Přehled
Rozhodnutí
FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 15860/22
Gulzar HUSSAIN
against Denmark
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 19 March 2026 as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Gilberto Felici,
Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Sophie Piquet, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 15860/22) against the Kingdom of Denmark lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 March 2022 by a Pakistani national, Mr Gulzar Hussain (“the applicant”), who was born in 1959, lived in Odense and was represented by Mr Glenn Verding Hein, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Danish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their Co‑Agent, Ms Nina Holst‑Christensen, from the Ministry of Justice;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicant entered Denmark at the age of 15.
2. By a High Court judgment of 20 June 2019, the applicant was convicted, on 20 May 2018, of having committed the offences of deprivation of liberty, assault and making threats. He was sentenced to three years and three months’ imprisonment, and warned of the risk of expulsion.
3. It was subsequently established that the applicant had committed similar offences on 21 May 2018. By a High Court judgment of 6 August 2021, which became final on 14 February 2022, the applicant was convicted of those offences which he had committed before his conviction on 20 June 2019. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment as a supplementary penalty. He was also ordered to be deported from Denmark with a lifelong ban on re‑entry.
4. The applicant was deported on 23 December 2022.
5. The applicant complained that the deportation order had been in violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
6. The Court notes that the general principles applicable to cases involving the expulsion of settled immigrants are well‑established in the Court’s case‑law (see, in particular, Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, §§ 54‑60, ECHR 2006-XII; Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, §§ 68‑76, ECHR 2008; and Savran v. Denmark [GC], no. 57467/15, §§ 181-89 and 194, 7 December 2021).
7. The Court also notes the numerous cases against Denmark concerning the expulsion of settled immigrants (see, among other authorities, Miari v. Denmark, no. 2852/24, 15 July 2025; Sharafane v. Denmark, no. 5199/23, 12 November 2024; Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, no. 14171/23, 12 November 2024; Savuran v. Denmark, no. 3645/23, 12 November 2024; Winther v. Denmark, no. 9588/21, 12 November 2024; Noorzae v. Denmark, no. 44810/20, 5 September 2023; Sharifi v. Denmark, no. 31434/21, 5 September 2023; Al‑Masudi v. Denmark, no. 35740/21, 5 September 2023; Avci v. Denmark, no. 40240/19, 30 November 2021; and Abdi v. Denmark, no. 41643/19, 14 September 2021), and concerning the expulsion of immigrants who entered the country as adults (see, for example, Assem Hassan Ali v. Denmark, no. 25593/14, 23 October 2018; Salem v. Denmark, no. 77036/11, 1 December 2016; Hamesevic v. Denmark (dec.), no. 25748/15, 16 May 2017; Lagergren v. Denmark (dec.), no. 18668/03, 16 October 2006; and Bajrami v. Denmark (dec.) [Committee], no. 24379/20, 22 February 2022).
8. The Court considers it established that there was an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life within the meaning of Article 8, that the expulsion order and the re‑entry ban were “in accordance with the law”, and that they pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder and crime (see also, for example, Salem, cited above, § 61).
9. As to the question of whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court recognises that the domestic courts thoroughly examined each relevant criterion set out, for example, in Maslov (cited above, §§ 72-73).
10. The applicant was 15 years old when he moved to Denmark; he was not born in Denmark and had not spent all or a major part of his childhood and adolescence there. The Court considers that “very serious reasons” are not therefore required to justify expulsion (see, a contrario, Maslov, cited above, § 75, and Mavric v. Denmark (dec.), no. 17803/20, § 26, 29 March 2022).
11. As regards the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life, the domestic courts took the relevant factors into account, which included the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by the applicant; the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he was going to be expelled; the nationalities of the various individuals concerned; and the solidity of his social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
12. In making an overall assessment, the High Court took into account, among other things, the fact that the applicant had been resident in Denmark for nearly 45 years, had strong ties with Denmark, and that his wife and minor children also lived there. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had committed similar very serious offences two days in a row – that is, on 20 and 21 May 2018, that the applicant had strong and lasting ties with Pakistan, and that his wife and children, also of Pakistani origin, could follow him there.
13. In respect of the criterion “the best interests and well‑being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any of the applicant’s children are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled”, it is noted that in its judgment Jeunesse v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 12738/10, § 109, 3 October 2014), which concerned family reunification, the Court reiterated “that there is a broad consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance ... Whilst alone they cannot be decisive, such interests certainly must be afforded significant weight. Accordingly, national decision‑making bodies should, in principle, advert to and assess evidence in respect of the practicality, feasibility and proportionality of any removal of a non‑national parent in order to give effective protection and sufficient weight to the best interests of the children directly affected by it.”
14. Whilst this principle applies to all decisions concerning children, the Court notes that in the context of the removal of a non‑national parent as a consequence of a criminal conviction, the decision first and foremost concerns the offender. Furthermore, as case-law has shown, in such cases the nature and seriousness of the offence committed or the offending history may outweigh the other criteria to be taken into account (see, for example, Üner, cited above, §§ 62-64, and Salem, cited above, § 76).
15. The Court further notes that the applicant’s children were born in around 2004 and 2006; they were therefore approximately 18 and 16 years old on the date that the applicant was deported – that is, 23 December 2022.
16. The applicant has not pointed to any obstacles to his wife and children visiting him in Pakistan, or to maintaining contact in other ways, for example, via the telephone or the internet.
17. Lastly, the domestic courts found that the expulsion order combined with a permanent re‑entry ban was a proportionate measure to prevent disorder and crime.
18. The Court has previously found such a ban to be disproportionate on account of its unlimited duration, whereas in other cases it has considered the limited duration of an exclusion order to be a factor weighing in favour of its being proportionate (see, for example, Savran, cited above, §§ 182 and 199, and the cases cited therein). One of the elements relied on in this connection has been whether the offence leading to the expulsion order was of such a nature that the person in question posed a serious threat to public order (see, among other authorities, Ezzouhdi v. France, no. 47160/99, § 34, 13 February 2001; Keles v. Germany, no. 32231/02, § 59, 27 October 2005; and Bousarra v. France, no. 25672/07, § 53, 23 September 2010, in which the Court found that the individuals in question did not pose a serious threat to public order; see also Mutlag v. Germany, no. 40601/05, §§ 61-62, 25 March 2010, and Balogun v. the United Kingdom, no. 60286/09, § 49, 10 April 2012, in which the Court found that the individuals in question did pose a serious threat to public order).
19. In the present case, the Court does not call into question the finding that the applicant’s offences leading to the expulsion order were of such a nature that he posed a serious threat to public order at the time (see also, among other authorities and mutatis mutandis, Abdi, cited above, § 39; Mutlag, cited above, §§ 61-62; Balogun, cited above, § 53; Noorzae, cited above, § 32; and Sharifi, cited above, § 33).
20. Taking account of all the factors described above, the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s private and family life was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons. It notes that at all levels of jurisdiction there was an explicit and thorough assessment of whether the expulsion order could be considered to be contrary to Denmark’s international obligations. The Court points out in this connection that where independent and impartial domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the relevant human rights standards consistently with the Convention and its case‑law, and adequately weighed up the applicant’s personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities. The only exception to this is where there are shown to be strong reasons for doing so (see Savran, cited above, § 189). In the Court’s opinion, such strong reasons are absent in the present case.
21. It follows that the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 April 2026.
Sophie Piquet María Elósegui
Acting Deputy Registrar President