DZYON proti Ukrajině

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF DZYON v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 44249/17)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

12 February 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Dzyon v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Gilberto Felici, President,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 44249/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 October 2017 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Valentyn Ivanovych Dzyon (“the applicant”), who was born in 1954, lives in Selyshche (Vinnytsya Region), and was represented by Mr B. Linkevych, a lawyer practising in Tyvriv (Vinnytsya Region);

the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 22 January 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

introduction

1. The present case concerns the applicant’s complaints that State agents were responsible for the death of his son, a police investigator, at his workplace and that the investigation into the incident had not been effective, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention.

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

2. Having graduated from the Odesa State University of Internal Affairs, the applicant’s son was appointed to the post of investigator at the Staromiskyi district police station under the Vinnytsya city department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the Staromiskyi police station”) on 28 February 2010.

3. Following his appointment, the applicant’s son underwent several medical and psychological examinations and tests, which did not reveal any abnormalities, except for emotional immaturity when encountering difficulties.

4. On 19 May 2010, at around 6.13 p.m., the applicant’s son died in his office from a gunshot to the chest in the area around his heart; he also had multiple scratches and bruises on his head. The pistol found at the scene belonged to his superior, S. On the same day an inspection of the premises of the Staromiskyi police station was carried out.

5. On 21 May 2010 the Staromiskyi district prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the offence of negligence in official duties leading to grave consequences (Article 367 § 2 of the Criminal Code). On the same day material evidence, including antidepressants found in the applicant’s son’s desk drawer and his personal file, were seized and examined.

6. Between 26 May 2010 and 14 February 2011 a significant number of forensic expert examinations (medical, ballistic, psychological and psychiatric) were ordered and carried out.

The experts discovered one gunshot entry wound to the front of the deceased’s chest and an exit wound to his back, concluding that the bullet had been fired from a close range, from in front of the deceased, and had followed a downward trajectory. The experts ruled out the possibility that the bullet had been fired from behind the deceased. At the time the bullet had been fired, the applicant’s son could have been sitting on a chair behind a desk. There was no objective forensic evidence to suggest that somebody had moved or touched the applicant’s son’s body after his death.

The experts also noted that there were abrasions, scratches and bruises on the applicant’s son’s head. Those injuries could have occurred shortly before his death and could have been caused by contact with blunt objects – such as the pistol bolt – when he had bowed his head with his arms crossed at the time of the shot, or surrounding objects (stereo speaker, ashtray, heating pipe, floor) – as a result of the fall during the agonal period. The experts did not record any other injuries to other parts of the applicant’s son’s body, including his hands and feet, which could have been inflicted as a result of an assault or struggle.

The experts pointed out that the applicant’s son had never demonstrated any signs of increased suggestibility, a tendency to fantasise, or suicidal ideation.

7. On 27 May 2010 S. was charged with negligence in his official duties.

8. Between 28 and 31 May 2010 the applicant, his wife and his other son were granted victim status and questioned in that capacity.

The applicant testified that he had not been aware of any conflict within his son’s investigation team, except for work‑related disputes with his superiors, K. and S., and that his son had not complained about anyone else. According to the applicant, his son had enjoyed working in the team, had had no congenital or chronic diseases, had not been on any medication and had not smoked or drunk alcohol. The applicant also testified that on 19 May 2010 at around 5.15 p.m. his son had spoken to his mother on the telephone and had told her that K. and S. were “bitches” (суки). At about 6.10 p.m. K. had telephoned the applicant and had informed him that his son had barricaded himself in his office and that their attempts to open it had failed; K. had asked the applicant to come to the station and had stated that he “did not want to go to prison”.

The applicant later changed his testimony, stating that K. and S. had been pressuring his son to arrest a suspect, L., in order to take a bribe from him (L.). The applicant alleged that owing to his son’s refusal to engage in illegal activities, he had been severely beaten and shot by his superiors and other colleagues.

The applicant’s wife and his other son confirmed the applicant’s above‑mentioned testimony. L.’s lawyer, V., also confirmed that when she had been at the Staromiskyi police station, the applicant’s son had argued with K. as to the necessity of arresting her client.

9. Between 2 and 22 June 2010 a significant number of witnesses, including the applicant’s son’s superiors and colleagues, were questioned. A reconstruction of events was conducted with their participation.

According to S., on 19 May 2010 at about 4.30 p.m. he put his service pistol and ammunition into his office safe and locked it with a key which he then left in his desk drawer. At around 5.41 p.m. the applicant’s son telephoned him, expressing his dissatisfaction with S.’s instruction to question L.’s relatives. At about 6 p.m. a meeting was held in the office of his superior, K., at which all the investigators at the Staromiskyi police station were present, except for the applicant’s son. K. then tried to telephone the applicant’s son, who was in his office, but when they went there they found the door locked and the entrance blocked by a bookcase. The applicant’s son asked them not to come in and K. then telephoned the applicant to explain the situation involving his son. After gaining access to the office by using a spare key and moving the bookcase, they discovered the applicant’s son inside, standing close to the safe. At that point, K. ordered S. to remove all the criminal case files from the applicant’s son’s desk and safe. While doing so, S. heard a gunshot; the applicant’s son had shot himself. The body of the applicant’s son was initially seated behind the desk and then fell from the chair to the floor. S. discovered his pistol lying on the desk and the pistol holster on top of the safe. At the time of the incident there was nobody in the office, except for S. and the applicant’s son.

K. confirmed S.’s testimony in part. According to K., having noticed the absence of the applicant’s son at the meeting, he telephoned him three times and the applicant’s son informed him that he was in his own office. When he and S. managed to gain access to the applicant’s son’s office, the applicant’s son was standing behind the bookcase between the safe and the desk and was smiling. K. called the applicant from his office and spoke to him by telephone, without any witnesses being present. K. was not present at the time the pistol was fired, but was in the office when the body of the applicant’s son fell to the floor, along with the chair. The applicant’s son was a quiet and introverted person who had a normal working relationship with everyone in the team, meaning that he could approach any of the investigators to discuss work‑related matters. His caseload did not include any high-profile or serious cases; he dealt only with routine matters such as suspending criminal proceedings, investigating minor offences and referring them to court. There were no major questions related to his performance, but he did have serious difficulties in coping with work-related issues. There was no ongoing conflict between the applicant’s son and his colleagues at the time of his death. As a new employee, the applicant’s son was treated leniently.

Ts., an investigator with the team, confirmed the testimony of S. and K. in part. She explained that before she had heard the gunshot, the applicant’s son had been sitting at his desk and she had been standing in the corridor leading to his office. After the gunshot, she had seen the applicant’s son slumped over the desk with a pistol in his right hand. Having noticed the blood, she had started screaming and had then seen the applicant’s son’s body fall from the chair to the floor.

Other investigators at the Staromiskyi police station also confirmed the above‑mentioned statements in part. They explained that the atmosphere in the investigation unit had been friendly and that there had been no conflict. The applicant’s son had not complained to them that K. and S. had been pressurising him to engage in illegal activities. He had often stayed late at work and had sometimes even spent the night there. The applicant’s son’s colleagues noted that he had appeared isolated and alienated when they had spent time together.

10. Between 2 and 30 June 2010 the Staromiskyi police station’s IT system was examined and an additional inspection of the premises was carried out.

11. On 14 June 2010 responsibility for carrying out the investigation was entrusted to the investigation department of the public prosecutor’s office in Vinnytsya Region.

12. Between 29 July 2010 and 17 January 2011 the premises of the Staromiskyi police station were inspected on several different occasions; the witnesses were questioned again, and there were formal confrontations between the witnesses and the applicant.

13. On 7 June 2011 a bill of indictment was issued against S. According to that indictment, on 19 May 2010 at about 4.30 p.m. S. put his service pistol and ammunition into his office safe and locked it with a key, which he then left in his desk drawer. Taking advantage of S.’s absence from his office, the applicant’s son entered it, opened the safe and took possession of S.’s service pistol; the applicant’s son then took the weapon to his office, where he shot himself at approximately 6.13 p.m. On the same day the criminal case was sent for trial to the Staromiskyi District Court in Vinnytsya, and was subsequently transferred to the Vinnytsya City Court.

14. On 29 April 2013 S. was convicted as charged and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. However, that sentence was suspended, subject to a two-year probation period. The Vinnytsya City Court upheld the charge brought against S. relating to the negligent storage of a service weapon, given that his service pistol had been taken by the applicant’s son and used to take his own life. That court also rejected the applicant’s claim that his son had been murdered, citing a lack of evidence. It likewise rejected other alternative explanations, including the possibility of a fatal accident and the applicant’s son being driven to suicide.

15. On 12 August 2013 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision owing to numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in the witnesses’ statements and forensic evidence, and ordered a fresh investigation into the incident. That court also pointed out that the investigating authorities had not properly checked the applicant’s statement about the lack of an identifiable motive for his son’s suicide or his claim that his son had been murdered by his colleagues because of a work‑related conflict. Nor had the authorities proved that the applicant’s son had stolen S.’s service pistol from his office.

