VIEIRA COELHO proti Portugalsku

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF VIEIRA COELHO v. PORTUGAL

(Application no. 40764/20)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

13 January 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Vieira Coelho v. Portugal,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Anja Seibert-Fohr, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
András Jakab, judges,
and Crina Kaufman, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 40764/20) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 1 September 2020 by a Portuguese national, Mr José Manuel da Mata Vieira Coelho (“the applicant”), who was born in 1952 and lives in Santa Cruz, and was represented by Mr F. Teixeira da Mota, a lawyer practising in Lisbon;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”), represented by their co-Agent, Ms A. Garcia Marques, subsequently replaced by Ms H. Martins Leitão, Deputy Attorney-General;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 2 December 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns criminal proceedings brought against the applicant for aggravated defamation and aggravated disobedience. The applicant complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) and Article 10 of the Convention.

2. At the material time the applicant was a member of the Regional Parliament of Madeira. On various dates, during press conferences organised by him in Madeira and on different social media platforms, he accused A.C., the deputy secretary general of a regional political party, of misappropriation of funds; M.A.G., a public prosecutor, of corruption; J.M.G., a businessman, of involvement in a fraud and falsification scheme; and M.J.M., an enforcement solicitor, of the homicide of a French politician. The applicant reiterated the accusation which concerned specifically M.A.G. during one session of the regional parliament.

3. Proceedings were instituted against him in the Madeira Criminal Court on account of these accusations. Proceedings were also instituted against him for aggravated disobedience on account of his refusal to comply with two legal orders: first, his refusal to disclose to the public prosecutor’s office the identity of the author of an article published in a local newspaper under his direction, and second, his failure to comply with a court injunction ordering him to remove from websites under his management certain statements concerning M.J.M. Those proceedings were eventually appended.

4. The applicant’s parliamentary mandate was suspended to enable the continuation of the criminal proceedings.

5. The applicant’s trial before the Madeira Criminal Court started on 25 February 2019.

6. On 25 February 2019, at the first hearing, N.B., the lawyer appointed by the applicant, withdrew from the case and was absent. At the beginning of the hearing, the court appointed A.C.S., a legal aid lawyer, to replace him. However, the applicant refused the new appointment and requested a 30-day adjournment. The judge noted that the applicant was free to choose his own lawyer at any time but emphasised that, under Articles 64 and 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he could not attend the hearing without legal representation. Further citing the need for the proper administration of justice and the interests of the other parties present in the room, the judge denied the adjournment request and proceeded with the hearing. During that session, the court heard the applicant, represented by A.C.S.

7. Following a withdrawal request presented by A.C.S., a new legal aid lawyer, C.P.G., was assigned to represent the applicant. However, C.P.G. also filed a withdrawal request, refusing to represent him. On 11 March 2019, at the outset of the second hearing, following the two prior withdrawals, a new legal aid lawyer, C.C., was assigned by the court to represent the applicant. The third hearing was held later that afternoon after a 30-minute adjournment to allow C.C. to review the case file. At the outset of the hearing, C.C. requested a further five-day adjournment, but it was refused on the grounds that her appointment was limited to that day and that the scheduled discussion was not considered complex, as only one injured party was expected to testify.

8. On 12 March 2019, at the outset of the fourth hearing, the judge determined that C.C. should represent the applicant for the remainder of the trial, and, accordingly, the session was adjourned in the morning to allow C.C. to review the case file. In the afternoon, during the fifth hearing, C.C. requested a 20-day adjournment for further examination of the case file. The judge rejected that request but granted a six-day adjournment, authorising her to review the case file outside court premises.

