SERBIAN-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY FDH proti Srbsku

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF SERBIAN-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY FDH v. SERBIA

(Application no. 54936/20)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

2 June 2026

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Serbian-Chinese Friendship Society FDH v. Serbia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Darian Pavli,
Diana Kovatcheva,
Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
Mateja Đurović,
Vasilka Sancin, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 54936/20) against Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the Serbian‑Chinese Friendship Society FDH (“the applicant society”) on 1 December 2020;

the decision to give notice to the Serbian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention concerning the authorities’ decision to prohibit public protests scheduled to take place on 17 and 18 June 2016, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 5 May 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The application concerns the applicant society’s attempt to hold public protests in Serbia with regard to the alleged persecution of Falun Gong and its members in the People’s Republic of China. The protests, which had been scheduled to take place on 17 and 18 June 2016, were ultimately prohibited by the Serbian authorities on the grounds of public safety. The applicant society complained under Article 11 of the Convention that it had suffered a violation of its right to freedom of peaceful assembly. It also complained under Article 13, read in conjunction with Article 11, that it had had no effective domestic remedy at its disposal.

• THE FACTS

2. The applicant society is an organisation based in Belgrade. It was represented before the Court by the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), a non‑governmental organisation also based in Belgrade.

3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Zorana Jadrijević Mladar.

4. The relevant facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

1. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

5. In June 2016 the applicant society planned to hold three peaceful gatherings in Belgrade to protest against the alleged persecution of Falun Gong and its members in the People’s Republic of China. The timing of the events coincided with the official visit of the Chinese President to the Republic of Serbia.

6. Falun Gong describes itself, inter alia, as a spiritual practice rooted in the Buddhist tradition which offers the possibility of spiritual growth[1].

2. administrative proceedings at first instance

7. On 10 June 2016 the applicant society informed the New Belgrade police station of its plan to hold a gathering on 17 June 2016, between 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. on Mihailo Pupin Boulevard.

8. On 13 June 2016 the applicant society submitted two additional notifications. The first concerned a gathering scheduled to take place on 18 June 2016, between 11.30 a.m. and 1 p.m. on Užička Street (close to the Chinese embassy) and was submitted to the Savski venac police station. The second was submitted to the Stari grad police station and related to a gathering also scheduled to take place on 18 June 2016, between 6.30 p.m. and 9 p.m. at Republic Square in the city centre.

9. The police stations each adopted a prohibition order on the day of receiving the respective notifications. The New Belgrade police station issued and served its decision on the applicant society on 10 June 2016, while the Savski venac and Stari grad police stations issued and served their decisions on 13 June 2016. In all three cases the authorities took into account Article 8 of the Public Assembly Act, which provides that a public gathering is not permitted when there is a threat to public safety, public health, morals, the rights of others or national security (see paragraph 19 below). The police authorities justified their decisions by referring to the anticipated presence of a significant number of Chinese nationals showing support for the visiting President in the vicinity of the proposed gatherings. They concluded that the situation carried a risk of confrontation likely to endanger public safety and property.

3. administrative proceedings at second instance

10. The applicant society lodged three appeals with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on 11 June 2016 (with regard to the protest scheduled to take place on 17 June 2016, see paragraph 7 above) and 14 June 2016 (with regard to the two separate protests scheduled to take place on 18 June 2016, see paragraph 8 above) respectively. The appeals were dismissed as unfounded. The appeal concerning the decision to prohibit the protest scheduled to take place on 17 June 2016 was dismissed on 13 June 2016, while the appeals concerning the decisions to prohibit the two protests scheduled to take place on 18 June 2016 were dismissed on 16 June 2016. The reasoning provided in each of those decisions essentially endorsed the reasoning of the police authorities at first instance (see paragraph 9 above).

4. administrative disputes

11. On 16 June 2016 the applicant society lodged two separate claims with the Administrative Court, challenging the decisions of the relevant administrative authorities to prohibit the public protests scheduled to take place in the municipalities of New Belgrade and Stari grad (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).

12. On 17 June 2016 the applicant society lodged an additional claim with the Administrative Court, contesting the decision to prohibit the public gathering scheduled to take place in the municipality of Savski venac (see paragraph 8 above).

13. On 12 August 2016 the Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted its response to the applicant society’s claim of 17 June 2016 (see paragraph 12 above). The Ministry stated, inter alia, that during the visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China, a “spontaneous gathering” of Serbian and Chinese nationals had been “expected”, with the intention of “offering support and solidarity” to him. According to the Ministry, such expectations had been based on information from media reports. The Ministry further noted that Falun Gong was an organisation that had been banned in the People’s Republic of China, but which had followers in more than 80 countries worldwide and an estimated membership ranging from 70 to 100 million individuals. Accordingly, it had been impossible to predict the total number of people expected to participate in the planned gathering. The Ministry argued that such uncertainty surrounding the event had made adequate preparation difficult. Allowing the protest to proceed under such conditions would have carried a risk of confrontation between opposing groups likely to endanger people and property. In reaching that conclusion, the Ministry asserted that the above‑mentioned facts had been common knowledge and that, in accordance with Article 150 § 2 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraph 24 below), they had not had to be established. In view of the foregoing, the Ministry affirmed that the relevant administrative authorities had acted properly in deciding to prohibit the public gathering in question.

