CHALIDZE proti Gruzii

FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 57816/21
Davit CHALIDZE
against Georgia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 17 March 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Anja Seibert-Fohr, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
András Jakab, judges,
and Giorgi Badashvili, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 57816/21) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 November 2021 by a Georgian national, Mr Davit Chalidze (“the applicant”), who was born in Gori and was represented by Mr A. Merebashvili, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention to the Georgian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns, under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, a physical altercation between the applicant, who was a police officer at the material time, and several fellow police officers and the ineffectiveness of the ensuing investigation.

2. The applicant, who was an investigator with the Gori district police, submitted that on 31 July 2011 what began as a verbal altercation with a colleague at a police department had escalated into him being physically assaulted by several fellow officers. According to the official version of events, the applicant, who was under the influence of alcohol and was behaving aggressively, was ordered to surrender his weapon but refused to obey and, as a result, physical force had to be used to overcome his resistance.

3. The applicant was transferred to a temporary detention centre, where he underwent a visual examination which showed bruising to both upper eyelids and nose, redness on both wrists, and abrasions to his right arm. The record of the visual examination stated that the applicant, who smelled of alcohol, had alleged that he had been physically assaulted by police officers J.K., R.M., and M.T. On the same day a duty officer prepared a report describing the applicant’s injuries and identifying by name the police officers whom he had accused of ill-treatment. The report, which was then sent to the Human Rights Department of the Ministry of the Interior, also stated that a prosecutor from the District Prosecutor’s Office had been informed of the applicant’s allegations.

4. On 1 August 2011 the Gori District Court convicted the applicant of disobeying police orders and committing a minor breach of public order under the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to sixty days of administrative detention. The first-instance judge concluded that the applicant had verbally assaulted them and had required handcuffing to overcome his resistance. When interviewed, M.T., one of the police officers implicated by the applicant, stated in court that the applicant had self-harmed by hitting his head against the wall. The applicant’s conviction was upheld on appeal by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 3 August 2011.

5. On 12 and 30 December 2017 and 10 October 2019 the applicant secretly recorded his conversations with three police officers, M.T., Z.T. and G.B., in which they allegedly confirmed that he had not behaved aggressively during the above-mentioned incident.

6. On 19 August 2020 the applicant wrote to the Public Defender, detailing the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment and submitting the video recordings he had obtained. On 9 September 2020 the Public Defender wrote to the General Prosecutor’s Office enquiring about the progress of the investigation into the alleged incident.

7. On 15 September 2020 a criminal investigation was opened under Article 333 § 3 (b) of the Criminal Code (aggravated abuse of power) into the incident. Throughout 2021 the prosecution interviewed about eighty individuals, organised a forensic examination of the applicant’s medical file, and examined the applicant’s secret recordings of his conversations with the three police officers (see paragraph 5 above). Among those interviewed were ten police officers who had either witnessed or participated in the alleged incident. They all denied the applicant’s allegations and maintained that the force used had been strictly necessary in view of the applicant’s aggressive behaviour. Two police officers additionally stated that the applicant had tried to self-harm by hitting his head against the floor.

8. On 30 November 2020 the applicant wrote to the prosecutor’s office, requesting victim status. On 2 December 2020 his request was refused; his requests of 16 and 28 April, 28 June, 11 and 18 August and 9 November 2021 to the same effect were likewise refused. Following another round of refusals, the applicant lodged a complaint with a court. On 28 October 2022 the Gori District Court held that the evidence in the case file did not warrant granting him victim status.

9. On 31 October 2022 another investigation, concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in a separate incident in March 2011, was merged with that criminal case.

10. According to the case file, the criminal proceedings are still ongoing. The applicant was allowed access to the case file twice, on 8 February 2022 and 31 July 2024.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

11. The Government submitted, among other arguments, that the application had not been lodged with the Court with due expedition as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, because the applicant had failed to raise his grievances with the appropriate domestic authorities in a timely manner. The applicant replied that he had received death threats from the implicated police officers and had therefore been afraid to bring complaints against them. He further contended that more than fourteen years had elapsed since his ill-treatment and that no one had been punished.

12. The Court observes that the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment took place on 31 July 2011, whereas he formally lodged his complaint, via the Public Defender’s Office, nine years later, on 9 September 2020.

1. Period before 9 September 2020

13. As regards the applicant’s assertion that he had been afraid to voice his grievances, the Court notes that the present case is different from cases in which applicants had remained under the control of the police and/or prison officers who had allegedly ill-treated them. In the absence of specific evidence, the applicant’s situation cannot thus be regarded as one of particular vulnerability vis-à-vis the implicated police officers (contrast Gablishvili and Others v. Georgia, no. 7088/11, § 44, 21 February 2019, and Ochigava v. Georgia, no. 14142/15, § 51, 16 February 2023). The Court considers that the applicant must have been aware that no criminal proceedings had been initiated, given that, as the alleged victim, he had not been questioned by the authorities for more than nine years. Regardless of the authorities’ conduct, the applicant could not be absolved of his own obligation to take at least basic steps to seek information from the prosecuting authorities regarding the progress of any investigation. The nine-year delay in pursuing the matter therefore clearly indicates a lack of diligence on the applicant’s part in respect of the investigation (see Akhvlediani and Others v. Georgia (dec.), no. 22026/10, § 26, 9 April 2013, Manukyan v. Georgia (dec.), no. 53073/07, §§ 30-33, 9 October 2012; and Raush v. Russia (dec.), no. 17767/06, §§ 54‑62, 22 March 2016).

