MINASYAN A GERAVETYAN proti Arménii

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF MINASYAN AND GERAVETYAN v. ARMENIA

(Applications nos. 4892/16 and 24052/16)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

30 April 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Minasyan and Geravetyan v. Armenia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Georgios A. Serghides, President,
Gilberto Felici,
Diana Sârcu, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Kim Minasyan (“the first applicant”) and Vardan Geravetyan (“the second applicant”), on various dates indicated in the appended table;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the Armenian Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, and subsequently by Mr K. Andreasyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the applications by a Committee;

the withdrawal of Mr Vahe Grigoryan, the judge elected in respect of Armenia from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court);

Having deliberated in private on 2 April 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the alleged unlawfulness of the applicants’ arrest at a demonstration and the alleged failure of the police to inform them promptly of the reasons for their arrest. The applicants relied on Article 5 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. The second applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 that he had been denied access to the Court of Cassation.

2. On 24 August 2013 a group of demonstrators, including the applicants, blocked the traffic on Komitas Avenue in Yerevan for about 50 minutes. Subsequently, both applicants were taken to a police station under Article 258 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the Code”) so that administrative offence records could be drawn up for “disobeying a lawful order of the police”, an administrative offence under Article 182 of the Code. Under the same Code, such deprivation of liberty may not exceed one hour.

3. According to the police material, the first applicant was taken to a police station at around 5 p.m. Then he was transferred to another police station, this time under administrative arrest, which pursuant to the Code may not exceed three hours. Like Article 258, Article 259 of the same Code allowed administrative arrest, inter alia, to prepare an administrative offence record when that preparation was required and could not be done on the spot (see Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, no. 5297/16, §§ 59-60, 13 February 2025). According to the administrative case material, the first applicant was arrested at the site of the demonstration at 5.45 p.m. He was released at 7.20 p.m.

4. The second applicant was taken to the police station at 4.05 p.m. Once he was at the police station, among other things, records were made concerning his administrative arrest and the administrative offence. He was released at 7.05 p.m.

5. On 9 and 10 September 2013 the police applied to the Administrative Court, seeking to have a fine imposed on each of the applicant under Article 182 of the Code.

6. The applicants lodged counterclaims against the police complaining that, inter alia, they had been deprived of their liberty arbitrarily.

7. On various dates the Administrative Court allowed the police’s claims and dismissed the applicants’ respective counterclaims. Having examined the video footage of the event, the Administrative Court found that the demonstrators, including the applicants, had blocked the traffic on the street and had disobeyed the lawful orders of the police to clear the road, thereby committing an administrative offence under Article 182. The court fined each applicant 50,000 Armenian drams (around 90 euros at the material time). As for the applicants’ counterclaims, it found that the actions of the police had complied with Article 258 of the Code which allowed police custody for the purpose of drawing up an administrative offence record if one could not be prepared at the place where the offence had been detected. Given that the demonstration had been large and chaotic, the police had to take the applicants to the police station so that the relevant offence records could be drawn up. The court also referred to Article 259 of the Code to justify the applicants’ administrative arrest. The first applicant’s transfer from one police station to another was explained by the fact that the original station had been overwhelmed and unable to carry out the required administrative procedures, as it had not anticipated such a large demonstration and did not have enough staff on duty. The court found that the applicants had not been held in police custody beyond the three-hour limit for administrative arrest. Both judgments were upheld on appeal.

8. The first applicant’s further appeal was dismissed by the Court of Cassation, and he was notified of that on 8 July 2015.

9. On 29 July 2015 the second applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his appeal he asked the court to allow him to appeal despite his having missed the one‑month time-limit for lodging an appeal, since a copy of an appeal court’s decision of 23 June 2015 had been served on him only on 29 June 2015. He argued that the one-month time‑limit for appeal should be calculated from that date. Attached to the second applicant’s appeal was evidence that he had served a copy of that document on the opposing party and the lower court, as required by law.

10. The Court of Cassation returned his appeal for failure to pay the court fees and set a three-day time-limit for him to pay the fee and re-submit the appeal, which the second applicant did.

11. On 14 October 2015 the Court of Cassation rejected the second applicant’s appeal because it had been lodged outside the one-month time‑limit. Time had started running from the date of the appeal court’s decision (23 June 2015), not from the later date of 29 June 2015 when the applicant had been served. The applicant had also failed to provide evidence that he had served his amended appeal on the police and the lower court – attached to his appeal was evidence only that he had served copies of his initial appeal on the police and the lower court (see paragraph 9 above). This was an additional reason for rejecting the appeal. Specifically, referring to its decision to return the appeal (see paragraph 10 above), the Court of Cassation found that it had already decided the same case on the same grounds as those raised in the appeal, which was a reason to reject the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible under Article 160 § 1(5) of the Code of Administrative Procedure. The applicant was notified of the decision on 21 October 2015.

12. On 25 May 2017 in decision no. ՍԴՈ-1370 the Constitutional Court of Armenia held principally that the above-noted Article 160 § 1(5) did not apply to a decision by the Court of Cassation to return an appeal for clerical or procedural errors, but to a decision on the substance of the appeal. If a claimant made further errors after a decision to return the appeal, those failures to comply with the required procedures could instead result in the appeal being returned again, with a time-limit for correction and re‑submission. Where the Court of Cassation identified defects in the appeal which did not pertain to the content of the appeal, the requirement to show evidence of having served the amended appeal on the parties to the proceedings and the lower court did not stem from the right to effective judicial protection.

• THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
  1. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

13. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

14. Relying on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants complained that they had been unlawfully and arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.

15. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

16. The general principles concerning Article 5 § 1 have been summarised in S., V. and A. v. Denmark ([GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, §§ 73-77, 22 October 2018). It is not enough for the deprivation of liberty to have been carried out in conformity with national law; it must also have been necessary in the circumstances (ibid., § 77).

17. The applicants’ deprivation of liberty had the purpose of bringing them before the relevant legal authority on suspicion of having committed an administrative offence and thus fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention (compare Berkman v. Russia, no. 46712/15, § 36, 1 December 2020, and Matchavariani v. Georgia, no. 46852/21, § 61, 20 May 2025). Under domestic law, the commission of an administrative offence alone was insufficient to impose such a measure; deprivation of liberty had to be necessary, pursuant to Articles 258 and 259 of the Code.

18. In the present case, the Administrative Court established that the applicants had refused to comply with police orders to desist from blocking the road and that the chaotic conditions at the demonstration had made it impossible for the police to draw up an administrative offence record on the spot, which meant that the applicants had had to be removed to a police station. However, 45 minutes after the first applicant was taken to the police station (under Article 258), he was deprived of his liberty again, this time by being taken into administrative arrest (under Article 259). The domestic courts did not enquire what measures had been taken during those 45 minutes to complete the administrative offence record, which was the reason the applicant was held in police custody. Although they later tried to justify the applicant’s transfer to another police station as having been because of staff shortages at the first police station and in order to carry out the administrative process, the applicant was not administratively arrested on any new grounds or for any further legal reason within the meaning of Article 259 of the Code. In fact, no justification was offered by the police or the courts in relation to the applicant’s administrative arrest under that Article. The record of the arrest did not mention any necessity and, instead, indicated that the applicant had been deprived of his liberty at 5.45 p.m. at the site of the demonstration. It therefore disregarded the fact that he had already been held in police custody for 45 minutes for the preparation of the offence record. In such circumstances, even if the applicant’s deprivation of liberty under Article 258 of the Code had indeed been necessary to complete the administrative offence record because it had been impossible to do it on the spot, his subsequent administrative arrest was arbitrary as it amounted to a de facto extension of the initial deprivation of his liberty which, under Article 258, should not have continued beyond an hour.

19. Like the first applicant, the second applicant was first taken to the police station under Article 258 and then arrested pursuant to Article 259. However, and even assuming that completing the offence record had not been possible on the spot, the authorities failed to explain why the record had not been completed while the applicant had been in police custody for an hour (under Article 258). They also did not explain whether his subsequent administrative arrest apparently for the same purpose was at all necessary.

20. The above considerations are sufficient to conclude that both applicants’ administrative arrest was not free from arbitrariness as the authorities had failed to show that it had been necessary in the circumstances.

21. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

3. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION (No. 24052/16)

22. The second applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 that, by rejecting his appeal on points of law, the Court of Cassation had breached his right of access to a court. This complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible.

23. In the leading case of Vachik Karapetyan and Others (nos. 15736/16 and 2 others, 15 May 2025), the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to the present case (§§ 94-101). The same considerations apply to this application.

24. The Government argued that the applicant’s appeal had in any event been inadmissible as he had made another procedural error – he had not provided evidence that he had served his amended appeal on the police and the lower court. However, as pointed out by the applicant, under domestic law a procedural error of that kind should not have resulted in the Court of Cassation declining to hear the appeal for the reasons it gave (see paragraph 12 in fine above).

25. The Court therefore considers that the restrictions on the applicant’s procedural rights impaired the very essence of his right of access to a court.

26. Accordingly, there has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

4. REMAINING COMPLAINT

27. The applicants also raised a complaint under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.

28. The Court has examined that part of the applications and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its jurisdiction, this complaint either does not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.

It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention

• APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

29. The applicants each claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. They also made separate claims for 1,405,000 drams (AMD) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and AMD 1,000,000 for those incurred before the Court, the total amount they each claimed being equivalent to EUR 3,798. They did not make any claim in respect of pecuniary damage.

30. The Government contested those claims

31. The Court awards the first applicant EUR 1,600, and it awards the second applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, in both cases plus any tax that may be chargeable.

32. Having regard to the documents in its possession and its case-law (see Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, § 151, 23 January 2025, with further references), the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants a joint sum of EUR 2,000, covering costs for the proceedings before it, to be paid to the applicants’ principal lawyer, Mr T. Yegoryan, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, and dismisses the remainder of the claim.

• FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the complaints under Article 5 § 1, concerning the lawfulness of the applicants’ arrest, and the second applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 about a breach of his right of access to court, admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as regards both applicants;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the second applicant (application no. 24052/16);
5. Holds
   1. that the respondent State is to pay within three months the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
      1. EUR 1,600 (one thousand six hundred euros) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
      2. EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the second applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
      3. EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), in total to the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid to their principal lawyer, Mr T. Yegoryan;
   2. that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 April 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Martina Keller Georgios A. Serghides
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases: