ACHTYPI proti Řecku

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ACHTYPI v. GREECE

(Application no. 58669/19)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

3 February 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Achtypi v. Greece,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Peeter Roosma, President,
Ioannis Ktistakis,
Lətif Hüseynov, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 58669/19) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 November 2019 by a Greek national, Ms Dionysia Achtypi (“the applicant”), who was born in 1953, lives in Nea Smyrni and was represented by Mr A. Anagnostakis, a lawyer practising in Athens;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 6 § 2 of the Convention to the Greek Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent Ms N. Marioli, President of the State Legal Council and their Agent’s delegate, Ms Z. Chatzipavou, Legal Adviser at the State Legal Council, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 13 January 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The case concerns allegedly incriminating statements given regarding the applicant during criminal proceedings conducted against one of her co‑defendants.

2. The applicant worked as a civil servant in the pension awards department of the Social Security Fund (IKA-ETAM), a public‑law entity. In 2013 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, E.M. (also a civil servant at the IKA-ETAM), and three other individuals. The applicant was charged with fraud committed to the detriment of a public‑law entity, breach of duty and misappropriation of documents. The applicant and her co‑defendants were indicted to stand trial together and, by judgment no. 76/2019, the Athens Three‑Member Misdemeanour Court of Appeal (Τριμελές Εφετείο Πλημμελημάτων) found them guilty on appeal. Following an appeal on points of law by the applicant, the Court of Cassation allowed her objection that the summons (κλητήριο θέσπισμα) had been invalid. By judgment no. 697/2019, it overturned the conviction and remitted the case to the Athens Three‑Member Misdemeanour Court of Appeal.

3. The Athens Three‑Member Misdemeanour Court of Appeal reheard the case and delivered judgment no. 2634/2019 on 6 May 2019. It noted at the outset that the summons in respect of, inter alia, the applicant had been invalid and that, as a result, the charges against her had become time‑barred. It therefore separated the proceedings against the applicant from those against the other co‑defendants and referred her case to the relevant prosecutor for further action.

4. In the same judgment, the appellate court went on to assess the criminal responsibility of E.M., who was charged with instigating fraud committed to the detriment of a public-law entity, and found her guilty. The judgment made several references to the role played by the applicant in connection with the offence in question. The applicant’s full name was mentioned several times in the judgment.

5. The most relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:

“[Page 39] It was established that the first accused [the applicant] prepared [a] new ... form on 12 May 2011[in which she] calculated the relevant working days for the benefit of V.M., the brother of E.M. ... [She then] issued the corresponding decisions granting a pension on the basis of the working days as recorded in the amended form, which [the applicant] had prepared herself; the information entered in the [form] did not correspond to the truth, thereby causing damage to IKA-ETAM’s property ... and resulting in a corresponding benefit for V.M ... Accordingly, the intent [δόλος] of Dionysia Achtypi was to ensure that V.M. was granted a higher pension ...

[Page 40] It was also established that the third accused, E.M., had induced the first accused, Dionysia Achtypi, through insistence and forcefulness, to commit ... fraud to the detriment of the public-law entity IKA-ETAM ...

[Page 41] The time when the third accused, E.M., instigated the first accused, Dionysia Achtypi, to commit fraud, which [the applicant] committed, clearly falls within the period between 5 and 12 May 2011 ... [On] 5 May 2011 the original ... form concerning V.M. was prepared, recording fewer working days ... [Subsequently], under pressure exerted by his sister and third accused [E.M.], through telephone calls, ... [the applicant] deleted the original ... form ... [One] week later, on 12 May 2011, she prepared a second ... form, this time with additional working days [recorded for] V.M. ...”

6. The appellate court found E.M. guilty of instigating fraud. It concluded that, through the pressure she had exerted and her entreaties, E.M. had induced the applicant – referred to as “the first accused, Dionysia Achtypi” – to carry out the act of fraud, which she had ultimately committed.

7. Subsequently, by order no. 2480/2021, the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of First Instance (Συμβούλιο Πλημμελειοδικών), terminated the criminal proceedings (έπαυσε οριστικά την ποινική δίωξη) against the applicant with final effect, as the charges had become time‑barred.

8. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that the impugned statements in judgment no. 2634/2019 had amounted to a premature expression of her guilt, thus breaching her right to the presumption of innocence.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

9. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

10. The general principles applicable to the present case have been summarised in Karaman v. Germany (no. 17103/10, §§ 41, 42 and 63, 27 February 2014) and Bauras v. Lithuania (no. 56795/13, §§ 50-52, 31 October 2017).

11. In the present case, the Court notes at the outset that E.M. was tried separately from the applicant. Although the proceedings were initially brought against the applicant and the other co‑defendants, the proceedings against the applicant were subsequently separated from those against the other co‑defendants (judgment no. 2634/2019) and were eventually discontinued (order no. 2480/2021). The trial court based its decision to separate the proceedings on the fact that the summons in respect of the applicant had been void, which had resulted in the charges against her becoming time‑barred. The Court sees no reason to consider that decision unjustified (see, mutatis mutandis, Bauras, cited above, § 54). Furthermore, the Court observes that the trial court’s statements did not ultimately have any prejudicial effect on the criminal proceedings against the applicant, which were eventually discontinued (see C.O. v. Germany, no. 16678/22, § 69, 17 September 2024).