14. In response to the above‑mentioned claims (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above), the Administrative Court delivered three judgments. The first, delivered on 27 July 2016, concerned the decision to prohibit the gathering in the municipality of New Belgrade (see paragraph 11 above). The second, delivered on 9 September 2016, related to the decision to prohibit the gathering in the municipality of Stari grad (ibid.). The third, delivered on 25 May 2018, related to the decision to prohibit the public protest in the municipality of Savski venac (see paragraph 12 above). Each of the applicant society’s claims was dismissed. The Administrative Court found that the relevant administrative authorities had appropriately assessed the existence of a threat to public safety, order and property. That assessment had been based on the fact that the proposed gatherings had been scheduled to coincide with the official visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China, during which the presence of Chinese nationals expressing support for their government’s policies had been anticipated. In so far as the applicant society, an organisation banned in the People’s Republic of China, had intended to display banners and publicly express its views, the court considered that such activities could reasonably be expected to have provoked conflict between the opposing groups. Furthermore, the Administrative Court concluded that the applicant society, although having identified itself as the organiser and party responsible for the planned public gatherings, had nevertheless failed to provide adequate assurances as required under Article 11 of the Public Assembly Act (see paragraph 20 below).

5. proceedings before the Constitutional Court

15. On 18 July 2016 the applicant society lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. It alleged, inter alia, that there had been a breach of its right to freedom of peaceful assembly, contrary to Article 54 of the Constitution, and a violation of Article 36 § 2 of the Constitution, which provided for the right to an effective domestic legal remedy (see paragraph 17 below). In its appeal, the applicant society specifically challenged the decision to prohibit the public gathering which had been scheduled to take place in the municipality of Savski venac (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above).

16. On 8 February 2024 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant society’s appeal on the grounds of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act. Specifically, the applicant society had not requested postponement of enforcement of the administrative decision given at first instance to prohibit the public gathering which had been scheduled to take place on 18 June 2016 in the municipality of Savski venac (see paragraph 28 below). The Constitutional Court further noted that the Administrative Court had not yet delivered its decision in the applicant society’s administrative dispute at the time it had lodged its constitutional appeal (see paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 above). Lastly, the Constitutional Court referred to, inter alia, relevant international standards (see paragraphs 33 and 34 below) and the Court’s own case‑law regarding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

• RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
  1. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Ustav Republike Srbije, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – OG RS – no. 98/06), as in force at the material time

17. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read as follows:

Article 36 § 2

“Everyone shall have the right to an appeal or another legal remedy in respect of any decision ... [involving the determination of] ... his [or her] rights, obligations or lawful interests.”

Article 54

“The peaceful assembly of citizens shall be free.

...

Gatherings, demonstrations and other forms of assembly held outdoors shall be reported to [the relevant] State authorities, in accordance with the law.

Freedom of assembly may be restricted by law only if necessary to protect public health, morals, the rights of others or the security of the Republic of Serbia.”

2. Public Assembly Act (Zakon o javnom okupljanju, published in OG RS no. 6/16)

18. Article 2 of the Public Assembly Act provides that everyone has the right to assemble peacefully, in accordance with the law.

19. Article 8 provides, however, that a public gathering is not permitted if (i) it is likely to endanger the safety of people and property, public health, morals, the rights of others or the security of the Republic of Serbia; (ii) the purpose of the gathering is to incite violence or racial, national, religious or other forms of discrimination, hatred or bigotry; (iii) it is likely to provoke armed conflict, the use of violence, or violations of human rights and the rights of minorities; or (iv) its purpose is otherwise contrary to the Act itself.

20. Article 11 provides, inter alia, that the organiser of a public gathering must ensure the peaceful conduct of the event, guarantee unobstructed access to the emergency services, comply with the instructions of the relevant authorities, and terminate the gathering and immediately notify the police if there is an imminent threat to public safety or property.

21. Article 12 provides, inter alia, that the organiser of a public gathering is required to provide prior notification. This must be submitted to the local police station – the organisational unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for the municipality where the public gathering is to take place – at least five days before the scheduled date.

22. Articles 15 and 16 provide that a decision to prohibit a public gathering must be issued no later than 96 hours before the scheduled start time. An appeal may be lodged with the Ministry of Internal Affairs within 24 hours of receiving the decision, but it does not have suspensive effect. The Ministry of Internal Affairs must provide a decision without delay and at the latest within 24 hours of the appeal being lodged. That decision is amenable to judicial review, in the form of an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court.

3. General Administrative Proceedings Act (Zakon o opštem upravnom postupku, published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 33/97 and 31/01, AND in OG RS no. 30/10), as in force at the material time

23. Article 13 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act provided, inter alia, that a “final administrative decision” (pravnosnažno rešenje) was a decision which could not, or could no longer, be appealed against to a higher administrative authority, nor be challenged before a court of law through an administrative dispute (upravni spor).

24. Article 150 § 2 provided that facts considered common knowledge (činjenice koje su opštepoznate) did not have to be established.

