ZAGANJORI proti Albánii

THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 18559/20
Xhezair ZAGANJORI
against Albania

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 3 March 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Peeter Roosma, President,
Diana Kovatcheva,
Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 18559/20) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 April 2020 by an Albanian national, Mr Xhezair Zaganjori (“the applicant”), who was born in 1957 and lives in Tirana, and was represented by Mr A. Toslluku, a lawyer practising in Tirana;

the withdrawal of Mr Darian Pavli, the judge elected in respect of Albania, from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court);

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to respect for private life to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by Mr O. Moçka, General State Advocate, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the applicant’s dismissal from office under the Vetting Act (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19, 9 February 2021).

2. The applicant served as a Constitutional Court judge from 2003. In 2013 he was appointed to the Supreme Court and served as its President.

3. On 24 July 2018 the Independent Qualification Commission (“the IQC”) confirmed the applicant in office under all three components of the vetting process (assessment of assets, background integrity assessment and professional assessment). Although it identified certain irregularities and inconsistencies concerning the assessment of assets, it considered that they did not justify the dismissal from office.

4. The Public Commissioner appealed to the Special Appeal Chamber (“the SAC”) regarding the assessment of assets.

5. The SAC held several hearings and re-examined the case on the basis of submissions made by the Public Commissioner and the applicant, and the evidence adduced by them. By a decision of 26 July 2019, the SAC unanimously reversed the IQC’s decision and dismissed the applicant from office under section 61 (3) of the Vetting Act. It held as follows.

6. The applicant had bought a flat in Durrës for 32,000 United States dollars (USD) with a sale contract signed on 6 July 2006 and the payment had been made outside the notary office. In his 2006 declaration, he had stated that 1,250,000 Albanian leks (ALL) had been withdrawn from the Italo‑Albanian Bank in May 2006. In the vetting declaration, the source of this asset was reported as personal and rental income. During the vetting proceedings, he explained that USD 16,000 had been withdrawn from a deposit in the American Bank of Albania. He stated that the account in that bank had been opened with a starting amount of USD 16,000, then increased by a further USD 15,000 in 2004 and USD 16,000 in 2005. The account in the Italo-Albanian Bank had been opened with ALL 1,200,000. He further stated that the amount of USD 16,000 “should have been given at the beginning of 2006” (“duhet të jetë dhënë në fillim të vitit 2006”). However, the applicant made an incorrect/inaccurate statement by claiming that USD 16,000 had been withdrawn from the American Bank of Albania account to finance the purchase. Bank records showed that the relevant deposit account, opened in December 2004 with USD 16,093, had increased to USD 31,576 by December 2005 and had remained largely unchanged until 2008, indicating that no withdrawal had occurred. The deposit of ALL 1,200,000 (equivalent to approximately USD 12,000) from the account opened in the Italo-Albanian Bank in 2004 had been withdrawn in April 2006.

7. The applicant had the financial ability to cover expenses and savings with lawful income (kishte mundësi financiare për të mbuluar me të ardhura të ligjshme shpenzimet dhe kursimet) in the amount of ALL 455,199 (approximately 3,275 euros (EUR)) for 2011, but was financially unable to do the same for 2012 in the amount of ALL 1,402,445 and for 2014 in the amount of ALL 1,530,109 (approximately EUR 21,000 in total). In reaching that conclusion, the SAC excluded the applicant’s official expenses in the amount of EUR 5,207 from the calculations concerning the household expenses. The SAC dismissed the applicant’s claim that he had declared annually and that he had had, including in 2012 and 2014, ALL 900,000 (approximately EUR 6,450) in cash on hand. Although he had declared ALL 300,000 for 2003 and ALL 600,000 for 2004, he had never reported any changes afterward, despite a legal obligation to declare all additions or reductions in cash every year. No trace of that amount appeared in subsequent annual declarations or in the vetting declaration.

8. The applicant made an inaccurate declaration regarding his expenditures in respect of two family members’ education and living expenses abroad.

