RJABIŅINS A OSTATNÍ proti Lotyšsku

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF RJABIŅINS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA

(Application no. 55091/15)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

20 November 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Rjabiņins and Others v. Latvia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Davor Derenčinović, President,
Artūrs Kučs,
Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 55091/15) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 30 October 2015 by three Latvian nationals, whose relevant details are listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), and who were represented by Mr E. Rusanovs, a lawyer practising in Riga;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention to the Latvian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms K. Līce, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the application by a Committee;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 23 October 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the covert interception of the applicants’ telephone conversations, their subsequent discovery of the interception and their inability to challenge it ex post facto.

2. The first applicant was employed by a company where he was directly supervised by G.M.G. The second and third applicants were employed by a different company (“the X company”), whose board of directors was chaired by V.G. for some time prior to 2012, and by G.M.G. from 2012 onwards.

3. On 28 May 2014 a criminal investigation was opened to investigate allegations of misappropriation of a large shipment from a warehouse belonging to the X company in 2012.

4. On 17 October 2014 a police investigator submitted a request to an investigating judge to authorise the covert interception of the telephone communications of G.M.G., V.G. and the three applicants. Separate requests were submitted in respect of each person. All the requests included a summary of the facts, which explained that an investigation had been opened on 28 May 2014 and that, on the basis of the information gathered, there was reason to believe that “[G.M.G.] and [V.G.], as part of a group of persons, might have reached a prior agreement to develop a criminal plan with the aim of misappropriating large amounts of other people’s property”. According to the requests, on 18 September 2014 the investigator had declared G.M.G. and V.G. suspects in criminal proceedings no. 11816007414. All the requests concluded that G.M.G., V.G. and the three applicants were “possibly connected with the organisation and execution” of the offence under investigation.

5. In the request in respect of the first applicant, the investigator also submitted that the applicant had frequently followed G.M.G.’s instructions. The investigator argued that it was necessary to carry out special investigative activities to monitor his mobile phone for a period of thirty days because there was reason to believe that his telephone conversations might contain relevant information, and that the information could not be obtained without performing such activities.

6. As regards the second and third applicants, the investigator submitted that, on 17 September 2014, they had been detained in the context of the criminal investigation and had been declared “persons against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated”. They were released later the same day. The investigator submitted identical reasons as for the first applicant (see paragraph 5 above).

7. On 28 October 2014 the investigating judge authorised the covert interception of the telephone communications of the three applicants, G.M.G. and V.G. from that date until 26 November 2014. In doing so, the judge referred to section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provided that the covert interception of communications could be carried out on the basis of a decision by an investigating judge if there were grounds to believe that the communications might contain information regarding “the circumstances to be established”, and if the acquisition of necessary information was otherwise impossible. The wording of the orders was identical for all three applicants, G.M.G. and V.G. Specifically, they stated:

“Having reviewed the investigator’s request and having examined the materials of the criminal proceedings, the judge considers that the request is justified and acceptable.

...

... [I]n accordance with section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Law ... the judge considers it necessary to authorise a special investigative activity – namely, monitoring of means of communication – for a period of 30 days from 28 October 2024 with the aim of obtaining information about facts forming part of the circumstances to be established.

...

The judge [decides] to grant the request.

With the aim of obtaining information about facts forming part of the circumstances to be established in criminal proceedings no. 11816007414, [the judge decides] to authorise a special investigative activity in respect of [the first applicant / the second applicant / the third applicant / G.M.G. / V.G.], namely monitoring the mobile phone and communications data associated with [that person’s] telephone number ...

...

A complaint about the decision may be lodged with the President of the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court at any point during the pre-trial proceedings.”

8. On 20 February 2015 the criminal proceedings were discontinued in respect of the second and third applicants for lack of evidence.

9. On 19 June 2015 the pre-trial investigation was concluded and a case against G.M.G., V.G. and a third person (L.K.) was referred to a first-instance court for trial. On the same day the lawyer representing G.M.G. and V.G., who was also the applicants’ lawyer at the time, received a copy of the case file. As a result, he discovered the investigating judge’s decisions of 28 October 2014 authorising the covert interception of the applicants’ telephone communications. There were no documents in the case file regarding the information which had been obtained as a result of the interception activities.

10. The applicants challenged the decisions of the investigative judge before the Riga City Ziemeļu District Court. The court dismissed the applicants’ complaints on the grounds that, under domestic law, the investigative judge’s decisions could not be challenged after the completion of the pre-trial investigation.

11. At the time of the exchange of the parties’ observations in the present case, the criminal proceedings against G.M.G and V.G. were pending before an appellate court.

12. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the interference with their private life had not been justified, in that the Criminal Procedure Law, on the basis of which the surveillance orders had been issued, was not foreseeable in its application and that, in any event, the interference had not been necessary in the circumstances. They further complained under Article 13 that they had not had an effective remedy under domestic law by which to challenge the interception of their telephone communications.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION

13. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

14. The applicants contended that the Criminal Procedure Law failed to define the groups of persons who were liable to have their communications intercepted; nor did it determine the duration of such secret investigative activities. They further argued that, in the absence of notification, they had discovered by chance that their telephone conversations had been intercepted and had subsequently been unable to challenge the authorities’ actions in so far as their request had been rejected as out of time.

15. The Government disagreed. They argued, inter alia, that subsequent notification was not always necessary. In any event, they argued that the lack of such notification in the applicants’ case had been offset by other effective safeguards laid down in domestic law, such as the mandatory prior authorisation of the surveillance measures by an investigating judge.

16. The general principles concerning covert surveillance measures and the availability of effective domestic remedies in that regard have been summarised in Roman Zakharov v. Russia ([GC], no. 47143/06, §§ 227‑34, ECHR 2015), Dragojević v. Croatia (no. 68955/11, §§ 78-84, 15 January 2015) and Romanchenko and Kharazishvili v. Georgia (nos. 33067/22 and 37832/22, §§ 45-48, 18 February 2025), among other authorities.

17. As regards the applicants’ complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court accepts, and it has not been disputed by the parties, that the measures to intercept the applicants’ telephone communications amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their “private life” and “correspondence” as set out in Article 8 of the Convention.

18. As regards the question of lawfulness, it has not been disputed by the parties that the interception of the applicants’ telephone conversations had a legal basis in domestic law, namely the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, and that the legal basis was accessible to them. Nonetheless, the applicants complained about the quality of the domestic law, which in their view fell below Convention standards, and the manner of its application by the domestic courts, which had allegedly failed to establish the necessity of the interference.

19. In the present case, the Court does not consider it necessary to assess the quality of the domestic law. Even assuming that the applicable law meets the “quality of law” requirement under the Convention, the requirement that the measure be “necessary in a democratic society” was not satisfied.

20. Specifically, the orders issued by the investigating judge lacked sufficient detail. It is not apparent from the wording of the orders how the investigating judge applied the “necessity” test. The application of that test was required by the Criminal Procedure Law, which provided that “[t]he special investigative activities ... shall be performed if ... the acquisition of information regarding facts is necessary” (section 210) and “if the acquisition of the necessary information is not possible without such activities” (section 218). There is no indication in the orders issued by the investigating judge or in any other material before the Court that the investigating judge considered whether the investigation could be conducted by other, less intrusive, means (see mutatis mutandis, Bašić v. Croatia, no. 22251/13, § 33, 25 October 2016; Grba v. Croatia, no. 47074/12, § 85, 23 November 2017; and Dudchenko v. Russia, no. 37717/05, § 98, 7 November 2017).

21. In addition, the orders made by the investigating judge were identical in respect of all three applicants, G.M.G. and V.G., despite their different statuses in the proceedings at the time (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). The Court observes that the first applicant only participated in the proceedings as a witness, and that the second and third applicants had a different procedural status from G.M.G. and V.G., in so far as those applicants had not been charged with an offence. Although the first applicant worked under the instructions of G.M.G., it is not clear what suspicions were considered to exist against him. The same is true for the second and third applicants, who worked for the X company. The Court notes thus the absence of sufficiently individualised assessment in respect of each applicant. Nor did the orders contain references to specific facts or information justifying the necessity of such drastic measures against each applicant. Although the investigating judge appears to have had access to the case file submitted by the police investigator, it is not clear from the orders which information, material or facts emanating from the case file were taken into consideration in finding the request justified. The prior authorisation process therefore failed to guarantee the necessity and proportionality of the surveillance measures in respect of each of the applicants (see, among other authorities, Roman Zakharov, § 260, and Romanchenko and Kharazishvili, §§ 57‑58, both cited above).

22. As concerns the applicants’ complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, the above-mentioned shortcomings meant that the safeguards provided for by the Criminal Procedure Law, as in force at the relevant time, to “offset” the absence of ex post facto notification of the covert surveillance measures (as argued by the Government; see paragraph 15 above) had essentially been void. In addition, the domestic court’s rejection of the applicants’ complaint as out of time, even though the applicants had only discovered the interference by chance after the pre-trial investigation had already been completed, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to remedy any errors committed by the investigating judge and left the applicants without an effective remedy in respect of their complaints.

23. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention in respect of all three applicants.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

24. The applicants claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

25. The Government challenged the applicants’ claims in respect of non‑pecuniary damage as, inter alia, excessive.

26. The Court considers that the applicants must have suffered non‑pecuniary damage on account of the infringement of their rights under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards each of the applicants EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable (see Meimanis v. Latvia, no. 70597/11, § 86, 21 July 2015).

27. The applicants made no claim in respect of costs or expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to award them any sum in that respect.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention;
3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months, EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 November 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Liv Tigerstedt Davor Derenčinović
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applicants