25. Article 239 provided, inter alia, that a “definitive administrative decision” (konačno rešenje) was a decision which could not, or could no longer, be appealed against to a higher administrative authority.

26. Article 261 § 3 provided, inter alia, that a first‑instance administrative decision became enforceable (izvršno) upon service if an appeal against such a decision did not postpone its enforcement – that is, it did not have suspensive effect (see paragraph 22 above).

4. COMMENTARY ON THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT (KOMENTAR ZAKONA O OPŠTEM UPRAVNOM POSTUPKU), ZORAN R. TOMIĆ AND VERA BAČIĆ, BELGRADE, 2016, SLUŽBENI GLASNIK, p. 348

27. Under Article 150 § 2 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraph 24 above), the determination of which facts could be considered common knowledge (opštepoznate činjenice) was to be made in the light of “each individual case”, taking into account the “wider circle of persons” concerned, and the relevant “social (local) environment”, among other similar criteria. Certain areas of the country that were prone to earthquakes or the inherent properties of particular chemicals were given as examples of facts that could be considered common knowledge for the purposes of administrative proceedings.

5. Administrative Disputes Act (Zakon o upravnim sporovima, published in OG RS no. 111/09)

28. The relevant provisions of the Administrative Disputes Act read as follows:

Article 3 § 1

“In an administrative dispute, the ... [Administrative Court] ... shall decide on the lawfulness of definitive administrative decisions, except for those for which other judicial protection is provided.”

Article 18 § 1

“A claim [instituting an administrative dispute] shall be lodged [with the Administrative Court] within 30 days of the party [to the proceedings] being served with the administrative decision [in question] ...”

Article 23

“A claim [instituting an administrative dispute] shall, as a rule, not postpone enforcement of the administrative decision against which it has been lodged.

At the request of the claimant ... [the Administrative Court] ... may postpone enforcement of a definitive administrative decision delivered on the merits of an administrative matter, until a court decision is given, provided that enforcement would cause the claimant harm that would be difficult to redress and postponement would not be contrary to the public interest or cause greater or irreparable harm to the opposing party [in the proceedings] or to any other interested person.

Exceptionally, a party to administrative proceedings may request that ... [the Administrative Court] ... postpone enforcement of an administrative decision even before a claim [instituting an administrative dispute] has been lodged:

(1) in cases of urgency;

(2) where an appeal [against an administrative decision given at first instance] has been lodged but the appeal does not have suspensive effect and the appeal proceedings themselves have not yet been finished.

Where a request is made to postpone the enforcement ... [in question] ... , the ... [Administrative Court] ... shall give a decision within five days at the latest from the date of receipt of the request ...”

Article 24 § 1

“An administrative decision may be challenged by means of a claim in an administrative dispute on the grounds of unlawfulness, if:

(1) the decision did not at all or did not properly apply the [relevant] legislation or other regulations ...;

(2) the decision was given by an authority which did not have the legal jurisdiction to do so;

(3) ... the procedural rules were not followed;

(4) the facts were insufficiently or incorrectly established, or an incorrect factual conclusion was drawn from the established facts;

(5) in the exercise of its discretion, the authority [which issued the decision in question] exceeded the limits of its lawful competence or if such a decision was not adopted in accordance with the purpose for which that competence was granted.”

6. Commentary oN the Administrative Disputes Act with Case‑law REFERENCES (Komentar Zakona o upravnim sporovima sa sudskom praksom), Zoran R. Tomić, Belgrade, 2010, Službeni glasnik, p. 395)

29. If the Administrative Court accepted a request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision before a claim in an administrative dispute against that decision had been lodged, under Article 23 § 3 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 28 above), the effects of the postponement would be valid until the administrative decision in question became final (pravnosnažno, see paragraph 23 above). In a situation where an administrative appeal lodged with a higher administrative authority had been dismissed and a claim instituting an administrative dispute had subsequently been lodged with the Administrative Court, the effects of the postponement ordered would be valid until the matter had been adjudicated on the merits by that court itself (see paragraphs 23-26 and 28 above).

7. Order SU I-2 11/16 of the President of the Administrative Court of 10 February 2016

30. Order SU I-2 11/16 listed, inter alia, the categories of cases to be handled with “urgency” and “particular urgency”. Within that framework, a “request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision” was classified as a matter of “particular urgency”. That required such requests to be “brought before a judge rapporteur”, who was responsible for ensuring that they be handled with urgency so that the Administrative Court could give a decision within the applicable “statutory deadlines” (u zakonom propisanom roku). There was no similar provision in Order SU I-2 11/16 addressing the urgency of dealing with administrative disputes on their merits involving the prohibition of planned public gatherings.