(a) During the vetting proceedings he had declared various amounts for 2008-2014. The SAC generally accepted those amounts as confirmed by bank activity (apparently deposited into those family members’ accounts), which totalled over 82,000 British pounds sterling (GBP) for 2008-2013 – including GBP 17,386 for 2010 and GBP 20,565 for 2011 – as well as EUR 12,024 for 2014. However, it considered that there were significant discrepancies – GBP 1,700 for 2008, GBP 4,886 for 2010, GBP 7,365 for 2011 and EUR 2,977 for 2014 – as compared to the lower amounts declared in the annual declarations for the same expenses in those years. The assessment of assets within the vetting process included the assessment of annual declarations to determine whether a vetting subject had made an incorrect declaration, had hidden assets or had made a false statement in the previous years. While not a self-standing factor to conclude on the insufficiency of declaration and dismissal from office, the general assessment of the vetting declaration by way of comparing it to previous declarations allowed evaluating the veracity of a vetting subject’s declarations and drawing conclusions on the legality of wealth or sufficiency of statements over the years, especially since annual declarations contained contemporaneous statements about transactions. Lastly, it was noted that the above-mentioned difference for 2014 also exceeded the statutory threshold for expenses which had to be declared at the time and was considered not to have been declared.

(b) The applicant had failed to present documents to prove one family member’s education and living expenses abroad in 2008-13 (see (a) above), when the applicant had also had a shortfall for 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). The SAC rejected the applicant’s claim that securing invoices had been difficult on account of the significant amount of time which had elapsed. He provided no document or evidence to demonstrate efforts to obtain those records or to prove that they had disappeared, had been lost or could not be recreated or obtained by other means, resulting in the objective impossibility of presenting them (as required by section 32 (2) of the Vetting Act).

9. The SAC also considered (a) that the applicant had made an inaccurate declaration because the sums declared – in the vetting declaration and the 2003 declaration – as his investment in the construction of a building in 1997-99 had differed and because his alleged income from renting out one part of the building could not have financed the other part, since both had been acquired at the same time under purchase contracts in 2001, and thus his 2003 declaration was incorrect; (b) that he had failed to prove that ALL 6,698,384 for that investment had originated from his savings; (c) that he had failed to justify with legal resources – including rental income – the expenses incurred during the first half of 2006 and had had a shortfall of ALL 458,761 (approximately EUR 3,700), including for financing the above‑mentioned flat in Durrës; he had only become a co-owner of several spaces in the above‑mentioned building under the 2001 purchase contracts, had not been a party to any rental contract for those spaces until February 2003 and had not provided sufficient proof of payment of the tax on the rental income until 2007; and (d) that the documents submitted by the applicant did not fully prove that his second family member’s accommodation and tuition expenses abroad justified the expenditure declared by the applicant for 2014‑17.

10. It appears that the applicant received the full text of the SAC’s decision by email on 25 October 2019, and by post on an unspecified date.

11. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his dismissal from office had been arbitrary and disproportionate, as it had been based on minor irregularities or inconsistencies.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. Scope of the case

12. In his observations in 2024, the applicant included new claims for the first time, including that the SAC panel had not been “established by law” because of L.D.’s alleged ineligibility to be appointed as a judge of the SAC. Those claims are not an elaboration of the original communicated complaint which concerned grounds for the applicant’s dismissal from office. They therefore fall outside the scope of the case as it stands (see Kulák v. Slovakia, no. 57748/21, § 52, 3 April 2025).

2. Article 8 of the Convention
   1. The parties’ submissions
      1. The Government

13. The Government restated the SAC’s findings and conclusions. The grounds for the applicant’s dismissal – based on issues with the rental income, the lack of legitimate sources to justify expenses for 2012 and 2014 and the purchase of a flat – had concerned the period when he had served as a judge and for which he had submitted declarations since 2003. The applicant had not specified any alternative standard for calculating expenses for 2012-14 that would have been more accurate or suitable for his situation and had not provided precise calculations of the surpluses allegedly generated during that time to demonstrate that the assessment made by the SAC regarding his expenses had been incorrect or unreasonable. The SAC had identified discrepancies concerning one specific type of expense in several declarations between 2008 and 2014.

2. The applicant

14. The applicant argued that he had been dismissed for minor inconsistencies or irregularities committed before 2003, when he had become a judge, rather than for any serious violation, such as a false declaration or concealment of an asset. There had been no evidence of an extravagant lifestyle and he had never acted in bad faith when submitting asset declarations.

15. The purchase contract of 2006 and the funds for it had been duly declared in the annual declaration. 40% of the amount had been withdrawn from the bank and paid to the seller. The SAC had noted that the applicant could not supply further evidence on account of the significant amount of time that had elapsed. His household income in 2005 and 2006, taken separately, had fully covered the amount paid for the flat. The SAC had unreasonably disregarded that and had misinterpreted the facts and evidence presented, failing to give reasons for its diverging interpretation.

16. The methodology used to calculate yearly expenses for 2012 and 2014 had been incorrect. His family’s previous income and savings should have been considered. He had indicated in his annual declarations a surplus of ALL 3,200,000 in 2011 and ALL 3,900,000 in 2013 and an amount in cash for emergency expenses. Additionally, work-related expenses which had been paid with his credit card had been reimbursed to him.

17. The applicant argued that he had never previously been questioned in connection with his annual declarations. When asked during the vetting proceedings, he had clarified in detail all payments and had submitted all bank transfer records since 2008. There had been some inconsistencies related to expenses in respect of one family member’s studies abroad due to “a lack of methodology” in the applicant’s annual declarations for 2009-11. However, he had clarified the situation in the vetting declaration and had submitted all available evidence. Given the considerable period of time that had elapsed, not all the invoices related to the expenses incurred had been retained by him or his family member, as they had been unaware that these would be required in 2017 for the vetting process. It had been objectively impossible to provide all these documents and some inaccuracies had been inevitable. In any event, nothing had been concealed and all expenses had been fully covered by the income received by the applicant and his wife during those years.

2. The Court’s assessment

18. The applicant’s dismissal from office interfered with his right to respect for his private life (see Thanza v. Albania, no. 41047/19, §§ 135 and 137, 4 July 2023). The applicant acknowledged that the interference had been in accordance with the law and pursued legitimate aims (see also Sevdari v. Albania, no. 40662/19, §§ 75 and 79, 13 December 2022), but argued that it had been disproportionate.

19. The Public Commissioner appealed against the IQC’s conclusions concerning only the first component of the vetting process (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). The SAC based the applicant’s dismissal from office on section 61 (3) of the Vetting Act and found a shortfall for 2012 and 2014. It also found that he had made incomplete, inaccurate or incorrect statements relating to (i) the amounts relating to sponsoring his family members’ expenses abroad over several years and (ii) the source for financing the purchase of a flat in 2006. The Court will address below the complaints about these findings, which also concerned the time when the applicant served as a senior judge and was subject to the requirements of the 2003 Assets Disclosure Act.

20. As regards the SAC’s findings mentioned above, first, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant alleged that there had been procedural shortcomings in the decision that resulted in his dismissal from the office. Those complaints had been declared inadmissible at the time of communication of the present application. In his observations in 2024, the applicant restated some of those complaints under Article 8. The Court identified no serious shortcomings in the decision-making process by which the above-mentioned findings had been reached at national level and sees no reason to adopt a different conclusion on the admissibility of those allegations under Article 8 (compare Thanza, cited above, § 158).