2. Period after 9 September 2020

14. As regards the opening of an investigation into the applicant’s allegations on 9 September 2020, the Court reiterates that, as a matter of principle, whenever new developments occur, for example newly discovered evidence comes to light, the obligation to investigate may be revived (see Egmez v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 12214/07, § 63, 18 September 2012). The nature and extent of any subsequent investigation required by the procedural obligation will inevitably depend on the circumstances of each particular case and may well differ from that to be expected immediately after the events in question have occurred. The scope of the fresh obligation to investigate will vary according to the nature of the purported new evidence or information. It may be restricted to verifying the reliability of the new evidence. Due to the lapse of time, the level of urgency may have diminished; the immediacy of required investigative steps in the aftermath of an incident is likely to be absent. The standard of expedition in such historical cases is much different from the standard applicable in recent incidents where time is often of the essence in preserving vital evidence at a scene and questioning witnesses when their memories are fresh and detailed (see Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 107, 5 July 2016, and, in the context of procedural obligations under Article 2, Treskavica v. Croatia, no. 32036/13, § 62, 12 January 2016).

15. Firstly, the Court is not persuaded that the formal opening of the investigation in 2020, in itself, amounted to a “revival” of the procedural obligation under Article 3, since, as a matter of principle, not every new assertion or allegation advanced by an alleged victim gives rise, automatically, to a fresh investigative obligation within the meaning of the Convention (compare Egmez, decision cited above, §§ 63-66; Israilov and Bakayeva [Committee], no. 20436/11, §§ 56-60, 30 January 2018; Dmitriyev v. Russia [Committee], no. 65263/09, 30 January 2018; and Afonichev v. Russia (dec.) [Committee], no. 26344/06, § 55, 2 June 2015). The Court further attaches significance to the fact that, although the applicant had been in possession of information allegedly capable of triggering a renewed investigative obligation as early as December 2017, he brought that information to the attention of the authorities only approximately two and a half years later, in August 2020 (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). Such a delay is again indicative of a lack of diligence on the applicant’s part, including in his subsequent attempts to revive the investigative obligation (compare Chong and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 29753/16, § 93, 11 September 2018, and Downes v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [Committee], no. 41630/22, 11 April 2023).

16. Even if accepting, arguendo, that the authorities’ procedural obligations were “revived” under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court would observe the following: the applicant’s allegation that the investigation has been conducted in a biased and subjective manner lacks substantiation, given that from the very first day the proceedings were entrusted to the prosecutor’s office, an authority independent from the police. As for the delay in conducting a proper medical examination, this was an inevitable consequence of the delay in initiating the investigation. The Court also notes that it was attributable, at least in part, to the applicant since he had not requested a medical examination in the immediate aftermath of the incident.

17. The Court further observes that, although the applicant was refused victim status in the proceedings, he cannot be regarded as having been entirely prevented from effectively participating in them, since he was granted access to the case file on at least two occasions. The Court reiterates that the obligation to conduct an effective investigation does not require applicants to have unfettered access to police files, or copies of all documents during an ongoing inquiry, or for them to be consulted or informed about every step (see Emin and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 59623/08 et el., § 35, 3 April 2012, with further references).

18. As regards the applicant’s grievance concerning the protracted nature of the investigation, the Court notes that, whilst it has to date lasted almost 5 years and 6 months, in 2022 it was merged with another criminal case, a development which unavoidably contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings (see paragraph 9 above). Whilst there was a relatively long period of inactivity due to the COVID‑19 pandemic, and the investigation stagnated again in 2023, the Court reiterates, that with the passage of time, the level of urgency necessarily diminished in the present case (see the general principles cited in paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, it appears from the case file that the relevant authorities undertook necessary investigative measures (see paragraph 7 above) and that important witness statements are contradictory or lack detail owing to the significant lapse of time since the alleged incident. In such circumstances, having regard in particular to the cumulative effect of the applicant’s own lack of due diligence (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above), which created objective constraints on the effectiveness of the investigation, the Court does not consider that the length of the proceedings, taken on its own, suffices to call into question the effectiveness of the investigation.

3. Conclusion

19. In the light of the foregoing considerations, and having regard to the cumulative effect of the various grounds of inadmissibility identified above, the Court considers that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 9 April 2026.

Giorgi Badashvili Anja Seibert-Fohr
Acting Deputy Registrar President