8. relevant Case‑law of the Constitutional Court

31. The Constitutional Court gave two decisions in which it found, inter alia, violations of the applicant society’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly in the context of a decision to prohibit planned public protests – specifically in cases Už-3048/2015 and Už-13917/2019 of 26 October 2017 and 7 March 2024 respectively – the former involving five separate constitutional appeals. The court identified no issues in relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in either of those cases, including with regard to the request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision as provided for in Article 23 § 3 of the Administrative Disputes Act, which the applicant society had not made use of (see paragraph 28 above). Moreover, the violation found in case Už-3048/2015 was based on an earlier decision by the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional the legislation regulating the conduct of public gatherings at the material time. With regard to case Už‑13917/2019, the court noted, inter alia, that the public gathering which had been planned by the applicant society had been prohibited on the basis of the administrative authorities’ conclusion that the anticipated presence in the same location of a number of Chinese nationals holding opposing views carried a risk of confrontation likely to endanger public safety and/or property. The court, however, disagreed and considered that no real security assessment had been carried out by the administrative authorities and that their conclusion had lacked substantiation. The relevant authorities had instead relied on out‑of‑date information or information considered “common knowledge”. The court also noted that the applicant society had notified the relevant authorities of its plan to hold a public protest in a timely manner and that the motivation behind the protest had clearly been peaceful. Furthermore, the protest itself had not been timed to coincide with either an official Chinese State visit or a Chinese national holiday.

32. In addition to the above‑mentioned decisions of the Constitutional Court, two other cases, involving more or less similar circumstances, were brought by the applicant society – which were themselves adjudicated by decisions Už-2805/2018 and Už-538/2018 of 12 May 2020 and 7 December 2021 respectively. Case Už-2805/2018 concerned the decision to prohibit a planned public protest, but the claim was dismissed by the Constitutional Court because the applicant society had not made use of the regular appeal procedure in the context of the administrative proceedings. The claim in case Už-538/2018 involved the disruption of an ongoing public protest by the police and was dismissed by the Constitutional Court because, inter alia, the applicant society had failed to: (i) institute a special complaints procedure before the Ministry of Internal Affairs; (ii) lodge a claim with the Administrative Court (see paragraph 28 above, Article 18 § 1); (iii) lodge a civil claim for damages; or (iv) file a criminal complaint in that regard.

• OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL

33. Other relevant material includes, inter alia, the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly adopted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) on 15 July 2020 (3rd edition, edited version, CDL-AD(2019)017rev, Strasbourg/Warsaw).

34. The relevant parts read as follows:

“125. Right to an effective remedy. Those seeking to exercise the right to freedom of peaceful assembly should have recourse to a prompt and effective remedy against decisions disproportionately, arbitrarily or illegally restricting or prohibiting assemblies ... Where assemblies are prevented or unreasonably restricted due to potentially unlawful inaction or negligence by the administrative authorities, the organizers or representatives of the assembly should be able to initiate direct legal action in courts or tribunals. The relevant court decisions should be issued prior to the planned events. The right to a remedy includes being able to access independent and impartial administrative and judicial appeal mechanisms. The availability of effective administrative review can reduce the burden on courts and help build a more constructive relationship between the authorities, the organizers and the public in general. In both administrative and court proceedings, the burden of proof should be on the relevant state authority to prove that the restrictions imposed are justified ... Courts or tribunals should have the authority to review all circumstances of the case, and to annul or, where applicable, correct any error or omission made at the administrative or first instance review stage ... Legal aid should be available to those who do not have the funds to pay for legal representation themselves.

126. Timeliness of court decisions. Court decisions should be issued in a timely manner, so that the appeal or challenge, can be resolved before the assembly is planned to take place ... In case of insufficient time, courts or tribunals should have the authority to issue interim orders or rulings pending final resolution of the case. A heavy case‑load cannot serve as justification for delays in judicial proceedings ... This requirement for an expeditious appeal mechanism should be provided for in law ...”

35. In its General comment No. 37 on the right of peaceful assembly (Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), adopted at its 129th session (29 June–24 July 2020), the United Nations Human Rights Committee furthermore opined as follows:

“52. The fact that an assembly provokes or may provoke a hostile reaction from members of the public against participants, as a general rule, does not justify restriction; the assembly must be allowed to go ahead, and its participants must be protected ... However, in the exceptional case where the State is manifestly unable to protect the participants from a severe threat to their safety, restrictions on participation in the assembly may be imposed. Any such restrictions must be able to withstand strict scrutiny. An unspecified risk of violence, or the mere possibility that the authorities will not have the capacity to prevent or neutralize the violence emanating from those opposed to the assembly, is not enough; the State must be able to show, based on a concrete risk assessment, that it would not be able to contain the situation, even if significant law enforcement capability were to be deployed ... Less intrusive restrictions, such as postponement or relocation of the assembly, must be considered before resort to prohibition.

53. The regulation of the time, place and manner of assemblies is generally content neutral, and while there is some scope for restrictions that regulate these elements, the onus remains on the authorities to justify any such restriction on a case-by-case basis ... Any such restrictions should still, as far as possible, allow participants to assemble within sight and sound of their target audience, or at whatever site is otherwise important to their purpose ...”

THE LAW

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION

36. The applicant society complained under Article 11 of the Convention that it had suffered a violation of its right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In particular, it argued that there had been no real threat to public safety and that the official assessment in that regard had been merely speculative, no proper examination of the relevant facts having been carried out. More generally, the applicant society submitted that even the existence of a real threat to public safety, stemming from counter‑protestors, could not in itself warrant decisions to prohibit planned peaceful protests. If that were not the case, violent groups would always be able to suppress the rights of others.

