS

Invoking Article 2 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the police exceeded the legal limits on the use of firearms (Article 13 of the Law on the Police) by opening fire in public on 26 June 2006.

Under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complains that on 26 June 2006 he was not given the insulin which he needed. He also complains of his conditions of detention in Prison No. 7, as a result of which his state of health seriously deteriorated.

Relying on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant claims that no grounds for his arrest existed and that the authorities made up the story of anonymous call. Invoking Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, he complains that he was not immediately informed of the reasons for his arrest and the nature of the charges against him, and that he was denied the assistance of a lawyer. Under Article 5 § 3, the applicant claims that the principle of equality of arms was violated since, prior to the hearing of 29 June 2004, the prosecutor’s motion was not communicated to either himself or his lawyer. Under the same provision, the applicant contends that the judicial decisions concerning his detention lacked reasonable motivation. Invoking Article 6 § 3 a), b) and c) of the Convention, the applicant reiterates the same complaints as under Articles 5 §§ 2 and 3. Invoking Article 5 § 4, he contends that the domestic law does not provide a mechanism for the automatic review of the lawfulness of detention at regular intervals.

In his voluminous submissions under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complains that, under the domestic law, no appeal lay against the court decision of 27 June 2004, by which the search and seizure measures were legalised. Under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, he complains that the investigator referred to him in the news of 26 June 2004 as a criminal and recidivist, although he had never been tried for an offence before.

Under Article 6 § 3 d) of the Convention, the applicant further challenges the prosecution’s refusal to interrogate witnesses on his behalf or to admit those witness testimonies to the file. He also contends that the verdict of 22 November 2004 was delivered in violation of his right to a fair trial, since he was unable to obtain the examination of witnesses on his behalf, and he had been obliged to pay GEL 100.000 (EUR 41.135), without any legal basis, in exchange for the prosecution’s promise to request a milder sentence, although it was considered as a mitigating circumstance.

The applicant invokes Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 (the impossibility to appeal against the decision of 27 June 2004), as well as Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1. Complaining that the police shooting exposed him to unnecessary, life-threatening danger, the applicant invokes Article 2 of the Convention, which reads insofar as relevant as follows:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law...”

The applicant relies on the provisions of the Law on the Police of 27 July 1993 (“the Law”), establishing limits on the use of firearms, and considers that those provisions were breached by the police.

However, the Court observes that, pursuant to Article 33 of that Law, it was open to the applicant to challenge the shooting before a superior police official, prosecutor or court. Nothing in the case file shows that he resorted to this remedy.

In the Court’s view, although when testifying on 28 June 2004 before the prosecution, the applicant mentioned in a descriptive manner the police shooting, this cannot be regarded as a complaint for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. His statement was devoid of any elements which would have required the authorities to conduct an investigation into the incident so as to acknowledge a breach of the applicant’s rights or to afford redress – two obligations of Contracting Parties flowing from the principle of subsidiarity in the Convention (see, amongst other authorities, Ernestina Zullo v. Italy [GC], no. 64897/01, §§ 71-73, 29 March 2006).

It follows that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies. His complaint under Article 2 of the Convention must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

2. Under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complains of the police officers’ initial refusal on 26 June 2004 to provide him with insulin and of his conditions of detention in Prison No. 7, which allegedly caused serious harm to his health. Article 3 reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

As to the alleged delay in receiving insulin on 26 June 2004 at the police station, the Court again observes that the applicant failed to raise this complaint before any of the domestic authorities in accordance with Article 33 of the Law on the Police.

As regards the conditions in Prison No. 7, nothing in the case file shows that the applicant lodged a hierarchical or judicial complaint, or put the relevant authorities of the Ministry of Justice, in charge of the penitentiary system, expressly on notice that his conditions of detention were in breach of Article 3 of the Convention (see Pandjikidze and six others c. Georgia (dec.), no. 30323/02, 20 June 2006; a contrario, Davtian v. Georgia (dec.), no. 73241/01, 6 September 2005).

Assuming that, while complaining about the harm caused to his health by his poor conditions of detention, the applicant also denounces the lack of proper medical assistance in Prison No. 7, the Court notes that no specific evidence has been presented in this regard. The applicant did not inform the Court what kind of treatment he had been provided with, or what was requested but withheld from him (see Mathew v. the Netherlands, no. 24919/03, §§ 185-195, ECHR 2005‑...). The case file does not disclose any instance where the applicant applied for particular medical treatment while in prison but was refused it. On the contrary, following the alternative expert medical opinion of 3 September 2004, the authorities granted without delay the applicant’s request to be transferred to the prison hospital, where he stayed until his release. No complaint is raised concerning the medical treatment received in the prison hospital.

In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. Under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant claims that no reasonable suspicion justified his arrest. He also complains that he was deprived of different procedural guarantees in breach of Article 5 §§ 2, 3 and 4. The relevant provisions of Article 5 of the Convention read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...

2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.

