GRBIĆ A OSTATNÍ proti Srbsku

THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 23420/22
Rajko GRBIĆ against Serbia
and 6 other applications
(see list appended)

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 16 September 2025 as a Committee composed of:

Darian Pavli, President,
Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the applicants’ right to a fair trial to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASES

1. The applications concern the allegedly inconsistent and arbitrary national case-law adopted when adjudicating the applicants’ civil claims, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention.

2. Between 2018 and 2020, each of the applicants lodged unrelated complaints under the Trial Within a Reasonable Time Act (Zakon o zaštiti prava na suđenje u razumnom roku, hereinafter “the Reasonable Time Act”). In their complaints, the applicants alleged that the civil proceedings in which they had been involved had been excessively lengthy. They requested that the courts establish violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time and order the respective presiding judges to take all necessary measures to expedite the proceedings in question. The applicants furthermore sought reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred in the course of the proceedings instituted under the Reasonable Time Act. Between February 2019 and March 2021, the relevant courts ruled in favour of the applicants, holding that they had indeed suffered a breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time. The respective presiding judges in the disputed proceedings were thus ordered to take all necessary measures to expedite the said civil proceedings. However, in each case, the applicants’ claims for the reimbursement of costs and expenses related to the proceedings brought in connection with the Reasonable Time Act were dismissed as unfounded. In their reasoning, the courts held that the Reasonable Time Act does not expressly provide for the award of costs and expenses, and that, given the one-party nature of such proceedings and their exemption from court fees, there was no legal basis for granting such claims.

3. At the material time, the Reasonable Time Act did not contain any provisions concerning the award of costs and expenses in such proceedings. However, it provided that the provisions of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Zakon o vanparničnom postupku) were to be applied accordingly in respect of all matters not otherwise regulated. Under the general provisions of that Act, the courts were given discretion on whether to award costs and expenses in non-contentious proceedings. Lastly, for matters not regulated by the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act itself, this Act envisaged the corresponding application of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku). Article 153 of the Civil Procedure Act provided, inter alia, that a party which entirely loses the case must reimburse the opposing party’s costs and expenses.

4. On 30 September 2020 the Supreme Court of Cassation, in similar unrelated proceedings brought under the Reasonable Time Act (Rž1 g 29/2020), adopted a decision establishing a violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. The court ordered the respective presiding judge to take all necessary measures in order to expedite the proceedings and awarded to the claimant the costs and expenses incurred before that court. This decision was based on Article 153 of the Civil Procedure Act.

5. Between April 2019 and October 2020, the applicants lodged constitutional appeals relying on the right to a fair trial and the right to equal protection of rights enshrined in the Serbian Constitution. They argued that the decisions not to award costs and expenses to them had violated the Non‑Contentious Proceedings Act and the Civil Procedure Act, that they were in collision with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and that for those reasons they were also arbitrary. In support of their claims, as stated in the constitutional appeals, the applicants provided copies of the decisions rejecting their own requests for costs and expenses. The applicants, however, did not provide copies of any divergent case-law on the issue. The Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeals in 2022.

6. In November 2023 the Reasonable Time Act was amended to include an explicit right for successful complainants to recover costs and expenses incurred in such proceedings.

7. Referring to Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants essentially complain that the rejection of their claims for costs and expenses, as well as the “flagrantly divergent case-law of the domestic courts” on the issue, created legal uncertainty and amounted to a denial of justice.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

8. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.

9. The Government objected with respect to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil limb to the proceedings in question, which had been conducted pursuant to the Reasonable Time Act. In the alternative, the Government submitted that the applications should be dismissed on the basis that the applicants had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies. In particular, the constitutional appeals lodged by the applicants did not contain a specific complaint concerning the existence of inconsistent case-law but were instead framed in terms of the incorrect application of domestic law. The applicants had also not presented to the Constitutional Court any evidence demonstrating the existence of divergent case-law on the relevant issue, as they had failed to submit conflicting judicial decisions. The Government lastly maintained that the applications were manifestly ill-founded.

10. The applicants contested the Government’s objections and maintained their complaints.

11. The Court does not find it necessary to examine all of the objections raised by the Government, as the applications are, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

12. As regards the complaints that the domestic courts applied flagrantly divergent case-law, the Court notes that, although the applicants relied on the right to a fair trial and the right to equal protection of rights under the Serbian Constitution in their constitutional complaints, and referred to the existence of inconsistent jurisprudence, they failed to substantiate this claim by submitting any copies of the relevant domestic judgments which they claimed demonstrate the alleged inconsistency (see paragraph 5 above). By this omission, the applicants deprived the Constitutional Court of a proper opportunity to assess the merits of their complaints. In this connection, the Court would reiterate its established case-law where it held that the requirement for applicants seeking redress before the Constitutional Court to include proper supporting evidence was reasonable (see Golubović and others v. Serbia (dec.) no. 10044/11, § 43, 17 September 2013). The Court sees no reason to depart from this approach in the present case.

13. In view of the foregoing, the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 concerning the allegedly divergent case-law of the domestic courts must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, or more precisely based on their failure to properly do so.

14. With respect to the complaints that the decisions of the domestic courts not to award costs and expenses were in opposition to the relevant domestic legislation and therefore arbitrary, the Court reiterates that it is generally not its task to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as such errors are manifest and infringe rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, for example, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015, and the authorities cited therein). The Court also does not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see, for example and among many other authorities, Anđelković v. Serbia, no. 1401/08, §§ 24-27, 9 April 2013, where the Court found that the arbitrariness of the domestic court’s decision, which principally had had no legal basis in domestic law and had not contained any connection between the established facts, the applicable law and the outcome of the proceedings, amounted to a “denial of justice”).

15. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that, at the time when the applicants’ claims were adjudicated domestically, the Reasonable Time Act did not contain a provision explicitly allowing the award of costs and expenses (see paragraph 3 above). Consequently, a degree of judicial interpretation by the domestic courts was required when deciding whether to award costs and expenses to successful litigants. In this regard, the Court further notes that the domestic courts provided reasons for rejecting the applicants’ claims, referring to the absence of an express statutory basis for such awards, the exemption of the proceedings from court fees and their one-party nature (see paragraph 2 above). In these circumstances, the Court does not consider that the interpretation and application of domestic law, including the conclusion that the applicants had no right to reimbursement of costs and expenses under the legislation then in force, was either arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.

16. In view of the foregoing, the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 § 1 concerning the allegedly arbitrary manner in which the domestic courts applied the domestic law, are manifestly ill-founded and must as such be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to join the applications;

Declares the applications inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 9 October 2025.

{signature_p_1} {signature_p_2}

Olga Chernishova Darian Pavli
Deputy Registrar President

Appendix

List of cases: