TORDIA A OSTATNÍ proti Gruzii

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF TORDIA AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA

(Application no. 24060/23)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

9 December 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Tordia and Others v. Georgia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Lorraine Schembri Orland, President,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
András Jakab, judges,
and Giorgi Badashvili, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 24060/23) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 7 June 2023 by sixteen Georgian nationals, whose relevant details are listed in the appended table (“the applicants”) and who were represented by Mr N. Dateshidze, Mr A. Khaindrava and Ms L. Absnadze, lawyers practising in Tbilisi;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention to the Georgian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 18 November 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns the length of civil proceedings (lasting from 2 July 2013 to 8 August 2024) instituted by the applicants with a view to reinstating their property rights. They relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.

2. On 2 July 2013 twenty former shareholders in a joint-stock company, Tbilaviamsheni – comprising the applicants and four other claimants – sued the State, arguing that they had been coerced into transferring their company shares to the respondent in 2010.

3. The Tbilisi City Court held two hearings on 21 October 2013 and 22 May 2014. Following almost two years of inactivity, the proceedings then resumed, and between 14 March 2016 and 10 May 2017 the same court, albeit in a new composition, held nine hearings. In June and July 2017, following yet another change in composition, the Tbilisi City Court held six hearings, and on 26 July 2017 it delivered a judgment dismissing the applicants’ claim.

4. On 7 September 2017 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. On 1 December 2017 the appeal court held a preparatory hearing. Subsequently, between 15 March 2018 and 6 November 2019, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal held a total of twelve hearings. On 6 December 2019 it delivered a judgment upholding the first-instance court’s decision.

5. On 17 January 2020 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law; however, as a copy of the written reasoned decision of the appeal court was not made available to them until 19 January 2020, their appeal was unsubstantiated at the time it was lodged. On 21 February 2020 the case was assigned to another judge, who, on 2 March 2020, found the applicants’ appeal procedurally defective on account of their failure to substantiate it and also to pay the required court fees. On 23 March 2020, after being provided with a copy of the court’s reasoned decision, the applicants lodged their appeal again. On 2 April 2020 the Supreme Court admitted the appeal for examination on admissibility and merits in respect of only nine of the applicants; similar decisions were taken in respect of six of the remaining applicants on 25 June and 9 September 2020, after they had met all the procedural requirements. Applicant no. 3 only rectified the relevant deficiencies at a later stage and the appeal in so far as it related to him was accordingly admitted for examination on 26 November 2021.

6. Between 1 and 6 August 2024 thirteen of the applicants (namely applicants nos. 2‑7, 9-12 and 14-16) ceded their property claims for the benefit of the first applicant. On 5 August 2024 the Supreme Court declared the applicants’ appeal on points of law admissible. On 7 August 2024 the Supreme Court, at the request of those applicants, recognised the first applicant as the successor to the other applicants’ proprietary interests. On 8 August 2024 the Supreme Court upheld the civil claim of applicants nos. 1, 8 and 13, finding that they had been coerced into ceding their shares in Tbilaviamsheni.

7. The applicants complained of the excessive length of the civil proceedings and the absence of an effective remedy in that respect.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION

8. The Court notes that applicant no. 12 died while the case was pending before the Court. The applicant’s son, Mr I. Mzhavanadze, has requested to pursue the application on his behalf. As the request is in line with its case‑law and the Government did not object, the Court sees no reason to refuse it (see, among other authorities, Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, § 26, 17 May 2005, and Benyaminson v. Ukraine, no. 31585/02, § 83, 26 July 2007). However, reference will still be made to applicant no. 12 throughout the present judgment.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 AND Article 13 OF THE CONVENTION

9. The Government submitted that the application was inadmissible on various grounds. Firstly, with respect to the thirteen applicants who had ceded their property claims for the benefit of the first applicant (applicants nos. 2‑7, 9-12, and 14-16), they had lost their victim status as they lacked a legitimate interest in the resolution of the case; furthermore, they had abused their right of individual petition by failing to inform the Court of that development in due time. Secondly, all the applicants had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies by failing to submit a disciplinary complaint. Thirdly, the applicants had failed to act with due diligence and lodge their application earlier. Lastly, the application was manifestly ill-founded as the domestic courts had handled the civil claim within a reasonable time. The applicants submitted that they maintained a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in so far as it concerned the length of the proceedings. They also challenged the Government’s remaining objections.

10. The Court notes that the thirteen applicants who transferred their property claims to the first applicant did so several days before the Supreme Court gave its final decision in the case (see paragraph 6 above). Thus, for eleven years they were parties to the domestic proceedings, the excessive length of which is at the heart of the present case (contrast Bitenc v. Slovenia, (dec.), no. 32963/02, 18 March 2008). In such circumstances, having particular regard to the timeline of the events, the Court considers that the applicants in question were able to show that they had been directly affected by the length of the proceedings (see Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Given that the rights those applicants sought to protect through the Convention mechanism related to effective access to a court and the lack of effective remedies in that respect, rather than to their proprietary interests per se (contrast, mutatis mutandis, Dimitrescu v. Romania, nos. 5629/03 and 3028/04, § 34, 3 June 2008, and Euro Marketing sp. z o. o. v. Poland (dec.), no. 49232/08, §§ 38‑39, 27 November 2012), the Court finds that the thirteen applicants in question cannot be considered to have lost their locus standi with respect to their complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. In a similar vein, noting that the domestic proceedings concluded in early August 2024 and that the Government informed the Court of that development in September 2024, the Court finds the Government’s plea of abuse of the right of application to be ill-founded.

11. The Court further refers to its consistent case-law concerning the lack of a specific preventive remedy capable of expediting proceedings in the Georgian legal system and the absence of a compensatory remedy (see Schrade v. Georgia [Committee], no. 15016/07, §§ 41-42, 11 March 2021, and I.B. v. Georgia [Committee], no. 4639/23, § 18, 11 July 2024). The applicants were not, accordingly, required to pursue the remedy proposed by the Government. As to due diligence, the Court does not consider it unreasonable for the applicants to have waited for the proceedings to advance before lodging their application with it (see Zaalishvili v. Georgia [Committee], no. 45681/22, § 8, 11 February 2025). Lastly, the applicants’ complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

12. The general principles concerning the length of proceedings have been summarised in Pélissier and Sassi v. France ([GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II) and Frydlender v. France ([GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII). It is for the Contracting States to organise their judicial systems in such a way that the courts are able to meet the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 (see Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 142, 29 November 2016).

13. The applicants maintained that the overall duration of the proceedings in their case had not been justified and that the authorities had been responsible for the delay. The Government contested their claim, stating that the civil case in question had been both legally and factually complex.

14. In the present case, the civil proceedings commenced on 2 July 2013 and ended on 8 August 2024. They therefore lasted a little over eleven years at three levels of jurisdiction. While acknowledging the complexity of the case, particularly in view of the number of claimants, the Court considers that that alone cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings. However voluminous the case file may have been, the first-instance court heard only fourteen witnesses and did not order any expert examinations to establish the facts. The proceedings before that court lasted four years, including almost a two-year period of inactivity for which the Government did not provide any valid explanations, and it appears that the repeated transfer of the applicants’ case from one judge to another likely contributed to the delay. The appeal proceedings were conducted with reasonable diligence and without any significant periods of inactivity. As for the cassation proceedings, the Government mainly argued that the delay of over four years in deciding on the applicants’ appeal on points of law had been partly attributable to the applicants’ conduct and partly due to the various measures implemented in Georgia between 21 March 2020 and 22 March 2022 on account of the COVID‑19 pandemic. Even if the Court accepts that the applicants, by lodging a deficient cassation appeal, contributed to the initial delay in its examination, it cannot but note, that, at least between November 2021 and August 2024, when anti-COVID sanitary measures were substantially eased, the major period of inactivity in the present case was entirely attributable to the judicial authorities. The proceedings before the Supreme Court took place entirely in writing, and the applicants, throughout the relevant period of time, did not make any requests before the Supreme Court that could have contributed to their length. While the case did not belong to a category that, by its very nature, should have warranted a special degree of expedition (see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 133, ECHR 2006‑VII), the Court considers that, in view of the advanced age of several of the applicants, the case merited special diligence (see, mutatis mutandis, Počuča v. Croatia, no. 38550/02, § 46, 29 June 2006).

15. Having examined all the material submitted to it, and particularly in view of the two periods of inactivity at first instance and cassation level lasting over four and a half years, the Court considers that the overall length of proceedings in the present case was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.

16. As regards the question whether the applicants had an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention at their disposal in respect of their length-of-proceedings complaint, the Court has already noted that the remedy suggested by the Government was not effective (see paragraph 11 above). Accordingly, it cannot find that the applicants were provided with an effective remedy, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, in respect of that complaint (see I.B. v. Georgia, § 26, cited above).

17. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention.

3. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

18. The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and a lump sum of EUR 10,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

19. The Government submitted that the claim regarding non-pecuniary damage was excessive and unsubstantiated. As for the costs and expenses, they argued that the applicants had failed to submit financial documents confirming the relevant transactions.

20. The Court awards the applicants EUR 2,300 each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. Having regard to the applicants’ failure to produce the required financial documents, the Court rejects their claim for costs and expenses.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there have been violations of Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention;
3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, EUR 2,300 (two thousand three hundred euros) each, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Giorgi Badashvili Lorraine Schembri Orland
Acting Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of applicants: