GREIMERS proti Německu

FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 32135/23
Markus GREIMERS
against Germany

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 13 January 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Ana Maria Guerra Martins, President,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
András Jakab, judges,
and Veronika Kotek, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 32135/23) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 August 2023 by a German national, Mr Markus Greimers, who was born in 1963 and lives in München (“the applicant”);

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the applicant’s dismissal from work for having reported alleged shortcomings in the management of housing property directly to his employer’s supervisory board and the labour courts’ decisions confirming the lawfulness of the dismissal.

2. The applicant’s former employer, a non-profit limited liability company owned by the City of Munich, runs several hospitals in Munich as its core business. It also owns housing property that it rents out to students, trainees and employees. Members of the company’s supervisory board include, inter alia, the mayor of Munich. The management board is responsible for making business decisions and heading the departments. It reports to the supervisory board. The task of the internal audit department is to assist the management board in supervising the running of the company and report directly to the management board. The internal audit assesses the legality of all business activities and provides information on the achievement of the company’s business objectives. To discharge its duties, it has full access to information relating to all business activities of the company.

3. In April 2019 the applicant started working for the internal audit department. Between March and October 2020, the company warned the applicant several times, inter alia, for non-compliance with instructions and set deadlines for the completion of tasks assigned to him. In that regard, in an e-mail sent on 21 September 2020, the head of internal audit set a further deadline of 5 October 2020 for the applicant to complete three audit assessments.

4. According to the applicant, his superior, the head of the internal audit department, did not submit any of the applicant’s reports to the management board. The applicant also alleged that he had been asked to audit the management of the company’s housing property.

5. On 28 September 2020 and on 16 October 2020, respectively, the applicant sent e-mails to the head of the management board asking for a personal meeting. He proposed to discuss, inter alia, the situation in the internal audit department. He stated that it would not be helpful to engage with the head of department because she had been responsible for the undesirable developments to be discussed. He did not mention his findings on the company’s housing property.

6. On 19 October 2020 the head of the management board replied that the department of human resources had scheduled a meeting with the applicant, and that he would not interfere with an ongoing procedure.

7. On 30 October 2020 the applicant sent an e-mail to the mayor of Munich (using a general e-mail address accessible to the mayor’s staff members), the mayor’s deputy and the other fourteen members of the supervisory board. He proposed that the supervisory board request the management board to lower the vacancy rate of the company’s housing property. He justified his proposal by citing the reprehensibly high vacancy rate in comparison with the rates concerning housing property held by other municipal companies. He attached a table on figures of the vacancy rates of 2019 and 2020 and a document containing detailed information on the occupancy rates of the company’s specific properties.

8. On 5 November 2020 the company became aware of the applicant’s e‑mail, and on 16 November 2020 the company dismissed him without notice.

9. Following a hearing the Munich Labour Court on 15 July 2021 dismissed the applicant’s action against the dismissal, finding that it had been lawful as his e‑mail of 30 October 2020 to the supervisory board had constituted a grave breach of the duty of loyalty towards his employer and provided a “compelling reason” for the termination of the employment relationship without notice under Article 626 § 1 of the Civil Code (see Heinisch v. Germany, no. 28274/08, § 32, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). The seriousness of the misconduct had rendered the continuation of the employment relationship unacceptable and the dismissal without notice proportionate, without requiring another warning.

10. Following a hearing the Munich Labour Court of Appeal on 3 June 2022 dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and fact, confirming that the dismissal had been lawful. It found that the applicant had intended to expose the management board, and possibly also his superior, before the supervisory board for being ignorant. The court emphasised the applicant’s function within the company’s internal audit department, a unit entrusted with special powers to identify shortcomings and report them directly to the management board. The management board had thus relied on internal audit to supervise and lead the company’s business activities. The applicant had not reported either to his superior or to the management board the information contained in his e-mail, which he had only been able to gather by using the special powers of the internal audit.

The court also observed that there was a coincidence in time between the applicant’s e-mail of 28 September 2020 to the head of the management board and his superior’s e-mail of 21 September 2020 setting him a further deadline and putting him under pressure to complete three audit assessments. Furthermore, sending the e-mail of 30 October 2020 had carried the risk of third parties’ gaining access to and becoming aware of internal figures of the company.