16. On 5 September 2013 a criminal investigation was opened into the offences of murder, theft and appropriation of a service weapon, abuse of power by experts, abuse of power by police officers, and the artificial creation by an expert of evidence relating to a criminal offence (Article 115 § 1, Article 262 § 1, Article 364 § 2, Article 365 § 2 and Article 383 § 2 of the Criminal Code).

17. Between 20 September 2013 and 26 October 2018 more than 20 forensic expert examinations were carried out, numerous witnesses and experts were questioned again, and the witnesses were questioned simultaneously on more than ten separate occasions.

18. On 13 November 2019 responsibility for carrying out the investigation was entrusted to the Khmelnytskyi Department of the State Bureau of Investigations.

19. On 10 February 2020 a criminal investigation was opened into the negligent storage of a service weapon resulting in the death of a person (Article 264 of the Criminal Code). The next day S. was charged with the above‑mentioned criminal offence and negligence in official duties leading to grave consequences (Article 367 § 2 of the Criminal Code).

20. On 9 April 2020 the investigation material relating to the offences of murder, theft and appropriation of a service weapon, abuse of power by experts, abuse of power by police officers, and the artificial creation by an expert of evidence relating to a criminal offence was divided into separate criminal proceedings. The next day the investigation into the negligent storage of a service weapon resulting in the death of a person and the negligence in official duties leading to grave consequences was completed, and the criminal case against S. was sent to the Vinnytsya City Court for trial.

21. On 22 June 2020 the Vinnytsya City Court terminated the proceedings against S. owing to the expiry of the statutory five‑year limitation period for the relevant criminal offences. That decision was upheld by the Vinnytsya Court of Appeal on 23 October 2020, and subsequently by the Supreme Court on 11 May 2021.

22. In October 2022 an additional forensic medical examination was ordered in the context of the proceedings in respect of the offences of murder, theft and appropriation of a service weapon, abuse of power by experts, abuse of power by police officers, and the artificial creation by an expert of evidence relating to a criminal offence. According to the examination report of 13 December 2022, the experts concluded that multiple bruises found on the applicant’s son’s head could not have occurred as a result of his fall during the agonal period before his death. In addition, the experts noted that the witness statements regarding the position of the applicant’s son at the time he had been shot were questionable and contradicted the forensic evidence.

23. An investigating judge at the Vinnytsya District Court examined the applicant’s complaint, and in August 2024 a criminal investigation was opened into the alleged torture and murder of his son by colleagues, committed with extreme cruelty (Article 115 § 2 (4) and Article 127 § 3 of the Criminal Code).

24. In September 2024 the above‑mentioned proceedings were joined to the proceedings in respect of the offences of murder, theft and appropriation of a service weapon, abuse of power by experts, abuse of power by police officers, and the artificial creation by an expert of evidence relating to a criminal offence.

25. The investigation into the death of the applicant’s son is still ongoing.

• THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

26. The applicant complained that State agents had been responsible for the death of his son at his workplace and that the investigation into the matter had not been effective. The applicant relied on Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.

27. The Court, which is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that the complaints at issue fall to be examined under the procedural and substantive limbs of Article 2 of the Convention (see Igor Shevchenko v. Ukraine, no. 22737/04, § 38, 12 January 2012).

1. Admissibility

28. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention should be declared manifestly ill‑founded, given that the domestic investigation into the circumstances surrounding his son’s death had made it possible to establish the facts and to determine whose negligence had been a contributing factor in the applicant’s son’s suicide. According to the Government, the investigation had been independent, adequate, diligent and prompt; the applicant had had access to the investigation material, had been duly informed about its course, and had fully exercised his rights as a victim.

As to the substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention, the Government asserted that the applicant’s complaint should be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, in so far as the domestic investigation had found that the applicant’s son had unexpectedly taken his own life at his workplace and that neither the State authorities nor State agents could be held liable for his death.

29. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints under Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural and substantive limbs are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. Procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention

30. The Government did not comment on the merits of the applicant’s complaints under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. Instead, they merely raised objections as to admissibility.

31. The applicant insisted that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.

32. The Court has previously held that once the obligation to conduct an effective investigation is triggered, compliance with the procedural requirement of Article 2 of the Convention is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters: the adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the deceased person’s family and the independence of the investigation. Those elements are inter‑related and each of them, taken separately, does not amount to an end in itself (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 225, 14 April 2015).

Moreover, the obligation to conduct an effective investigation is not an obligation of results to be achieved but of means to be employed. The Court accepts that not every investigation is necessarily successful or comes to a conclusion coinciding with the claimant’s account of events. However, an investigation should, in principle, be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71, ECHR 2002-II).