37. Article 11 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”

1. Admissibility
   1. The Government’s submissions

38. The Government argued that the applicant society had failed to make use of an effective domestic remedy by not seeking redress under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraphs 28 and 16 above, in that order). If that avenue had been pursued successfully, the Administrative Court could have suspended, if warranted, the decisions to prohibit the protests scheduled to take place on 17 and 18 June 2016 and allowed them to go ahead lawfully as planned. The Administrative Court would have been required, in that connection, to proceed with particular urgency. In the specific circumstances of the present case, there would also have been sufficient time before the dates in question for the Administrative Court to give a decision, particularly if the requests to postpone enforcement of the decisions to prohibit the planned protests under Article 23 had been lodged together with the appeals against those first‑instance administrative decisions (see paragraph 28 above, Article 23 §§ 3 and 4).

39. The Government further submitted that a constitutional appeal remained an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in general and with regard to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in particular. Indeed, the Constitutional Court had previously ruled in favour of appellants where warranted, including in respect of the applicant society itself in the context of, inter alia, prohibited public protests (see paragraph 31 above). In any event, the dismissal of a constitutional appeal could not, in itself, render the remedy ineffective, since appellants had no right to a favourable outcome of their proceedings before the Constitutional Court, irrespective of the relevant circumstances (see paragraph 32 above).

40. Lastly, the Government maintained, with regard to the constitutional appeal lodged in the present case, that it could not but have been rejected on the grounds of non-exhaustion (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). Also, the sheer volume of constitutional appeals lodged by the applicant society over the years (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above), as well as the specific role and function of the Constitutional Court, explained the excessive duration of the constitutional proceedings in the present case. The constitutional appeal nevertheless remained an effective remedy despite “indisputably” being of a “post‑hoc character”, in so far as it was the inevitable consequence of the requirement that appellants make use of all other effective domestic remedies first.

2. The applicant society’s submissions

41. The applicant society argued that a request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act did not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of the Court’s case‑law. The remedy in question was subject to complex and stringent conditions under Serbian law, which rendered it inaccessible in practice, particularly for individuals without legal representation or sufficient resources. In any event, the Government had provided no relevant case‑law to the contrary.

42. Such a request, even if accepted by the Administrative Court when lodged together with an appeal against a first‑instance administrative decision (see paragraph 28 above, Article 23 §§ 3 and 4), remained an effective remedy only until the relevant second-instance administrative body issued its own decision on appeal. The temporary nature of the postponement of enforcement could not therefore provide lasting redress, nor could it allow a public gathering to take place as planned. In the alternative, that is when a request to postpone enforcement was submitted within the framework of an administrative dispute itself, following the rejection of an administrative appeal at second instance (see paragraph 28 above, Article 23 §§ 1 and 2), the Administrative Court’s decision would typically be given after the scheduled date of the planned gathering and the remedy would therefore be devoid of any practical purpose.

43. At the same time, the likelihood of the Administrative Court dealing with administrative disputes on their merits within a sufficiently short period of time was negligible. Proceedings concerning decisions to prohibit public gatherings were not classified as urgent, either by law or by order of the President of the Administrative Court (see paragraph 30 above). In practice, decisions in such proceedings were frequently given months after the scheduled date of the gatherings. Statistical data also showed that the Administrative Court had dismissed 87.5% of all claims concerning prohibited public gatherings (reference was made to Freedom of Assembly in Serbia and Digital Technologies, YUCOM, July 2023, p. 16, in Serbian).

44. Lastly, the applicant society submitted that, in the specific circumstances of the present case and, more generally, when it came to the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, a constitutional appeal could not be considered an effective domestic remedy, partly because of the excessive duration of those proceedings and partly because of the Constitutional Court’s approach in adjudicating such cases. In any event, the applicant society had made use of this legal avenue but ultimately obtained no redress.

3. The Court’s assessment

45. The relevant principles governing the exhaustion of domestic remedies, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, have recently been summarised in the Court’s judgment in Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 21881/20, §§ 138-43, 27 November 2023, with further references).

46. With regard to the effectiveness of domestic remedies in the specific field of freedom of assembly, the Court requires that domestic law provides for adequate and effective legal safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the discretion left to the executive. This “judicial review must make it possible to obtain an assessment of the proportionality and necessity of the impugned restriction” in accordance with Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. In addition, “provided that the authorities are informed within the prescribed time‑limits, organisers ought to be able to obtain a judicial decision before the date of the planned events” (ibid., § 146, with further references).

47. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the Government provided no domestic case‑law indicating that requests to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 28 above) had ever been successful or even used in the context of prohibited public gatherings (see, for example, Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS), cited above, § 143, with further references), despite the Administrative Disputes Act being in force since 2009.

48. Furthermore, the relevant domestic legislation contains no legally binding time frame for the Administrative Court to give its decision in this context before the scheduled date of public protests (ibid., § 146; see also Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, no. 9106/06, § 35, 12 June 2012). Although Article 23 § 4 of the Administrative Disputes Act provides for a five‑day time‑limit for the Administrative Court to give a decision, it does not, however, require a decision to be given before the date of the proposed event (see paragraph 28 above). The same can be said for Order SU I-2 11/16 of the President of the Administrative Court of 10 February 2016 in which, despite a reference to “particular urgency”, no such requirement was included (see paragraph 30 above).