21. Second, as regards proportionality, the applicant essentially alleged the SAC’s factual findings on the points stated in paragraph 19 above to be arbitrary and unreasonable. As presented, these allegations remain unsubstantiated and the SAC’s conclusions do not appear to reach the threshold of arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, § 304 in fine, 26 September 2023, and Xhoxhaj, cited above, § 407). The Court notes, in particular, that the SAC provided reasons for dismissing the applicant’s arguments relating to his financial capacity for the years 2012 and 2014. At the same time, he has not adduced any compelling elements or evidence which would demonstrate any manifest factual or legal error in the SAC’s reasoning, calculations or method (see Jaupi v. Albania, no. 23369/16, § 119, 29 April 2025, and contrast Sevdari, cited above, § 96).

22. Therefore, the Court will review the original allegation of disproportionality on the basis of the facts as they were established and assessed by the SAC.

23. The applicant stated that a considerable portion of the funds used to purchase the flat in 2006 (USD 16,000, allegedly accumulated from savings derived from employment and rental income) had been withdrawn from an account, as it appears, in the American Bank of Albania. The SAC determined that no such withdrawal had occurred from that account during the relevant period. The amount withdrawn from an account in another bank had not appeared to sufficiently explain that inaccurate statement. An accurate and substantiated statement on the principal source for a significant asset and the movement of large funds related to it – a payment in cash following a bank withdrawal or through bank transfer – was essential to ensure traceability and verify the lawful origin of the funds and other aspects of legality and sufficiency of those funds. The applicant failed to provide a credible explanation (see paragraphs 6 and 15 above).

24. The amounts, newly declared and accepted during the vetting proceedings, for 2010, 2011 and 2014 were significantly higher than those reported for the same type of recurring expenditure in the relevant annual declarations. These differences concerned several years and were not minor, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the size of the expenditure. For example, the amount of the difference for 2014 exceeded the statutory threshold for expenses requiring declaration (see paragraph 8(a) above and Thanza, cited above, § 68). The Court also notes that in 2014 there was also an overall annual shortfall (see paragraph 7 above). While documentation confirming the bank account activity was provided, taken together with similar adjustments for other years, this context called for careful consideration of the accuracy and credibility of the declarations. These discrepancies were not properly explained.

25. In addition, the applicant failed to substantiate the education and living expenses for a family member, corresponding to the amounts resulting from bank activity in 2008-13 (see paragraph 8(b) above). It has not been disputed between the parties that the requirement to substantiate the actual amount of, at least, the main categories of that major expenditure (over GBP 82,000, see paragraph 8(a) above) – for instance, accommodation or tuition – was consistent with the legitimate aims of the vetting process. It also appears that, under the 2003 Assets Disclosure Act, the applicant could reasonably have been expected to retain relevant documents (see Xhoxhaj, cited above, §§ 201-03). In any event, he did not indicate whether he had taken any steps to obtain these documents during the vetting proceedings, whereas he had done so in respect of subsequent years (see paragraph 9(d) above).

26. The overall annual shortfalls identified for 2012 and 2014 were objectively significant (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant’s argument that his family’s disposable income, accumulated within the period from 2011 to 2014, had considerably exceeded the overall expenses for that period is unsubstantiated and does not refute the SAC’s conclusions in respect of two specific years. The applicant has not adduced any compelling argument or evidence to contest, explain or justify those shortfalls (see paragraphs 16 and 21 above).

27. Where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applied the relevant human-rights standards consistently with the Convention and its case-law, and adequately balanced the individual interests against the public interest in a case, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts (see Halet v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 21884/18, § 161, 14 February 2023). Taking the above-mentioned factors cumulatively and noting the applicant’s position as a senior judge, who also held the highest position in the judicial system during the vetting process (see Xhoxhaj, cited above, § 407 in fine), the reasons provided by him are insufficient for the Court to depart from the SAC’s conclusions and, more generally, to undermine the outcome of the vetting case. Therefore, the Court does not find that his dismissal from office was disproportionate.

28. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to conduct a detailed examination of the SAC’s other findings and conclusions (compare Thanza, cited above, § 160).

29. Accordingly, the complaint under Article 8 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 26 March 2026.

Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma
Deputy Registrar President