11. The court held that the dismissal did not violate the applicant’s freedom of opinion under Article 5 of the Basic Law and under Article 10 of the Convention as the weighing of interests went in favour of the duty of loyalty. The applicant had not made any attempts to address his superiors before turning to the supervisory board. In the court’s view the applicant did not enjoy whistle-blower protection under Article 10 of the Convention because the vacancy rate in properties was not illegal and because the applicant had initially not considered himself as uncovering or publicly disclosing illegal conduct. The court held that in the present case there was no public interest comparable to the situation in the case of Heinisch (cited above), on which the applicant had relied for the first time in the appeal proceedings.

12. The court considered the dismissal without notice to be proportionate in the light of the severity of the breach of duty of loyalty and because there were no less intrusive means available. It considered the applicant’s age of 57 years at the time of the dismissal as a factor in his favour but weighed against him that he had been employed for a considerably short period, that the working relationship had been burdened with various problems concerning his performance and adherence to internal rules, and that he was highly qualified and had no maintenance obligations.

13. On 19 December 2022 the Federal Labour Court rejected the applicant’s application for leave to appeal on points of law, without giving further reasons.

14. On 6 April 2023 the Federal Constitutional Court did not admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons.

15. The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the labour courts had confirmed the lawfulness of his dismissal. He submitted that the dismissal had been disproportionate and that the courts had not properly balanced the conflicting interests at stake and had disregarded the special protection the Convention afforded to whistle-blowers.

16. He also complained under Article 6 of the Convention, alleging that the Munich Court of Appeal had failed to consider evidence and arguments he had submitted to prove that he had been tasked with auditing the property vacancies, that he had submitted the report to his superior before informing the supervisory board, and that he had reported to the supervisory board only after his superiors had remained passive. He further complained about other procedural shortcomings, most notably the Court of Appeal’s failure to apply domestic and European Union legislation on whistle-blower protection.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. Complaint under Article 10 of the Convention

17. The Court finds that the applicant’s dismissal, as upheld by the German courts, on account of his e-mail of 30 October 2020 to his employer’s supervisory board, constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.

18. It is satisfied that the interference, based on Article 626 § 1 of the Civil Code, was “prescribed by law”. It further considers that the interference was intended to protect the rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely, the business reputation and interests of the company (see Heinisch, cited above, §§ 48-49, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).

19. As to whether the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”, the general principles have been identified in Guja v. Moldova ([GC], no. 14277/04, §§ 72-78, ECHR 2008) and refined in Halet v. Luxembourg ([GC], no. 21884/18, §§ 121-54, 14 February 2023). They have also been held to apply in the context of employment contracts, taking into account an employee’s duty of loyalty, reserve and discretion owed to the employer (Heinisch, cited above, §§ 63-64, and, more recently, Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 15028/16, § 44, 27 August 2024).

20. The Court reiterates, in particular, its approach of assessing, firstly, the manner in which the domestic courts responded to the applicant’s arguments and, secondly, ruling on its compatibility with the principles and criteria set out in Halet and, if necessary, applying them itself (compare Halet, cited above, § 158).

21. Turning to the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the domestic courts did not assess the case specifically from a whistle-blowing perspective but rather applied the general principles pertaining to the right to freedom of expression and weighed this right against the duty of discretion and loyalty owed by employees to their employer. However, as the applicant raised a number of arguments pertaining to the criteria applicable in whistle‑blower cases and, at least in the proceedings before the Munich Court of Appeal, explicitly considered himself a whistle‑blower (see paragraph 11 above), he gave the national courts the opportunity to rule on his case in substance also from that perspective.

22. In examining, firstly, whether alternative channels for disclosure had been available, the Court of Appeal held that the applicant had had other effective reporting channels available before approaching the supervisory board. In line with internal reporting channels, he could have reported to the head of internal audit or, ultimately, to the management board. In this regard, the Court has found no violation in a case where the applicant was aware of internal reporting channels but had not complied with the chain of command, denying his superior the opportunity to act on the allegations made (see Soares v. Portugal, no. 79972/12, § 48, 21 June 2016; see also Heinisch, cited above, § 65).