49. The applicant society’s claims were also dismissed by the Administrative Court in separate administrative disputes on their merits, well after the planned events were scheduled to take place (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 14 above). This demonstrates that any earlier request under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act would have been either obviously futile or, at best, purely theoretical (see, for example, Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS), cited above, §§ 139 and 142, with further references).

50. The Court also notes that the Constitutional Court has considered a request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act to be an effective remedy on only one occasion, in relation to the constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant society in the present case (see paragraph 16 above). On two other occasions, in cases also brought by the applicant society in which violations were found, the Constitutional Court raised no issue with regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. One of those decisions was given by that court in 2017, whereas the other was given only one month after the adoption of its decision in the present case (see paragraph 31 above).

51. Taking into account the above‑mentioned circumstances and its relevant case‑law, the Court is of the opinion that a request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act cannot be considered an effective remedy in the specific context of the present case and within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It follows that the Government’s objection in that regard must be dismissed.

52. It is further understood that the approach adopted by the Court in Đorđević and Others did not address the effectiveness of the remedy provided for in Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act. Instead, the Court considered that the matter in that case which had given rise to the complaints under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention could be considered resolved, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention, given the entry into force of the new Public Assembly Act in 2016 and the proactive attitude of the Constitutional Court prior to that development (see Đorđević and Others v. Serbia (dec.), no. 5591/10 and 3 others, §§ 56‑60, 17 January 2017).

53. The Court is also of the opinion that the Government’s remarks concerning the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above) are merely a clarification of their position on the relevant procedural developments and the overall effectiveness of constitutional redress, not a separate admissibility objection regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies in the present case. Accordingly, the Court will not address this matter separately (see, mutatis mutandis, Selimi and Krasnići v. Serbia, nos. 20641/20 and 20644/20, § 160, 3 June 2025).

54. The Court lastly considers that the applicant society’s complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded, nor is it inadmissible on any of the other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. The applicant society’s submissions

55. The applicant society reaffirmed its complaints as outlined in paragraph 36 above.

56. In addition, it submitted that the uniform wording of the prohibition orders further supported its argument that the decisions had not been based on thorough and individualised assessments.

57. The administrative authorities had failed to substantiate the existence of a real threat of violent counter‑demonstrations, relying instead on speculation. Even assuming that such a threat had existed, there was no evidence that the authorities had assessed the resources necessary to deal with it, contrary to the standards set out in the Court’s case‑law. As for the applicant society, it had not previously been involved in any physical confrontations.

58. The position adopted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that it had been impossible to estimate the number of expected participants had also been arbitrary. In any event, the inability to provide such estimates had not been sufficient to justify a blanket ban on the planned protests. Moreover, the Ministry’s response of 12 August 2016 (see paragraph 13 above) had been disclosed to the applicant society only in the Government’s written observations in the proceedings before the Court, thus limiting its ability to challenge the alleged failure to carry out proper security assessments in the course of the domestic judicial review proceedings.

59. Lastly, the applicant society contended that the relevant national authorities had failed to take any proactive steps towards conflict mitigation, in so far as they had not identified or engaged in dialogue with the purported organisers of the alleged counter‑demonstrations.

2. The Government’s submissions

60. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention in the present case. The decisions to prohibit the planned public gatherings had been based on Articles 8 and 15 of the Public Assembly Act and therefore fully in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above). Furthermore, they had pursued a legitimate aim – that is, the prevention of disorder and/or the protection of the rights of others. They also fell within the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State.

61. The relevant domestic authorities had anticipated an increased presence of Serbian citizens and nationals of the People’s Republic of China during the official visit of the Chinese President. The public gatherings announced by the applicant society had had the aim of protesting against the persecution of a group banned in that country. In the light of that fact, the Serbian authorities had conducted a security assessment and identified that the gatherings carried a substantial risk of confrontation between supporters of the Chinese government and the applicant society’s protestors, particularly owing to the sensitive nature of the protestors’ anticipated statements concerning the internal affairs of a foreign State.

62. Accordingly, the administrative authorities had exercised their power to prohibit the planned gatherings. Those decisions had been based on an earlier security assessment and had ultimately been reviewed by the Administrative Court. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had submitted detailed information to the Administrative Court indicating that the applicant society’s affiliation with a group proscribed in China could incite conflict between protestors and counter‑protestors. It had also stated that the lack of reliable data regarding the number of Falun Gong sympathisers in Serbia, combined with the organisation’s substantial global membership, further intensified the perceived risk (see paragraph 13 above).

63. Moreover, the proposed locations for the gatherings – that is, in close proximity to diplomatic missions, had been considered particularly sensitive, further reinforcing the justification for the decisions to prohibit them. Although the applicant society had anticipated only a modest number of participants, the authorities had considered this to be insufficient to rule out the possibility of a larger turnout or possible clashes between opposing groups.

64. Lastly, the Government referred to the Court’s case‑law relating to the fact that States enjoy a margin of appreciation in regulating the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention, even though any restrictions had to be interpreted narrowly. In the present case, however, they maintained that the authorities had acted within that margin, in full compliance with domestic legislation and the Court’s own case‑law.