9. On 20 May 2019, after 19 hearings, the trial was concluded. C.C. represented the applicant in 18 of those hearings.

10. On 5 July 2019 the Madeira Criminal Court convicted the applicant on four counts of aggravated defamation, under Article 180 § 1, Article 183 §§ 1 (a) and 2, and Article 184 of the Criminal Code, and two counts of aggravated disobedience, under Article 348 of the Criminal Code. The court concluded that the applicant had failed to produce evidence to substantiate his particularly serious allegations (see paragraph 2 above). As a result, and taking into account the fact that he had already been convicted six times of defamation, the court sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay 6,000 euros (EUR) to A.C., EUR 20,000 to M.A.G., and EUR 2,000 to J.M.G. in compensation.

11. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Court of Appeal of Lisbon. Claiming that his right to freedom of expression had been breached, he argued that the impugned statements had been made in a context of political debate and in service of his legitimate interest in disclosing corruption practices.

12. On 4 March 2020 the Lisbon Court of Appeal partially upheld the first-instance judgment, and decided that the suspension of the prison sentence would depend on the condition that the applicant pay, within a period of two years, the total sum of EUR 28,000, as previously determined by the Madeira Criminal Court, in compensation to the civil parties. In its reasoning, it balanced the competing rights which were at stake, and held that it was necessary to restrict the applicant’s freedom of expression in order to protect the reputation of the persons concerned by the accusations at issue.

13. Relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention, the applicant complained that C.C., the lawyer assigned to him at the second hearing of the trial, had not had adequate time to study the case file and discuss the case with him, and that this incident had undermined his defence rights and the right to effective legal assistance, in breach of his right to a fair trial. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant asserted that his conviction had constituted a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression as a member of the Regional Parliament of Madeira.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (b) AND (c) OF THE CONVENTION

14. According to the Court’s well-established case-law, the guarantees contained in Article 6 § 3 are specific aspects of the general concept of a fair trial set forth in Article 6 § 1. The various rights, of which a non‑exhaustive list appears in Article 6 § 3, reflect certain of the aspects of the notion of a fair trial in criminal proceedings. When compliance with Article 6 § 3 is being reviewed, its basic purpose must not be forgotten, nor must it be severed from its roots. The Court therefore considers complaints under Article 6 § 3 under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 taken together (see Correia de Matos v. Portugal [GC], no. 56402/12, § 119, 4 April 2018).

15. The Court’s primary task in examining a complaint under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, considering their development as a whole rather than focusing on a single aspect or incident in isolation (see Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, §§ 120-22, 9 November 2018). In making this assessment the Court will have regard to the rights of the defence but also to the interests of the public and the victim(s) that crime is properly prosecuted (see Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154/10, § 101, ECHR 2015).

16. In view of the facts of the case, specifically the 30-minute adjournment afforded before the third hearing, the morning adjournment of the fourth hearing, the six-day adjournment granted during the fifth hearing, and the opportunity given to C.C. to examine the case file outside court premises (see paragraphs 7-9 above), and further considering the complexity of the trial and the competing interests at stake, particularly the rights of the other parties to a timely resolution of the case, the Court finds that the judge afforded C.C. sufficient time to examine the case file (contrast Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272/03, §§ 101-03, 2 November 2010, and Nevzlin v. Russia, no. 26679/08, §§ 151-56, 18 January 2022)

17. The Court further observes that, although in the first two trial hearings successive court-appointed lawyers withdrew and failed to appear – for reasons which remain unclear – the judge consistently ensured, including in those first two hearings, that the applicant was always represented by a legal aid counsel, as required by domestic law (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, the applicant was free to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing at any time, but chose not to do so. The Court also notes that C.C. ultimately represented the applicant in 18 out of the 19 trial sessions held (see paragraph 9 above), a situation indicative of a stable lawyer-client relationship based on mutual trust and understanding. The Court finds that this continuity in legal representation, coupled with the procedural opportunities and adjournments afforded (see paragraphs 7-8 above), shows that the applicant had ample time to discuss and develop a defence strategy with C.C. throughout the trial (contrast Elif Nazan Şeker v. Turkey, no. 41954/10, §§ 55-58, 8 March 2022).