33. Turning to the present case, the Court notes at the outset that the domestic authorities were under a procedural obligation to investigate the circumstances of the applicant’s son’s death, in particular to establish whether there had been a suicide or a murder (see Masneva v. Ukraine, no. 5952/07, § 52, 20 December 2011).

34. The Court observes that shortly after the death of the applicant’s son, a full‑scale criminal investigation was launched into negligence in official duties, and a significant number of necessary investigative steps were taken in order to establish the basic circumstances surrounding the fatal incident (see paragraphs 4-14 above). However, more than three years after the proceedings had been instituted, the domestic court ordered a fresh investigation after concluding that there had been serious deficiencies in the previous investigation (see paragraph 15 above), and the most recent expert examination ultimately cast doubt on the credibility of the previous expert examinations and the reliability of the witness statements (see paragraph 22 above).

As a result, the investigation into the death of the applicant’s son has been ongoing for over 15 years, with no foreseeable date of completion. Such a protracted investigation has enabled the person whose negligence indirectly contributed to the incident to be exempted from criminal liability, because the limitation period expired (see paragraph 21 above). Furthermore, it cannot be concluded that the overall length of the investigation was justified by the circumstances of the case. In that regard, the Court reiterates that the effectiveness of an investigation implies a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition. Even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful acts. Moreover, with the passage of time, the prospects that any effective investigation can be undertaken will increasingly diminish (see Indylo v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 71056/14, § 36, 13 February 2025).

35. In addition, the Court considers that the following undisputed deficiencies indicate that the investigation undertaken fell short of the required standard of effectiveness. The investigation was criticised by the domestic court for not being effective. In particular, the court found that (i) there had been a failure to examine the applicant’s claims that there was no identifiable motive for his son’s suicide and that his colleagues could have been involved in his death (see Pozhyvotko v. Ukraine, no. 42752/08, § 40, 17 October 2013); (ii) there had been an unusually high number of repeated forensic expert examinations, which suggested a lack of a comprehensive approach to the collection of evidence (see Basyuk v. Ukraine, no. 51151/10, § 68, 5 November 2015); and (iii) there had been a lack of thoroughness and promptness, which had undermined the domestic authorities’ ability to establish the circumstances of the case in full, most notably the origin of multiple minor injuries found on the applicant’s son’s body (see Zubkova v. Ukraine, no. 36660/08, § 40, 17 October 2013).

36. Having regard to its well‑established case-law on the subject (see, among many other authorities, Masneva, cited above, §§ 49-59), the Court concludes that in the present case, the State failed to discharge its obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the death of the applicant’s son.

37. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.

2. Substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention

38. The Government submitted that the State could not be held responsible for the death of the applicant’s son, which had been unforeseeable in the circumstances, since there was nothing to suggest that the domestic authorities had known or ought to have known that his life had been subject to a real and immediate risk, triggering the State’s obligation to take appropriate preventive measures.

39. The applicant disagreed with the Government’s submissions. He insisted that his son had been tortured and killed by his superiors, who were police officers, for his refusal to engage in illegal activities.

40. The Court reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see, for example, Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000‑VII).

41. The Court has extended that principle to situations where individuals were found injured, dead or disappeared in areas under the exclusive control of the authorities and there was prima facie evidence that State agents could be involved (see Akkum and Others v. Turkey, no. 21894/93, § 211, ECHR 2005-II (extracts), and Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944/06 and 4 others, § 97, 18 December 2012, with further references).

42. Turning to the present case, the Court takes note that it should be distinguished from cases in which individuals deprived of their liberty, as well as individuals carrying out compulsory military service, were under the exclusive control of the authorities (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, § 91, ECHR 2001‑III, and Mosendz v. Ukraine, no. 52013/08, § 92, 17 January 2013). The Court further observes that, despite the applicant’s claims about the possible involvement of the police officers in his son’s death and the serious deficiencies in the domestic investigation (see paragraphs 34-37 above), the available evidence does not enable the Court to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that State agents were responsible for the death of the applicant’s son.

43. The Court also notes that the applicant did not state that his son had been driven to suicide or subjected to bullying before his death, or that there had been a real and immediate risk of suicide, triggering the State’s duty to take appropriate preventive measures to protect his life. In any event, the Court has no evidence before it that would indicate that the domestic authorities ought to have acted in anticipation of such a risk (see, for similar conclusions, Masneva, cited above, § 70).

44. Thus, in finding no coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact that the State failed to protect the life of the applicant’s son, and in the absence of a final domestic decision establishing conclusively the cause and circumstances of his death, there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb.

• APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

45. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

• FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb;
3. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
Deputy Registrar President