COSTA FIGUEIREDO proti Portugalsku

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF COSTA FIGUEIREDO v. PORTUGAL

(Application no. 6928/19)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

14 October 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Costa Figueiredo v. Portugal,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Anne Louise Bormann, President,
Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Crina Kaufman, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 6928/19) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 February 2019 by a Portuguese national, Mr Luis Filipe Costa Figueiredo (“the applicant”), who was born in 1966, lives in Repeses and was represented by Mr F. Teixeira da Mota, a lawyer practising in Lisbon;

the decision to give notice of the application to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Mr M. Aires Magriço, public prosecutor, and Ms H. de Carvalho Martins Leitão, Deputy Attorney General;

the parties’ observations;

the decision to reject the unilateral declaration presented by the Government;

Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant for aggravated defamation on account of statements made by him about a prosecutor and a judge to the press, in an online publication and in a letter sent to the High Council of the Judiciary. Relying on Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his conviction had been in breach of his right to freedom of expression.

2. The applicant is a professor, a member of the Molelos parish assembly, vice-president of the Casa do Povo association and director of the association’s quarterly publication. On 12 February 2016 and 29 June 2016 the Court of Tondela convicted him of non-compliance with a legal order (desobediência) following two sets of criminal proceedings in which A.B. had been the public prosecutor and L.A. had been the judge.

3. Talking to journalists after the first judgment had been served on him, the applicant stated: “Judge [L.A.] showed prejudice against my profession as a professor and behaved from the beginning as if he had already made a decision, demonstrating political motivation”. That statement was later published in a local and a national newspaper. Several days later, in the association’s online publication, the applicant published an article he had written entitled “Chronicle of the Game”, in which he satirised the criminal proceedings against him by using football references and directly criticising Judge L.A. The applicant stated, in particular: “... on a scale from 0 to 5, the judge in this game had a performance of below 1, meaning below substandard, somewhere between mediocre and despicable”. Furthermore, on unknown dates the applicant sent a complaint against Judge L.A. to the High Council of the Judiciary and an email to the Tondela District Court entitled “Open letter to Judge L.A.”, which he later published in the association’s online publication.

4. On 29 June 2016, following the judgment in the second set of criminal proceedings, the applicant sent another email to the Tondela District Court, in which he criticised Judge L.A. and the prosecutor A.B. He stated, in particular: “As a citizen I am disgusted that there are judges and public prosecutors like you, but your ploys, your incompetence, your ignorance and your lack of impartiality in the exercise of your functions will not defeat me”. On the same day he published the same statement in the association’s online publication, and on the following day he sent the Tondela District Court a further email, in which he questioned L.A. and A.B.’s legal expertise.

5. On an unknown date L.A. and A.B. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for defamation. By a judgment of the Santa Comba Dão Criminal Court delivered on 6 December 2017, the applicant was convicted under Article 180 § 1, Article 183 § 1 (a) and (b) and Article 184 of the Criminal Code of aggravated defamation in the form of publicity and slander for his above-mentioned statements about L.A. and A.B. He was sentenced to 25 months’ imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended on condition that he donated a total of 3,000 euros (EUR) to two charitable organisations and had the sentence published in the local and the national newspaper in which his statements had previously appeared. The Criminal Court assessed all of the impugned statements made by the applicant about L.A. and A.B. (see paragraphs 3-4 above), finding that they constituted both statements of fact and value judgments that were offensive to the honour and reputation of the individuals concerned. It further considered that the applicant’s disagreement with the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him and his feelings of injustice had not given him the right to make such comments, noting that he had not presented any evidence to substantiate his statements. Balancing the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and L.A.’s and A.B.’s right to honour and reputation, the Criminal Court found that the right to freedom of expression did not protect such statements as they did not serve the legitimate aim of imparting information.

6. By a judgment of the Coimbra Court of Appeal delivered on 3 October 2018, the conviction was partially quashed and the applicant was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended under the same terms as those established by the Santa Comba Dão Criminal Court. The appellate court rejected the applicant’s comparison of his case with Tavares de Almeida Fernandes and Almeida Fernandes v. Portugal (no. 31566/13, 17 January 2017) on the grounds that it did not relate to the President of the Supreme Court, who, though a member of the judiciary, could be considered a public figure by virtue of his position. It went on to hold that, as L.A. and A.B. were not public figures, they required the trust and respect of the general public in order to exercise their duties with impartiality and objectivity. The Court of Appeal also found that the statements in question had not been criticisms of the judicial decisions, but rather personal attacks against the judge and prosecutor themselves, and that the applicant had had other ways of showing his disagreement with the decisions, namely by lodging appeals against them.

7. Relying on Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his conviction had been in breach of his right to freedom of expression.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

8. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

9. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the applicant’s complaints (see paragraph 7 above) should be examined from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention only (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018).