3. The Court’s assessment
   1. Whether there has been an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly

65. The decisions by the relevant Serbian authorities to prohibit the applicant society’s planned public protests clearly constituted an interference with the exercise of its right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

66. The Court reiterates that such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 of the Convention unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.

2. Whether the interference was “prescribed by law”

67. The decisions to prohibit the public gatherings planned by the applicant society were based on Article 8 of the Public Assemblies Act (see paragraphs 19, 9 and 10 above, in that order). They were therefore “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention (see, for example, Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 410 and 411, 7 February 2017, with further references).

3. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim

68. The Court is prepared to accept the Government’s argument that the interference in question pursued the legitimate aim of the “prevention of disorder” (see paragraph 60 above), even if in the present case such concerns were rather vague (see paragraphs 61-63 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Pleshkov and Others v. Russia, nos. 29356/19 and 31119/19, § 61, 21 November 2023).

69. What remains to be examined therefore is whether the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of that aim. The Court reiterates in that regard that the right of peaceful assembly is one of the foundations of any democratic society, and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify an interference with that right (ibid., § 61, with further references).

4. Whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”

70. The relevant general principles in this context have been summarised in the Court’s judgment in Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 37553/05, §§ 142-60, ECHR 2015; see also Lashmankin and Others, cited above, § 412, among other authorities).

71. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that there is no evidence in the case file that the relevant Serbian authorities had carried out any specific security assessments before deciding to prohibit the public gatherings planned by the applicant society (see, mutatis mutandis, Fáber v. Hungary, no. 40721/08, § 40, 24 July 2012, with further references). Instead, they merely referred to the anticipated presence of a significant number of Chinese nationals in support of the visiting President of the People’s Republic of China. As the applicant society is an organisation banned in that country, the authorities concluded that its activities could be expected to incite conflict between opposing groups of demonstrators. This, in turn, carried a risk to public safety and property (see paragraphs 9, 10 and 14 above). In those circumstances, it is the Court’s view that the alleged risk of confrontation between the two groups of demonstrators remained speculative at best. The very similar wording of the prohibition orders and the decisions of the Administrative Court, all in the absence of specific factual substantiation, also only served to reinforce that impression (ibid.; see also, mutatis mutandis, Barankevich v. Russia, no. 10519/03, § 33 in fine, 26 July 2007), as did, importantly, the Constitutional Court’s decision Už. 13917/2019 finding a violation on those same grounds in a different case brought by the applicant society (see paragraph 31 above in fine). There was, in any event, nothing to indicate that the applicant society had previously engaged in violence of any sort (ibid.).

72. Moreover, on 12 August 2016 the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated, inter alia, that a spontaneous gathering of Serbian and Chinese nationals was expected to be held during the official visit of the President of the People’s Republic of China with the aim of expressing their support for him. Such expectations were based on information from alleged media reports. The Ministry highlighted that Falun Gong had a significant global presence, making it impossible to estimate the number of expected participants in the gathering. Such uncertainty surrounding the event made adequate preparation difficult and the Ministry concluded that allowing it to proceed could carry a risk of confrontation likely to endanger public safety and property. It further asserted that the relevant facts were “common knowledge” and, under Article 150 § 2 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act (see paragraphs 13, 24 and 27 above), did not therefore have to be established. The Court, however, considers that the wording of the prohibition orders, in particular, demonstrates that the relevant authorities’ decision‑making process was based on mere conjecture (see also, mutatis mutandis, paragraph 31 above in fine, in so far as it relates to the Constitutional Court’s own views of the probative value of “common knowledge” in this context).

73. Even if there had been a genuine risk of violent confrontation between the protestors and counter‑protestors, this, in and of itself, should not have resulted in the decisions to prohibit the planned public gatherings, without the authorities having first complied with their positive obligation to try to ensure the peaceful conduct of the planned events and the safety of all persons concerned. This could have included, inter alia, putting in place appropriate organisational measures or assessing what resources may be needed in that regard (see, for example, Barankevich, § 33, and Fáber, § 43, both cited above). Moreover, a positive obligation might have also required the authorities to propose an alternative location for the planned protests before resorting to a blanket ban (see, mutatis mutandis, Pleshkov and Others, cited above, §§ 57 and 58; see also paragraph 52 of the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 37 in fine cited in paragraph 35 above).

74. Lastly, it is clear that even if the public gatherings planned by the applicant society might have been perceived as annoying or giving offence to a group of counter‑protestors, this could not have absolved the Serbian authorities from the said positive obligation, as protests or rallies that may annoy or give offence are also protected under Article 11 of the Convention (see Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, 21 June 1988, § 32, Series A no. 139). Indeed, if every probability of tension and heated exchange between opposing groups during a demonstration were to warrant its prohibition, society would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing views on any question which offends the sensibilities of others (see, mutatis mutandis, Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 107, ECHR 2001-IX). It is understood, in this context, that even where some restrictions on planned public gatherings might be warranted, they should still, in so far as possible, allow participants to assemble at a location which is, because it is within sight or sound of the target audience or for some other reason, important to their purpose (see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, § 405, with further references; see also paragraph 53 of the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 37 cited in paragraph 35 above).

75. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the interference by the authorities with the applicant society’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly was not necessary in a democratic society.

76. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in the present case.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

77. The applicant society also complained under Article 13 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 11, that it had had no effective domestic remedy at its disposal. In particular, it complained that the judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court had been of a post hoc character and that the length of the proceedings in the Constitutional Court had been too long to be considered effective.

78. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

1. Admissibility

79. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded, nor is it inadmissible on any of the other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. The applicant society’s submissions

80. The applicant society reaffirmed its complaints as outlined in paragraph 77 above.

81. It also submitted that the Court had repeatedly found that failure to set a specific time frame for giving domestic court decisions prior to planned public gatherings constituted a clear violation of the Convention. Similarly, the relevant Serbian legislation did not indicate any time‑limit within which the Administrative Court had to deal with cases challenging, on their merits, decisions to prohibit public gatherings. Moreover, that court did not treat such cases as a matter of urgency (see paragraph 22 above in fine and paragraph 30 above). The applicant society further argued that despite its requests for urgency and its indication of the scheduled dates of the gatherings, the domestic courts’ decisions had often been delayed by several months or even years.

82. Lastly, the applicant society maintained that, according to an annual report on the functioning of the courts in Serbia published by the Supreme Court in 2024, the average time for the disposition of cases before the Administrative Court, on its merits, had increased by over 200% between 2012 and 2022, reaching 1,496 days. This had been largely due to its expanded jurisdiction and the prevalence of unlawful decisions given by the administrative authorities at lower levels.

2. The Government’s submissions

83. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 11. In so doing, they referred to Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act and their arguments already set out in paragraph 38 above.

84. As regards constitutional redress, the Government reiterated their earlier submissions summarised in paragraphs 39 and 40 above.

85. Ultimately, the Government concluded that, although no individual remedy could fully satisfy the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, the combined set of remedies available in a domestic legal system could collectively fulfil those requirements. The Government argued that that principle should apply in the present case.

3. The Court’s assessment

86. The Court reiterates that the effect of Article 13 is to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they comply with their obligations under this provision (see, among many other authorities, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 145, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V; see also Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07 and 2 others, § 97, 21 October 2010).

87. With regard to the effectiveness of domestic remedies in the specific field of freedom of assembly, the Court requires that domestic law provides for adequate and effective legal safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the discretion left to the executive. This “judicial review must make it possible to obtain an assessment of the proportionality and necessity of the impugned restriction” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. In addition, “provided that the authorities are informed within the prescribed time‑limits, organisers ought to be able to obtain a judicial decision before the date of the planned events” (see Communauté genevoise d’action syndicale (CGAS), cited above, § 146, with further references).

88. Turning to the present case, the Court has already found that the applicant society’s rights under Article 11 were infringed (see paragraphs 65‑76 above). It therefore had an arguable claim within the meaning of the Court’s case‑law and was thus entitled to a remedy satisfying the requirements of Article 13 (see, for example, Alekseyev, cited above, § 97 in fine, among other authorities).

89. Quite apart from whether domestic law, in theory and in practice, even allowed the Administrative Court to assess the “proportionality and necessity” of the decisions to prohibit the applicant society’s planned public gatherings (see paragraph 28 above and, in particular, Article 3 § 1 and Article 24 § 1 of the Administrative Disputes Act; see also, mutatis mutandis, Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 356-358, with further references), the Court notes that the applicant society pursued the administrative and judicial review remedies in a timely fashion (see paragraphs 7-14, 21, 22 and 28 above). Those remedial claims were then dismissed by the administrative authorities and, subsequently, the Administrative Court itself on 27 July 2016, 9 September 2016, and 25 May 2018 respectively (see paragraph 14 above). Since the public gatherings were scheduled to take place on 17 and 18 June 2016 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), it is evident that the applicant society’s judicial review claims, giving rise to administrative disputes, were adjudicated on the merits well after the planned events. Moreover, there was nothing in the relevant domestic legislation or practice to the effect that administrative disputes of that kind had to be concluded before planned public gatherings were set to take place (see paragraph 22 in fine; as well as paragraphs 28, 30 and 82 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, no. 1543/06, § 83, 3 May 2007; Alekseyev, cited above, § 99; and Lashmankin and Others, cited above, § 345).

90. The above conclusion as regards the post hoc character of the administrative disputes also applies to the constitutional appeal proceedings. Although the applicant society lodged its constitutional appeal on 18 July 2016, the Constitutional Court did not give a decision on the matter until 8 February 2024 – that is, almost seven years and seven months later (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above).

91. Lastly, the Court reiterates that it has already held that a request to postpone enforcement of an administrative decision under Article 23 of the Administrative Disputes Act cannot, in the specific circumstances of the present case, be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of the Convention (see paragraphs 45-51 above).

92. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant society was denied an effective domestic remedy in respect of its right to the freedom of peaceful assembly in breach of Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 11.

3. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

93. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

94. The applicant society did not make any claim in respect of pecuniary or non‑pecuniary damage or in respect of costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to make any such award.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 June 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis
Registrar President

[1] See https://en.falundafa.org/?v=bks04, last accessed on 17 February 2026.