M.B. proti Slovensku

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF M.B. v. SLOVAKIA

(Applications nos. 36989/21 and 7945/22)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

19 December 2024

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of M.B. v. Slovakia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Georgios A. Serghides, President,
Alena Poláčková,
Alain Chablais, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications nos. 36989/21 and 7945/22 against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 14 July 2021 and 31 January 2022 respectively by a Slovak national, Mr M.B. (“the applicant”), who was born in 2005, lives in Prešov and was represented by Ms Z. Pitoňáková, a lawyer practicing in Prešov;

the decision not to disclose the applicant’s name;

the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the alleged lack of justification for the applicant’s pre-trial detention and the allegedly excessive delay in reviewing his detention to the Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Bálintová, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 28 November 2024,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns the length and justification of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention and the speediness of its review.

2. On 4 August 2020 the applicant, a boy who was fourteen years and nearly ten months old at the time, was arrested on suspicion of having committed a theft two days earlier.

3. On 6 August 2020 the Prešov District Court remanded the applicant in custody, noting that he was in the care of a juvenile correctional facility (reedukačné centrum), that the suspected offence had been committed while he was temporarily home from that facility and that he was due to go back there on 1 September 2020. The court emphasised that, notwithstanding his young age, he was aware of the unlawful character of his actions. It further noted that the suspected theft had been committed while the applicant had been on probation for a robbery committed earlier in 2019. According to a report from the correctional facility, his behaviour there had improved but his stay had had no effect on his behaviour when in his home environment. It would therefore be necessary to detain him until he returned to the correctional facility in order to prevent him from reoffending. As his previous conviction had not deterred him from reoffending, substituting detention with less stringent measures would not be feasible.

4. On 6 August 2020 the applicant and his lawyer lodged an appeal against the detention order. On 17 August 2020 the detention order was served on the applicant’s lawyer. On 21 August 2020 they submitted an appeal with detailed reasoning. On 27 August 2020 the case was transferred to the Prešov Regional Court, which, on 2 September 2020, upheld the above-mentioned decision on appeal, stating, in addition, that the risk of the applicant continuing to engage in criminal behaviour was exacerbated by the fact that he had no known source of lawful income. The decision was sent on 16 September 2020 and reached the applicant and his lawyer on 18 and 22 September 2020 respectively.

5. On 21 October 2020 the remand court granted a request by the applicant to be released. The court held that his detention was no longer necessary since it was possible for him to return to the correctional facility. The court also referred to an expert report submitted in the course of the proceedings indicating that the applicant’s ability to control his behaviour was at a level which precluded pre-trial detention.

6. On 15 December 2020 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant’s rights relating to his detention had not been violated. He received that decision on 15 January 2021.

7. The applicant complained that his rights under Article 5 §§ 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention had been violated.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

8. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, relating to the same complaints about the applicant’s detention, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 (C) AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION

9. The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention had been unjustified, especially in view of his age. The Government argued that his pre-trial detention had not lasted a long time and that the courts had provided adequate reasoning for his deprivation of liberty.

10. The Court, being the master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that this complaint falls to be examined only under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see, for example, Margaretić v. Croatia, no. 16115/13, § 75, 5 June 2014).

11. The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

12. The Court observes that the general principles regarding the right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, have been set out in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000‑XI; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006‑X, with further references; Petrov v. Slovakia, no. 64195/10, § 55, 2 December 2014; and, as regards minors, Nart v. Turkey, no. 20817/04, § 31, 6 May 2008).

13. The applicant’s detention for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention began on 4 August 2020 and ended with his release on 21 October 2020. It accordingly lasted two months and seventeen days and was based on the suspicion of his repeated involvement in thefts.

14. The Court recalls that the pre-trial detention of minors should be used only as a measure of last resort; it should be as short as possible and, where detention is strictly necessary, minors should be kept apart from adults (see Nart, cited above).

15. In the present case, it is unclear whether the applicant was detained separately from adults during his detention in the remand centre which lasted a couple of months. However, in the Court’s view, the domestic courts did not properly consider whether other alternative measures could have been applied in the circumstances of the case. They established that the applicant’s behaviour had been good only when he was in the correctional facility, but they did not go further into their reasoning to determine if the applicant could have been returned to that facility after his arrest or at least by 1 September when he was due to go back there (see, paragraph 3 above; see by contrast, J.M. v. Denmark, no. 34421/09, § 63, 13 November 2012). This is in particular surprising as regards the Regional Court which rendered its decision on 2 September, thus after the applicant was expected back to the correctional facility. In this situation, the applicant’s detention does not seem a measure of last resort – even more so since the remand court granted the applicant’s release and transfer back to the facility later in October 2020. Moreover, the reference of the Regional Court to the lack of income as one of the grounds for deprivation of liberty does not seem relevant to the detention of a minor under the age of 15.

16. As regards the length of detention, the Court has previously found a violation of Article 5 § 3 regarding short periods of pre-trial detention (see Selçuk v. Turkey, no. 21768/02, § 32, 10 January 2006, in which the applicant had spent some four months in pre-trial detention when he was sixteen years old; and Nart, cited above, § 30, in which the applicant had spent forty-eight days in detention when he was seventeen years old). Again, it seems clear that the applicant’s detention could have been much shorter, taking account that he could have returned to the correctional facility at least on 1 September 2020.

17. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the grounds given by the domestic authorities for the applicant’s detention failed to take due account of his personal circumstances. As a result, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was based on grounds which cannot be seen as relevant and sufficient.

18. In these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special diligence (see, for example, Solmaz v. Turkey, no. 27561/02, § 43, 16 January 2007; Kulikowski v. Poland, no. 18353/03, § 51, 19 May 2009; and Kuc v. Slovakia, no. 37498/14, § 59, 25 July 2017).

19. The Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

3. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

20. The applicant complained that his detention had not been reviewed speedily by the domestic courts. The Government submitted that the delays in the course of the detention proceedings had been caused by the applicant and his lawyer.

21. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

22. The Court refers to the relevant principles described in the leading case of Osváthová v. Slovakia (no. 15684/05, § 69, 21 December 2010).

23. Turning to the present case, the Court first of all finds nothing to justify a conclusion that the applicant’s detention case was of any particular complexity. The proceedings began on 6 August 2020, when the applicant was remanded in custody, and ended on 18 September 2020, when his lawyer received the appellate court’s decision. Therefore, they lasted one month and twelve days.

24. As to the applicant’s conduct, it is true that fifteen days passed between the date on which he lodged his concise interlocutory appeal and the date on which he submitted the grounds of his appeal. However, the applicant’s lawyer did not receive the decision of 6 August 2020 until 17 August 2020. It then took the lawyer four days to prepare an appeal and submit it to the court (see Štetiar and Šutek v. Slovakia, nos. 20271/06 and 17517/07, § 130, 23 November 2010, and Gál v. Slovakia, no. 45426/06, § 68, 30 November 2010). Therefore, the delay in that part of the proceedings was not caused by the applicant and his lawyer.

25. As noted above, it took the authorities more than one week to prepare the first-instance court decision and to deliver it to the applicant’s lawyer. It further took more than two weeks to deliver the appeal decision to the applicant and his lawyer. Moreover, it took the Regional Court six days to come to a decision in the present case (see Osváthová, cited above, § 76, where the appellate court took five days to take a decision, and Štetiar and Šutek, cited above, § 130, in which it took fifteen days for the decision to be served on the applicants).

26. Having regard to its case-law on the subject and taking account of the fact that in circumstances where minors have been deprived of their liberty, particular expedition and diligence are required on the part of the domestic courts in reviewing the lawfulness of their detention (see, for example, Osváthová, cited above, §§ 47-77; Štetiar and Šutek, cited above, §§ 107-31; Michalko v. Slovakia, no. 35377/05, §§ 166-71, 21 December 2010; and, mutatis mutandis, G.B. and Others v. Turkey, no. 4633/15, § 167, 17 October 2019), the Court considers that the complaint about the excessive length of judicial review of the applicant’s detention discloses a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 2,250 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

28. The Government stated that the above amounts were excessive.

29. The Court awards the applicant EUR 2,100 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage plus any tax that may be chargeable.

30. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,125 covering costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, and dismisses the remainder of the claims.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the applications admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention;
5. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:

(i) EUR 2,100 (two thousand one hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,125 (one thousand one hundred and twenty-five euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 December 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Liv Tigerstedt Georgios A. Serghides
Deputy Registrar President