Přehled
Rozhodnutí
FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 16381/23
Junior Vladimir SANTANA DE REGLA
against the Netherlands
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 December 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Faris Vehabović, President,
Jolien Schukking,
Lorraine Schembri Orland, judges,
and Elica Grdinić-Rauch, Acting Deputy Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 16381/23) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 12 April 2023 by a Dominican national, Mr Junior Vladimir Santana de Regla (“the applicant”), who was born in 1993, lives in Rotterdam and was represented by Mr S.C. van Paridon, a lawyer practising in Rotterdam;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Dutch Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms B. Koopman, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The application concerns the question whether criminal proceedings against the applicant complied with the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and whether the applicant had at his disposal an effective remedy in that respect, as required under Article 13 of the Convention.
2. The criminal proceedings at issue started on 19 April 2019 when the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having been involved in the transportation of cocaine. On 24 May 2019 he was acquitted by the Rotterdam Regional Court and released from detention on remand. On 21 April 2021 the Court of Appeal of the Hague convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment and a fine of 1,740 euros. It gave an abridged judgment (verkort arrest) – that is, a judgment which provides the reasons why an accused was found guilty, but which does not include a detailed enumeration of the items of evidence relied on.
3. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court on 29 April 2021. This required the Court of Appeal to prepare a full version of its judgment, which it submitted – along with the case file – to the Supreme Court on 4 July 2022. The Procurator General at the Supreme Court notified the applicant accordingly, thus starting the time-limit within which the applicant had to submit a written statement detailing the grounds of his appeal on points of law (cassatieschriftuur).
4. On 11 August 2022 the applicant submitted his grounds of appeal on points of law, complaining, among other things, that the delay caused by the late submission of the full version of the Court of Appeal’s judgment had violated his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In respect of that complaint, the Supreme Court in its judgment of 14 February 2023 ruled:
“The ground of appeal [on points of law] is well-founded. In the light of the two‑month prison sentence imposed, the Supreme Court considers that the acknowledgement that the reasonable time‑limit was exceeded is sufficient [redress], and there is no reason to attach any other legal consequence to that finding.”
5. That ruling was based on well-established case-law of the Supreme Court (namely, leading judgments of 3 October 2000 and 17 June 2008) which provided that, as a rule, proceedings at first instance and on appeal should at each stage be concluded within two years, and that the time required for the Court of Appeal to forward the complete case file – including the full version of its judgment – to the Supreme Court should also be taken into account in assessing compliance with the “reasonable time” requirement within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. According to the relevant case-law, the complete case file had to be forwarded within eight months of the lodging of an appeal on points of law. If the reasonable time is exceeded in any phase of the proceedings, the relevant sentence should, as a rule, be reduced in accordance with further guidelines set out in the leading judgments mentioned above. Concerning the consequences of the exceeding of the reasonable time in the phase of the appeal on points of law, these judgments indicate that in certain specific situations the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention constitutes sufficient compensation.
6. The applicant complained before the Court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the mere acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had provided no redress. He argued that he had not lost his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. Relying on Article 13, he also complained that he did not have an effective remedy for his Article 6 complaint.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
7. In the present case, the parties disagreed on the applicant’s “victim” status and whether he had suffered a “significant disadvantage” owing to the alleged violation. The Court does not find it necessary to examine these admissibility criteria, since the application is, in any event, manifestly ill‑founded for the following reasons.
8. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], no. 35382/97, § 19, ECHR 2000-IV, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII).
9. The Court reiterates further that it is not its role to assess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by domestic courts. Its task is confined to determining whether their choices produce consequences that are in conformity with the Convention (see Papaioannou v. Greece, no. 18880/15, § 43, 2 June 2016, and Tsiolis v. Greece, no. 51774/17, § 58, 19 November 2024).
10. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has, by providing guidelines regarding reasonable time-limits in its leading judgments, put in place a system for ensuring that criminal charges are determined within a reasonable time. The domestic approach is different from that of the Court, which generally consists of examining the total length of the proceedings (see O’Neill and Lauchlan v. the United Kingdom, nos. 41516/10 and 75702/13, § 95, 28 June 2016; Kurganovs v. Latvia, no. 11579/05, § 51, 20 January 2015 and Dobbertin v. France, 25 February 1993, § 44, Series A no. 256-D).
11. The Court must thus satisfy itself – in the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law (see paragraph 8 above) – as to whether the applicant’s rights under the Convention have been respected.
12. The criminal proceedings in the applicant’s case lasted three years, nine months and 25 days at three levels of jurisdiction. The Court notes that the case was not particularly complex and that the applicant did not contribute to the length of proceedings. As regards the conduct of the domestic courts, the Court observes that the case was assessed promptly before the courts of first and second instance, and that a delay only occurred in respect of the time it took the Court of Appeal to forward the complete case file to the Supreme Court. That delay is attributable to the judicial authorities. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment one year, nine months and sixteen days after the appeal on points of law had been lodged. As regards what was at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that he was not in detention during the delay in the proceedings. He faced a fine and a relatively short prison sentence.
13. The Court considers that in the light of the circumstances set out above, the overall length of the proceedings – which was less than four years at three levels of jurisdiction – did not exceed what could be considered reasonable (compare Jaupi v. Albania, no. 23369/16, § 81, 29 April 2025; Chiarello v. Germany, no. 497/17, §§ 48-50, 20 June 2019; Mamič v. Slovenia (no. 2), no. 75778/01, §§ 34-38, ECHR 2006-X (extracts); and Mõtsnik v. Estonia, no. 50533/99, §§ 37-43, 29 April 2003). Consequently, the Court takes the view that in the specific circumstances of this case, the justification given by the Supreme Court – namely, that the acknowledgement that the reasonable time-limit had been exceeded constituted sufficient redress (see paragraph 4 above) – can be considered sufficient.
14. It follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
15. As to the Article 13 complaint, the Court notes that it is inextricably linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared inadmissible (see Ljubičić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 17338/05, 10 May 2007).
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 22 January 2026.
Elica Grdinić-Rauch Faris Vehabović
Acting Deputy Registrar President