12. Nevertheless, the Court has to examine whether the trial court’s reasoning was worded in such a way as to constitute a premature expression of guilt (see Karaman, cited above, § 65).

13. The Court reiterates that references by the trial court to the participation of third persons who may later be tried separately may be indispensable for the assessment of the guilt of those who are on trial. Criminal courts are required to establish the facts of the case relevant to the assessment of the legal responsibility of the accused as accurately and precisely as possible, and they cannot present established facts as mere allegations or suspicions. If facts relating to the involvement of third persons have to be introduced in criminal courts’ decisions, the courts should avoid giving more information than is necessary for the assessment of the legal responsibility of those persons who are accused in the trial before them (ibid., § 64).

14. In judgment no. 2634/2019, the trial court examined the criminal responsibility of E.M. and found her guilty of instigating the applicant to commit fraud, which the applicant committed. By taking that approach, it not only provided a factual account of the applicant’s actions, but also assessed them from a legal perspective, in terms of whether the actus reus of fraud and part of the applicant’s mens rea had been made out.

15. The Court observes that the trial court established that the applicant had had the intent (δόλος) to increase V.M.’s pension. The Government argued that that finding concerned a constituent element[1] of fraud under Article 386 § 1 of the Criminal Code – that is, the objective of obtaining illicit gains (σκοπός προσπορισμού παράνομου περιουσιακού οφέλους), in respect of which the trial court was required to provide specific reasoning justifying the perpetrator’s conviction for fraud. However, the impugned judgment concerned only the criminal responsibility of E.M., the instigator of the offence. In accordance with Articles 46 to 48 of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time, and in line with the relevant well‑established case‑law of the Court of Cassation that the Government adduced, it is essential that the trial court, when examining the criminal responsibility of the instigator of an offence, should first establish whether the actus reus (αντικειμενική υπόσταση) of the offence has been made out in respect of the perpetrator. However, it is not necessary to examine the perpetrator’s mens rea in order to establish the instigator’s criminal responsibility, as the perpetrator’s mens rea (υποκειμενική υπόσταση) is independent of that of the instigator. The Government therefore did not demonstrate that the trial court was required to establish the applicant’s intent (δολος) for determining the criminal responsibility of E.M. as an instigator, in contrast with Karaman (cited above, §§ 66‑67) and C.O. v. Germany (cited above, § 63), where the Court accepted that establishing the conduct of the third person was indispensable for assessing the criminal responsibility of the accused on trial.

16. Accordingly, the Court finds that, in establishing the applicant’s intent (δολος), the trial court failed to avoid giving more information than necessary to establish E.M.’s criminal responsibility.

17. The Court will also examine whether the trial court made it sufficiently clear that it was not also implicitly determining the applicant’s guilt (see Karaman, cited above, § 67). In the impugned judgment, the trial court separated the proceedings against the applicant from those against the other co‑defendants and referred her case to the relevant prosecutor for further action. It did so before assessing E.M.’s criminal responsibility. However, when assessing E.M.’s responsibility, the trial court repeatedly referred to the applicant either as “the accused” or by her full name, even though it had been established that the applicant’s criminal responsibility would be decided at a later stage in the context of separate criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that the well‑established meaning and effect of legal terms under domestic law must be taken into account when determining whether a statement can be characterised as a statement of criminal guilt (see Fleischner v. Germany, no. 61985/12, §§ 65 and 69, 3 October 2019). It acknowledges that although the applicant had technically been an accused in the context of the proceedings that led to the impugned judgment, the above‑mentioned unqualified statements were not accompanied by any clarification indicating that the assessment of her criminal responsibility was not the subject of those proceedings, but would be left to separate criminal proceedings (contrast Karaman, § 70; Bauras, § 54; and C.O. v. Germany, § 68, all cited above). The trial court therefore failed to indicate clearly that the applicant’s criminal responsibility was not being determined implicitly.

18. Having regard to (a) the fact that the trial court, in its assessment of the applicant’s conduct, went beyond what was necessary under domestic law for E.M.’s conviction, and (b) the absence of any clarification by the trial court capable of dispelling the impression that it was implicitly determining the applicant’s criminal responsibility, the Court concludes that the impugned statements in the reasoning of the Athens Three‑Member Misdemeanour Court of Appeal’s judgment no. 2634/2019 amounted to a premature expression of the applicant’s guilt.

19. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

20. The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

21. The Government argued that the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention constituted sufficient redress and that, in any event, the applicant had not substantiated the non‑pecuniary damage sustained.

22. The Court, considering the circumstances of the case, finds it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

23. The applicant did not submit any claims in respect of costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum on that account.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;
3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months,

EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;

(b) that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma
Deputy Registrar President

[1] According to the Court of Cassation, a subjective element of wrongfulness (υποκειμενικό στοιχείο του αδίκου), or special intent (υπερχειλής δόλος).