PARLAS A OSTATNÍ proti Turecku

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF PARLAS AND OTHERS v. TÜRKİYE

(Applications nos. 9413/22 and 57 others –

see appended list)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

14 October 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Parlas and Others v. Türkiye,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Jovan Ilievski, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention to the Turkish Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the time, Mr Hacı Ali Açıkgül, former Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 23 September 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The present applications concern the criminal convictions of the applicants, which resulted in prison sentences with a measure of suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment. All applicants complained of a violation of their freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention; some applicants relied in addition on Articles 11 or 6 of the Convention.

2. The applicants were charged and sentenced to imprisonment for carrying banners or chanting slogans during demonstrations or funerals which they had attended, or for certain social media posts. Some of the posts in question included swear words directed at the President of the Republic, statements or images comparing him to figures such as Adolf Hitler or describing him as a terrorist or a dictator, and statements or images allegedly glorifying illegal armed organisations such as the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) and other organisations allegedly linked to it or its fighters. The applicants were convicted under Article 125, Article 216 or Article 299 of the Criminal Code, section 1 of Law no. 5816, section 28 of Law no. 2911, or section 7 of Law no. 3713, which penalise, respectively, the offence of defamation, inciting the public to hatred and enmity, insulting the President of the Republic, insulting the memory of Atatürk, violation of the prohibitions concerning meetings and demonstrations, and disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The criminal courts of first instance decided, however, to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment in each case under Article 231 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for the text of that provision, see Durukan and Birol v. Türkiye, nos. 14879/20 and 13440/21, § 23, 3 October 2023), and to apply a three- or five‑year supervision period.

3. The assize courts dismissed the objections lodged by the applicants, stating that the impugned judgments with suspension of the pronouncement were in accordance with both the procedure and substantive law.

4. The applicants lodged individual applications with the Constitutional Court, complaining under Article 10 of the Convention about their conviction. The Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ individual applications inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, stating that there had been no interference with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution or that the interference had not constituted a violation.

5. Relying mainly on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicants alleged that they had been convicted, with suspensions of the pronouncement of the judgments, for expressing critical opinions.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

1. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

6. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

2. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

7. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, all applicants complained that their convictions with a measure of suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment violated their freedom of expression. Some applicants (nos. 35316/22, 35451/22, 37258/22 and 38702/22) relied in addition on Article 11 of the Convention, arguing that their impugned acts and statements related both to their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly. One applicant (no. 12095/23) further claimed that the impugned judgments lacked sufficient reasoning, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court observes that the thrust of the said applications lies on the expression of an opinion by the applicants, protected by Article 10. It further notes that it has examined the lack of reasoning regarding judgments the pronouncement of which had been suspended in the context of Article 10 (see Durukan and Birol v. Türkiye, nos. 14879/20 and 13440/21,
§§ 64 and 66, 3 October 2023). Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018), it therefore considers that all applications fall to be examined solely under Article 10.

1. Admissibility

8. The Government raised several objections.

1. Objection based on abuse of the right of individual application

9. The Government submitted that applications nos. 35316/22, 35451/22, 37258/22 and 38702/22 should be declared inadmissible as an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. They argued that, in their statement of facts in the application forms, the respective applicants had made misleading and inconsistent claims. In this regard, the Government alleged that the applicants had: denied having participated in demonstrations (despite having made statements to the contrary during the domestic proceedings); submitted to the Court that they had been placed in police custody and pre‑trial detention on the charge of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation whereas the actual basis for their detention had been their suspected membership of a terrorist organisation which was not raised in the present case; failed to mention that the charges brought against them in the domestic proceedings in relation to the events in question had also included violent and terrorist acts; and not filed the bills of indictment or the fully reasoned judgments of the domestic courts with the Court. The Government maintained that the applicants had therefore intended to mislead the Court by providing untrue and incomplete information concerning the essence of the applications.

10. The applicants contested the Government’s objection. They submitted that their statements had not been inconsistent and that during the domestic proceedings they had acknowledged their participation in certain demonstrations but had denied their involvement in others. They further contended that they had not claimed in their application forms to have been arrested or detained on charges of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. Furthermore, they argued that they had confined their submissions to the facts specifically related to the propaganda charges, which constituted the sole subject matter of the present applications. They also argued that none of them had been convicted of any acts of violence in relation to the events in question. They further contended that the domestic judgments convicting them had also concerned other charges that had been unrelated to the present complaints, and that, accordingly, they had submitted only the relevant parts of those judgments to the Court.