23. Secondly, as regards the authenticity of the disclosed figures on vacancy rates, the Court notes that although those figures were under dispute, the domestic courts did not take evidence to verify their accuracy. However, the applicant claimed that the information stemmed from the department managing the company’s properties. In the Court’s view, he therefore did not need to doubt its authenticity or further assess its accuracy (see Halet, cited above, §§ 124-27).

24. Thirdly, the Court emphasises that the domestic courts did not assume that the applicant had acted in good faith as the Court of Appeal found that his primary goal had been to put pressure on and to miscredit the head of internal audit and the management board for having been ignorant and inactive. The court based its conclusion on the wording of the e-mail of 30 October 2020, the manner in which it had been sent to the supervisory board, and the fact that the applicant had not provided convincing evidence that he had attempted to notify his head of department or the management board beforehand. In this regard the court also took note of the temporal context of the applicant’s e‑mail of 28 September 2020 (see paragraph 10 above) (contrast Guja, cited above, § 93).

25. Fourthly, the Court recognises that the Court of Appeal assumed that there had been only a reduced public interest in the vacancy rates of the company’s property because renting property was not the company’s core business purpose, and that the situation was not comparable to the case of Heinisch which concerned alleged shortcomings in the care provided to patients in a geriatric nursing home.

26. Fifthly, the Court notes that according to the Court of Appeal the detrimental effects of sending the e-mail to all members of the supervisory board consisted in the risk that third parties might gain knowledge of confidential information and in exerting pressure on and discrediting the head of internal audit department and the management board for having been ignorant of the alleged shortcoming (see paragraph 10 above).

27. Lastly, regarding the severity of the sanction in relation to the legitimate aim pursued, the Court observes that the Court of Appeal held that there had been no less intrusive means because the applicant had deliberately committed a grave breach of his duty of loyalty. Furthermore, during his time at the company, the applicant had received nine warning letters without any visible effect on his behaviour. The court noted that despite dismissal without notice being the heaviest sanction under German labour law, in the light of the heavy violation of the applicant’s contractual duties to his employer, the latter’s interest in terminating outweighed the applicant’s interest in continuing his employment. The court weighed in the applicant’s favour that being 57 years of age he could encounter difficulties in finding employment elsewhere. It acknowledged however also that he was highly qualified, that he had spent a relatively short period in the company, and that he did not have any maintenance obligations.

28. The Court sees no reason to depart from the findings of the Munich Court of Appeal, in particular from its reasoning that the applicant in working for the internal audit, a department equipped with wide-ranging powers, had owed a particular duty of loyalty to the head of unit and the management board, that he had breached this duty by not availing himself of the internally prescribed reporting channels (compare Soares, cited above, § 48), thereby also calling into question his acting in good faith, and that he had in fact acted with the intention of exposing the head of internal audit department and the management board. The Court consequently accepts that the domestic courts held that the applicant’s dismissal was proportionate.

29. It follows that the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. Complaints under Article 6 of the Convention

30. The Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). It notes that in its judgment the Munich Court of Appeal comprehensively considered the applicant’s arguments and assessed the evidence submitted with no signs of arbitrariness or unfairness. It found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had been commissioned to examine the vacancies in the company’s properties, and that he had not provided evidence sufficient to satisfy the court that he had reported his findings to the head of department. Taking account of the fact that the applicant had not raised the issue of vacancies during his exchange with the head of the company’s management board (see paragraph 5 above), the court concluded that it had not been foreseeable that the applicant would directly approach the supervisory board.

31. Furthermore, it is not for this Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts (see Bochan, cited above, § 61). The Court observes that the Munich Court of Appeal did not follow the applicant’s arguments relating to domestic and European Union legislation on whistle‑blower protection in a manner that appears neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable.

32. It follows that the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention are manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 5 February 2026.

Veronika Kotek Ana Maria Guerra Martins
Acting Deputy Registrar President