3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

a) As to the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention

As to the complaint relating to the anonymous call received by the authorities on 26 June 2004, the Court notes that the applicant did not submit any concrete argument capable of substantiating his doubts as to the existence of that call or the legality of its verbatim record drawn up by the
authorities. It follows that this limb of his complaint under Article 5 § 1 is manifestly ill-founded and must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

As to the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 3 concerning his arrest without reasonable suspicion, the absence of information about the reasons for his arrest and the lack of adequate reasoning in the court decisions ordering his detention, the Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the question of their admissibility.

It is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

b) Concerning the complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention

When complaining that the prosecutor’s motion was not notified to him before the hearing of 29 June 2004, the applicant invokes Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. However, the Court considers that a different characterisation in law should be attributed to that complaint (Camenzind v. Switzerland, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII, pp. 2895-2896, § 50), which in fact falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

Under the latter provision, the proceedings bearing on the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in Convention terms, of his deprivation of liberty must be adversarial and must always ensure “equality of arms” between the parties (see, among many others, Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, pp. 34-35, § 65; Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II; Schiesser v. Switzerland, judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A no. 34, p. 13, §§ 30‑31).

However, it must be noted that it is not always necessary that the procedure under Article 5 § 4 be attended by the same guarantees as those afforded by Article 6 of the Convention (see, for instance, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3302, § 162; Włoch v. Poland, no. 27785/95, § 125, ECHR 2000-XI; Megyeri v. Germany, judgment of 12 May 1992, Series A no. 237-A, p. 11, § 22).

The Court notes that, under Georgian law, review proceedings are urgent matters which have to be dealt with speedily. In order to ensure that decisions are taken expeditiously, under Article 18 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 146 § 7 of the CCP, the prosecutor has to bring the arrested person before a judicial authority within two days of the arrest. In the subsequent 24 hours, the competent court has to decide on the prosecutor’s motion.

In view of this requirement of speed, which is one of the core principles of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the domestic courts cannot be obliged to institute the exchange of all of the parties’ documents, which would render it impossible to take a decision within the statutory time-limit of 24 hours (cf. Yavuz v. Austria (dec.), 32800/96, 18 January 2000). However, this consideration must be qualified by the right of the detainee or his counsel to have a real opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the prosecutor’s submission during the review – i.e. at an oral hearing (see, among others, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 58, ECHR 1999‑II; Schiesser v. Switzerland, judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A no. 34, p. 13, §§ 30–31).

In the case at hand, the Vake-Saburtalo District Court held an oral hearing on 29 June 2004 in order to review the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and to decide on the prosecution’s motion to remand him in custody. The hearing was attended by the applicant and his lawyer, who responded to the prosecutor’s arguments. The applicant does not raise any complaint about his rights of defence during this hearing.

Moreover, as the domestic law provides for a two-tier system of review, the applicant and his lawyer had another opportunity on 1 July 2006 to question on appeal the prosecutor’s motion in the light of all the facts. The applicant does not dispute this.

In these circumstances, the Court does not find any appearance of a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in this respect.

As to the complaint about the absence of an automatic review of the lawfulness of detention at regular intervals, the Court recalls that Article 5 § 4 contains a crucial guarantee against arbitrary detention, providing for detained persons to obtain a review by a court of the lawfulness of their detention not only at the time of the initial deprivation of liberty but also where new issues of lawfulness are capable of arising, periodically thereafter (Kolanis c. Royaume-Uni, no 517/02, § 80, CEDH 2005‑...).

The Court notes that the CCP does not require that the authorities review of their own motion the lawfulness of detention. However, pursuant to Article 140 § 17 of the CCP, the applicant had the right to request, at any time during his detention pending investigation, the review of the merits of the impugned measure, provided that there were circumstances unknown to the courts when they determined the question before. As disclosed by the case file, the applicant did not exercise that right before the end of the preliminary investigation on 25 September 2004, as required by Article 140 § 17 of the CCP. Moreover, he does not specify which new elements would have justified a review by the authorities, on their own motion, of the lawfulness of his detention between 1 July 2004, the date of the last review, and 25 September 2004.

The applicant does not raise any specific complaints concerning the review of the lawfulness of his detention which took place before the District Court after his committal to trial in September 2004 (Article 417 § 3 of the CCP).

In the light of the above considerations, the Court does not find any appearance of a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in this respect.

The whole of the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention must therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

4. The applicant next alleges a violation of his rights to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 a), b), c) and d) of the Convention, which read as follows:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] tribunal...

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...”

The Court observes that the applicant did not exercise his right of appeal under Articles 519 and 547 of the CCP in order to challenge the alleged procedural violations perpetrated by the first instance court. In fact, he withdrew his appeal from the Tbilisi Regional Court, depriving himself of the possibility of a subsequent appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The applicant did not furnish any evidence in support of his general allegation that the prosecution forced him to abandon his appeal, or that the authorities threatened him or his family.

In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies for the purposes of his complaints under Article 6 of the Convention, which must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

5. Finally, the Court notes that, when invoking Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant raises the same complaints which he has made under Articles 5 § 4 and 6. However, it finds that no separate examination of these matters is required under Article 13.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaints concerning his arrest without reasonable suspicion, the absence of information about the reasons for his arrest and the lack of adequate reasoning in the court decisions ordering his detention;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President