11. The Court recalls that the applicable general principles concerning the abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) are set out in, inter alia, Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810/10, § 28, ECHR 2014, and Zhdanov and Others v. Russia (nos. 12200/08 and 2 others, §§ 79‑81, 16 July 2019). In particular, the submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (Gross, ibid.).

12. In the present case, the Court notes that even if the applicants did not inform the Court of all the facts and decisions concerning the events in question, they did provide it with relevant and sufficient information and with documents relating to their convictions with a measure of suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment for participating in demonstrations or chanting slogans, which constitutes the subject matter of the present case. Furthermore, the facts and decisions mentioned by the Government, in any event, cannot be regarded as “concerning the very core of the case” for the purposes of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.

13. The Government’s objection as to the abuse of the right of application must therefore be dismissed.

2. Objection based on incompatibility ratione materiae

14. The Government alleged that the expressions used by the applicants had clearly run counter to Article 17 of the Convention. They referred, in particular, to the use by certain applicants of statements or images targeting the President of the Republic or glorifying Kurdish armed groups or fighters. They therefore contended that the applicants’ complaints were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

15. The Court notes that it has already examined and dismissed a similar objection and sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case (see Durukan and Birol, cited above, §§ 46-47). The Court therefore concludes that these applications do not constitute an abuse of rights within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention and that the respective applicants cannot be denied the protection of Article 10 of the Convention in the present case. Accordingly, this objection must also be dismissed.

3. Objection to victim status

16. The Government also challenged the victim status of the applicant in application no. 13977/23, asserting that the suspension period had expired and that, consequently, the applicant’s situation was such that it was as if the conviction’s legal consequences had never occurred.

17. The Court notes that it has already examined and dismissed similar objections (Durukan and Birol, cited above, § 43; see also Üçdağ v. Turkey, no. 23314/19, § 58, 31 August 2021). Accordingly, it dismisses this objection on the same grounds.

4. Objection based on non-compliance with the four-month time-limit

18. The Government contended that applications nos. 36881/22 and 42304/22 had been lodged with the Court outside of the four-month time‑limit. They stated, in this regard, that the applicants had been notified of the latest domestic court decisions – that is, the Constitutional Court decisions – on 18 February 2022 and 12 March 2022, respectively, while the applications had been lodged with the Court on 7 July 2022 and 29 July 2022.

19. Regarding application no. 36881/22, the Court notes that the applicant sent his application to the Court on 9 June 2022, that is, within the four-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 if the Convention, yet it was returned to him undelivered. The Court observes that the applicant sent his application again on 7 July 2022 (the date to which the Government referred – see paragraph 18 above), also providing evidence that he had initially sent his application on 9 June but that it had been returned to him. Having regard to the documents and explanations provided to it by the applicant, the Court cannot discern any elements due to which the non-delivery to the Court of the application dispatched on 9 June 2022, or any subsequent delays, would be attributable to the applicant (see for the relevant principles in this regard Victoria Cassar v. Malta (dec.), no. 14179/21, §§ 30-33, 18 June 2024). The Court therefore concludes that the application was sent to it, and thus lodged (see Rule 47 § 6 (a) of the Rules of Court), on 9 June 2022. Accordingly, it complied with the four-month time-limit.

20. Regarding application no. 42304/22, in the light of the documentary evidence submitted by the applicant (which was not contested by the Government), the Court observes that the Constitutional Court’s decision was rendered on 1 April 2022 and that the applicant was notified thereof on 7 April 2022. Thus, the applicant could not have been notified of the final domestic decision on 12 March 2022 (as claimed by the Government), as this was several weeks before the date on which the decision was delivered. It follows that this applicant equally lodged his application of 29 July 2022 within four months of 7 April 2022.