10. The parties agreed that the domestic courts’ judgments had constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and that it had been prescribed by law (see paragraphs 5-6 above). The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. It notes that the interference was prescribed by law – namely under Article 180 § 1, Article 183 § 1 (a) and (b) and Article 184 of the Criminal Code – and had the aim of protecting the reputation of others, more specifically the reputation and honour of L.A. and A.B. It remains to be established whether it was “necessary in a democratic society”.

11. The general principles of the Court’s case-law for assessing the necessity of an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others” have been summarised in Lešník v. Slovakia (no. 35640/97, §§ 51-53, ECHR 2003-IV); Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and Freitas e Costa v. Portugal (no. 1529/08, §§ 42-46, 29 March 2011); Morice v. France ([GC], no. 29369/10, §§ 125‑27, ECHR 2015); and Pais Pires de Lima v. Portugal (no. 70465/12, §§ 57‑63, 12 February 2019).

12. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was convicted of aggravated defamation following statements he had made about a judge, L.A., and a public prosecutor, A.B. (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). The Court’s task is therefore to examine whether a fair balance was struck between the competing rights and interests at stake: the applicant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 on the one hand and L.A.’s and A.B.’s right to respect for their private life under Article 8 on the other. In this connection it is worth reiterating that Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention normally enjoy equal protection (see Miljević v. Croatia, no. 68317/13, § 63, 25 June 2020).

13. The applicant’s comments were of a disparaging nature and concerned the way in which L.A. and A.B. had intervened in their capacity as prosecutor and trial judge in criminal proceedings in which he was convicted of non‑compliance with a legal order (see paragraphs 3-4 above). The domestic courts found that the comments in question constituted both statements of fact and value judgments (see paragraphs 5-6 above). The Court notes that the impugned statements were made following the applicant’s convictions and that they reflected his disagreement with the outcome of the criminal proceedings. They could therefore be described as opinions or value judgments rather than statements of fact (see Ungváry and Irodalom Kft v. Hungary, no. 64520/10, § 46, 3 December 2013).

14. Turning to the content of the applicant’s statements, the Court notes that they called into question L.A.’s and A.B.’s professional integrity and ethics (see paragraphs 3-4 above). The domestic courts balanced the interests at issue (see paragraph 5 above) and found that the statements amounted to personal attacks overstepping the boundaries of acceptable criticism (see paragraph 6 above). The Court agrees with the domestic courts’ view that, as the statements at issue were repeated multiple times via different outlets, they could have affected L.A.’s and A.B.’s authority and the proper administration of justice (see paragraph 6 above, and Miljević, cited above, § 53).

15. Turning to the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed on the applicant, the Court notes that he was convicted of aggravated defamation and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, the execution of which was suspended on condition of a donation to two charitable organisations of a total sum of EUR 3,000 (see paragraphs 5-6 above) and the publication of the sentence in a regional and a national newspaper. In the Court’s view, the imposition of a prison sentence, by its very nature, will inevitably have a chilling effect, and the fact that the prison sentence imposed on the applicant was suspended does not alter that conclusion (see, mutatis mutandis, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 116, ECHR 2004‑XI, and Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey [GC], nos. 25067/94 and 25068/94, § 53, ECHR 1999‑IV; see also Morice, cited above, § 61). That sanction was therefore manifestly disproportionate (compare Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, no. 37698/97, § 36, ECHR 2000-X, and Pais Pires de Lima, cited above, §§ 66-67).

16. In view of the foregoing, although there were reasons to punish the applicant in view of the multiple statements made by him, the Court considers that the nature of the sanction imposed on him constituted in and of itself a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression and that it was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.

17. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

18. The applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to the amount which he had donated in order to have his sentence suspended, and EUR 297.60 in respect of the cost of having the sentence published following the criminal proceedings at issue. He also claimed EUR 5,535 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 7,610 for those incurred before the Court. He did not claim any amount in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

19. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed in respect of the applicant’s representation were excessive and they invited the Court to apply its case-law.

20. Given that the applicant may seek the reimbursement of both the donation and the cost of having the sentence published by requesting the reopening of the domestic proceedings, the Court rejects his claim in respect of pecuniary damage (see Almeida Arroja v. Portugal, no. 47238/19, § 97, 19 March 2024, and, for the provisions of the Code of Civil Proceedings, SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, no. 29856/13, § 75, 27 July 2021).

21. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court awards the applicant EUR 7,610 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.

As regards the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings, the Court is of the opinion that the claim in that regard must be rejected, given that the applicant may have the relevant part of those costs reimbursed by requesting the reopening of the domestic proceedings (see Almeida Arroja, cited above, § 104, and SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, cited above, § 79).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 7,610 (seven thousand six hundred and ten euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Crina Kaufman Anne Louise Bormann
Acting Deputy Registrar President