18. Bearing in mind that the Court’s primary task is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 14 above), the Court finds that the fact that the first two hearings were conducted with successive court-appointed lawyers did not have any irremediable impact on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against him (compare Hindioğlu v. Türkiye, no. 52544/18, § 22, 20 May 2025).

19. The considerations above are sufficient for the Court to conclude that no arguable case has been made that the overall fairness of the trial was prejudiced on account of the applicant’s representation on 25 February 2019 and 11 March 2019.

20. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION of ARTICLE 10 of the Convention

21. The Court considers that the applicant’s criminal conviction for aggravated defamation and aggravated disobedience constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. It also finds that the interference was “prescribed by law”, as it was based on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 7 above). It accepts that the interference complained of pursued two of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, namely the protection of the reputation or the rights of others and the proper administration of justice. It remains to be ascertained whether it was necessary in a democratic society.

22. The Court reiterates that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on freedom of expression in the sphere of political speech. In this context, the authorities’ margin of appreciation in assessing the “necessity” of a contested measure is therefore particularly narrow (see Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, §§ 146-48, 15 May 2023). While representatives of political parties must be allowed to discuss their opponents and the manner in which the latter perform their public duties, they are equally required to exercise some restraint when encroaching upon the reputation and the rights of others (see Barata Monteiro da Costa Nogueira and Patrício Pereira v. Portugal, no. 4035/08, § 37, 11 January 2011, and De Lesquen du Plessis-Casso v. France (no. 2), no. 34400/10, § 33, 30 January 2014).

23. In the present case, the Court notes that one of the four individuals concerned by the accusations at issue was a politician, the others were a public prosecutor, a businessman and an enforcement solicitor (see paragraph 2 above). As regards the content of the impugned statements, in view of the facts of the case as established at the domestic level (see, in this regard, Barata Monteiro da Costa Nogueira and Patrício Pereira, cited above, § 33), the Court finds that the applicant made particularly serious accusations without any solid factual basis, and that he had already been convicted six times of defamation (see paragraph 10 above). The Court further notes that only one of the accusations at issue was made during a session of the regional parliament (see paragraph 2 in fine above) (contrast Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, § 40, ECHR 2001-II, and De Lesquen du Plessis-Casso v. France, no. 54216/09, § 42, 12 April 2012). All other impugned accusations were therefore essentially made through the media and social media platforms (see paragraph 2 above). As regards the conviction for disobedience arising from the applicant’s refusal to disclose the identity of the author of an article (see paragraphs 3 and 10 above), the applicant did not provide further information regarding this part of the application, in particular how it related to the overall facts at issue. The Court is therefore unable to rely on it.

24. Turning to the nature and the severity of the sanction, the Court takes into account the fact that the applicant was sentenced to a three-and-a-half-year suspended prison sentence (see paragraph 8 above). In that regard, it reiterates that while the use of criminal‑law sanctions in defamation cases is not in itself disproportionate, a criminal conviction is a serious sanction, having regard to the existence of other means of intervention and rebuttal, particularly through civil remedies (see Matalas v. Greece, no. 1864/18, § 59, 25 March 2021). The Court has emphasised on many occasions that the imposition of a prison sentence in defamation cases will be compatible with freedom of expression only in exceptional circumstances – notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence (see Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 115, ECHR 2004-XI).

25. Therefore, the serious sanctions imposed on the applicant could only be regarded as necessary in exceptional circumstances. However, in the present case, given the substance of the statements made and the effect that they could possibly have had on the defamed individuals, the Court is not satisfied that this was so and finds that the circumstances presented no justification for the imposition of a prison sentence. Such a sanction, by its very nature, will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and public discussion, and the notion that the applicant’s sentence was in fact suspended does not alter that conclusion (see Paraskevopoulos v. Greece, no. 64184/11, § 42, 28 June 2018, and compare Matalas, cited above, § 60).

26. The Court thus concludes that there was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint under Article 10 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Crina Kaufman Anja Seibert-Fohr
Acting Deputy Registrar President