SILI proti Ukrajině

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 41980/18
Nikolay Yevdokimovich SILI
against Ukraine

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 22 January 2026 as a Committee composed of:

Gilberto Felici, President,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 41980/18) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 July 2018 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mykola Yevdokymovych Sili (“the applicant”), who was born in 1958 and is serving a prison sentence;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The applicant is a life prisoner who mainly complained under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention about the restrictions on his access to a telephone and the internet in prison.

2. Under Article 110 of the Code on the Enforcement of Sentences, prisoners are entitled, at their own expense, to have an unlimited number of telephone conversations with the outside world and to use the internet, under the supervision of the prison administration. As further provided for by that provision, it is for the Ministry of Justice to set the relevant procedures.

3. The Internal Regulations of Penal Institutions, which were approved by the Ministry of Justice, contain detailed rules on prisoners’ access to telephones and the internet. They specify, in particular, that in order to enable the entire prison population to benefit from the right of access to a telephone, a prisoner cannot occupy the telephone for longer than 15 minutes at a time. The prison administration puts in place the relevant schedules following prisoners’ written applications.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. Alleged violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention

4. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the prison administration, allegedly in contravention of the relevant domestic legislation, had restricted prisoners’ access to a telephone to only one call every four days (excluding weekends and official holidays), with the duration of calls being limited to 15 minutes. Furthermore, the applicant complained under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that access to the internet was possible only from a special room which had to be booked in advance, and that the internet connection was of poor quality.

5. The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case-law in respect of telephone facilities, Article 8 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing prisoners the right to make telephone calls, in particular where the facilities for contact by way of correspondence are available and adequate. Where, as in the present case, telephone facilities are provided by the prison authorities, these may – having regard to the ordinary and reasonable conditions of prison life – be subjected to legitimate restrictions, for example, in the light of the shared nature of the facilities with other prisoners and the requirements of the prevention of disorder and crime (see, for example, A.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 37328/97, §§ 92 and 93, 29 January 2002, and Daniliuc v. Romania (dec.), no. 7262/06, § 68, 2 October 2012). In a similar vein, the Court has held that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing prisoners the right to communicate with the outside world by way of online devices, particularly where facilities for contact via alternative ways are available and adequate (see Ciupercescu v. Romania (no. 3), nos. 41995/14 and 50276/15, § 105, 7 January 2020).

6. The Court has also noted that imprisonment inevitably involves a number of restrictions on prisoners’ communications with the outside world, including on their ability to receive information. It has held that Article 10 cannot be interpreted as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the internet, or to specific internet sites, for prisoners (see Kalda v. Estonia, no. 17429/10, § 45, 19 January 2016).

7. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not allege that he had been deprived of regular telephone contact with the outside world or of access to the internet. His allegations boil down to insignificant inconveniences not amounting to an infringement of his rights to respect for his private life and to receive and impart information or ideas (compare Davison v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 52990/08, 2 March 2010). Even assuming that those rights had been restricted, the Court notes that the restrictions in question complied with safeguards enshrined in the relevant Convention provisions (see Bădulescu v. Portugal, no. 33729/18, §§ 36 and 37, 20 October 2020).

8. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. Other complaints

9. The applicant also raised other complaints under various Convention provisions.

10. The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. They must therefore also be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 12 February 2026.

Martina Keller Gilberto Felici
Deputy Registrar President