21. Accordingly, the Government’s objections regarding non-compliance with the four-month time-limit must be dismissed.

5. Objection based on the manifestly ill-founded nature of certain applications

22. The Government argued that applications nos. 35316/22, 35451/22, 37258/22 and 38702/22 had been duly examined by the Constitutional Court, which had noted that either (i) there had been no interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression and right to hold meetings and demonstrations, or (ii) the interference had been clearly legitimate. They urged the Court to declare those applications inadmissible, asserting that they were manifestly ill‑founded.

23. The Court considers that the arguments put forward by the Government in this connection raise issues which require an examination of the merits of the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, rather than an examination of its admissibility (see Durukan and Birol, cited above, § 45, and the references therein).

24. The Court notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits
   1. The parties’ submissions

25. The applicants submitted that their acts – which had been the subject of the criminal proceedings brought against them and had resulted in their suspended sentences – had been aimed at expressing critical opinions. They accordingly alleged that there had been a violation of their rights under Article 10.

26. The Government contended that there had been no interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression, emphasising the fact that, because of the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgments, no convictions had been added to their criminal records. They accordingly argued that no negative legal consequences or deterrent effects had arisen from the criminal proceedings brought against the applicants or by their convictions.

27. The Government submitted that, even if the Court were to find that there had been any interference, the interference in question had been in accordance with the relevant legal provisions (see paragraph 2 above), having met the criteria of clarity, accessibility and foreseeability.

2. The Court’s assessment

28. The Court considers that the applicants’ criminal convictions with a suspension of the pronouncement of the judgments (including a three- or five‑year supervision period) for carrying banners or chanting slogans during gatherings or for social media posts had amounted to an interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression, in view of the deterrent effect that those measures must have had (see Üçdağ, cited above, § 75; Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, no. 42048/19, § 41, 19 October 2021; and Durukan and Birol, cited above, § 56).

29. In the present case, the Court notes, firstly, that it was not disputed between the parties that the applicants’ criminal convictions had had a legal basis. It also observes that Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided the legal basis for the suspension of the pronouncement of the judgments imposed on the applicants, which constituted an interference in the present case (see paragraph 2 above).

30. The Court notes that it has already held in Durukan and Birol (cited above, §§ 66-67) that Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – which provides for the suspension of the pronouncement of judgments – does not offer the required protection against arbitrary breaches by the public authorities of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. The present applications do not present any special features justifying a departure from that conclusion. The interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression by the suspension of the pronouncement of their judgments was thus not “prescribed by law” for the purposes of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

31. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

32. The applicants claimed amounts in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, as well as various amounts for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

33. With regard to pecuniary damage, some of the applicants submitted that they had suffered financial losses as a result of the impugned measures; they added that other consequences had subsequently arisen, including detention (leading to unemployment, suspension or dismissal from their jobs), travel bans, and the loss of a popular social media account. They either claimed in this respect amounts varying between 1,000 and 1 million euros (EUR) or left the amount unspecified.

34. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, they submitted that they had suffered distress as a result of the actions taken against them. They claimed the amounts indicated in the appended table.

35. With regard to costs and expenses, they claimed the amounts specified in the appended table, submitting the various supporting documents indicated therein.

36. The Government contended that the applicants’ claims in respect of pecuniary damage were unsubstantiated, excessive, and unrelated to the subject matter of the present case. They further submitted that there was no causal link between the applicants’ claims in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, on the one hand, and the alleged violation, on the other. They also argued that the applicants’ claims in respect of non‑pecuniary damage were unsubstantiated and excessive and did not correspond to the amounts awarded by the Court in similar cases. Lastly, the Government asserted that the applicants had failed to submit valid or convincing documents in support of their claims for costs and expenses.

37. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged. It therefore rejects the claims under this head.

38. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court awards each applicant, except for the applicants in applications nos. 34741/22, 35226/22, 41926/22, 42304/22, 51140/22, 16831/23 and 20978/23, who did not submit observations within the prescribed time-limit, EUR 2,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable (see Durukan and Birol, cited above, § 73).

39. In respect of costs and expenses, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants who submitted supporting documents the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, and dismisses the remainder of the claims.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
2. Declares the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay within three months the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) to each applicant, except for the applicants in applications nos. 34741/22, 35226/22, 41926/22, 42304/22, 51140/22, 16831/23 and 20978/23, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; and

(ii) the amounts indicated in the appended table, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases: