Přehled
Rozhodnutí
FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 19344/22
Elsa Maria TERRINCA MARQUES RAMOS
against Portugal
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 7 October 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
András Jakab, judges,
and Crina Kaufman, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 19344/22) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 12 April 2022 by a Portuguese national, Ms Elsa Maria Terrinca Marques Ramos (“the applicant”), who was born in 1974, lives in Lisbon and was represented by Mr V. Parente Ribeiro, a lawyer practising in Lisbon;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms H. de Carvalho Martins Leitão, Deputy Attorney-General, and co-Agent, Ms Ana Garcia Marques, a lawyer at the Office of the Agent;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the applicant’s conviction on two counts of defamation following a criminal complaint lodged against her by A. and F. Relying on Articles 9 and 10, the applicant complained of a breach of her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and her right to freedom of expression.
2. On 4 February 2016 the applicant sent an email to the Lisbon Family Court, where child custody proceedings in respect of a four-year-old boy, J., were pending. In the email she alleged, among other things, that A., the child’s mother, was manipulating J., citing the fact that he had once told his father that he was a liar. She alerted the court to two situations. The first concerned the mother’s refusal to tell the father why J. had bruises on his back, and the second concerned an occasion on which the mother had called the police because she was concerned about J.’s well-being while under his father’s care. The applicant went on to state that A. was an “adulterous mother” and that F., the child’s maternal grandfather, had been in “presumed possession of a firearm in the proximity of his grandchildren”.
3. On 16 February 2016 A. became aware of the applicant’s statements after consulting the case file concerning the custody of her son at the Lisbon Family Court. Along with F., she then lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for defamation, seeking damages for the harm caused to their reputation.
4. By a judgment of the Lisbon Criminal Court delivered on 10 December 2020, the applicant was convicted under Article 180 § 1 and Article 183 § 1 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code on two counts of defamation in view of the above-mentioned statements. Having regard, inter alia, to the applicant’s income, the court sentenced her to 120 day‑fines in respect of each count, the two fines being combined to form a total of 200 day-fines amounting to 1,200 euros (EUR), and ordered her to pay EUR 3,000 and EUR 1,500 in damages to A. and F. respectively. The court noted that the applicant was not involved in the child custody proceedings in issue, which were of a contentious nature, and did not know A. or F. personally. It found that the statements made by the applicant (which were based on what J.’s father had told her) were untrue, reflected her impressions and personal opinions, and targeted A.’s and F.’s honour and reputation – as evidenced, in particular, by the use of the expression “adulterous mother” to refer to A. They also took the view that the applicant’s intention to protect J.’s best interests was not genuine and that she did not have reasons to believe that he was at risk.
5. On 11 January 2022 the Lisbon Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court’s decision. It noted that there had not been any serious evidence to support the applicant’s statements and that there was no link between the statements and her concerns for the well-being of the child. In its analysis, the Court of Appeal referred to the equal weight of the right to freedom of expression and the right to honour and reputation.
6. Relying on Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained of a breach of her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and her right to freedom of expression.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
7. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the applicant’s complaints (see paragraph 5 above) fall to be examined from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention only (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018).
8. It was not disputed by the parties that the domestic courts’ judgments had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, that such interference had been “prescribed by law” – specifically Article 180 § 1 and Article 183 § 1 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 3 above) – and that it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting A.’s and F.’s honour and reputation. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise.
9. The general principles applicable to the present case are summarised in
Juppala v. Finland (no. 18620/03, §§ 41-42, 2 December 2008) and M.P. v. Finland (no. 36487/12, §§ 51-53, 15 December 2016; see also, mutatis mutandis, Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, § 77, ECHR 2008, and Halet v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 21884/18, § 85, 14 February 2023).
10. The Court notes that the applicant was convicted on two counts of defamation following an e-mail she had sent to the Lisbon Family Court regarding ongoing child custody proceedings, in which she questioned A.’s and F.’s care of J. (see paragraph 2 above). This case calls into consideration two countervailing interests, each of high social importance: the need to safeguard children from abuse by their own parents, and the need to protect parents from unnecessary interference with their right to respect for their private and family life or the risk of unjustified arrest and prosecution (see Juppala, cited above, § 41). The seriousness of child abuse requires that persons reporting an allegation in that regard should act in good faith (see, mutatis mutandis, Guja, cited above, § 77) and in what they believe are the best interests of the child. It must also be determined whether the person reporting the allegation was motivated by a desire for personal advantage or held any personal grievance, or whether there was any other ulterior motive for the actions taken (see, mutatis mutandis, Halet, cited above, § 128).
11. In the statements in dispute, the applicant relayed what she had heard from the child’s father. She expressed her personal opinions and made suppositions about A.’s and F.’s care of the child, which were found by the domestic courts to be untrue and unsubstantiated (see paragraphs 3-4 above). While the applicant aimed to make her opinions known for the purposes of the ongoing child custody proceedings, the domestic courts were not able to establish that her statements reflected a genuine concern for the well-being of the child. Furthermore, referring to the equal weight of the right to freedom of expression and the right to honour and reputation (see paragraph 5 above), they found that the applicant’s use of the expression “adulterous mother” reflected impressions and personal opinions unrelated to the child’s well‑being (see paragraph 4 above). As the use of that expression was unrelated to the subject of the email and its purported aim, it appears to indicate that the applicant held a personal grievance against A. (see Halet, cited above, § 128). In those circumstances, in the Court’s view, it does not appear that the applicant acted in good faith when reporting that J. had been abused by his mother and grandfather.
12. Turning to the severity of the punishment imposed on her, the Court notes that the applicant was sentenced to a total of 200 day-fines, amounting to EUR 1,200, and ordered to pay EUR 3,000 and EUR 1,500 in damages to A. and F. respectively (see paragraph 4 above). In determining the amounts to be imposed on the applicant, the domestic courts carried out an assessment of her income. The Court also notes that the applicable maximum fine was 360 day-fines, in accordance with Articles 180 and 184 of the Criminal Code. The total of 200 day-fines imposed on the applicant cannot therefore be considered disproportionate.
13. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the domestic courts struck a fair balance, within their margin of appreciation, between the interests that were at stake, taking into account the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law.
14. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.
Crina Kaufman Anja Seibert-Fohr
Acting Deputy Registrar President