ANTONYAN proti Ukrajině

FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF ANTONYAN v. UKRAINE

(Application no. 6855/15)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 January 2026

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Antonyan v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:

Andreas Zünd, President,
Mykola Gnatovskyy,
Vahe Grigoryan, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 6855/15) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 January 2015 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Artur Sarkisovych Antonyan (“the applicant”), who was born in 1982 and lives in Lubny;

the decision to give notice of the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning the cancellation of the applicant’s car registration to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms M. Sokorenko, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns the cancellation of the registration of the applicant’s car. The applicant relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. In March 2009 the applicant purchased a second-hand vehicle via a stock exchange agreement and registered it in his name with the traffic police, becoming its sixth owner. The vehicle had first been imported into Ukraine and then registered in 2003. In 2005 it was declared by the police to be an item of material evidence in a criminal investigation into the unlawful registration of a large number of imported vehicles, and the investigator formally prohibited any actions related to its registration, re-registration or deregistration. Nevertheless, in the following years the vehicle was repeatedly registered and re-registered by successive owners without any objection from the registration authorities.

3. On 6 March 2012 the central traffic police authority instructed its regional branches to cancel the registrations of 183 vehicles, including the applicant’s, pursuant to section 40 of the 1998 Procedure for the State registration and the keeping of accounting records for motor vehicles, buses, self-propelled vehicles constructed on car chassis, motorcycles of all types, makes and models, trailers, semi-trailers and sidecars, which had been adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by Resolution no. 1388 of 7 September 1998 (“the vehicle registration rules”). The central authority referred to a decision of the Nikopol Town Court of 17 December 2010, which had discontinued criminal proceedings against two traffic police officers accused of unlawfully registering imported cars and had relieved them of criminal liability on account of the expiry of the statutory limitation period. The central authority further stated that, as of February 2012, the State Customs Service database contained no record of the applicant’s car having undergone customs clearance. In compliance with the central authority’s instructions, the regional traffic police cancelled the car’s initial registration and, on 23 March 2012, cancelled the applicant’s registration accordingly, ordering him to surrender the licence plates and registration certificate. He was formally notified of that decision in June 2012.

4. The applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision in the administrative courts, arguing, inter alia, that he had lawfully acquired the car, which had already been registered, and that he had duly re-registered it with the traffic police, having ensured the accuracy of all the information he had been required to submit. No objections had been raised at the time; nor had there been any indication of irregularities in the customs clearance procedure. He contended that the cancellation of his car registration had been unlawful.

5. On 31 January and 18 April 2013, respectively, the courts of first instance and appeal both found in favour of the applicant, declaring the cancellation of his car’s registration unlawful and ordering that it be re-registered. They held that cancellation under section 40(3) of the vehicle registration rules was possible only where a vehicle had been registered on the basis of forged or fictitious documents, which could be established solely by a final criminal conviction in respect of the vehicle in question. The 17 December 2010 decision of the Nikopol Town Court discontinuing criminal proceedings against traffic police officers had not referred to the applicant’s car at all, and neither the instructions from the central traffic police authority nor the cancellation decision contained any evidence proving that the relevant documents had been forged. The courts further noted that the mere absence of relevant information in the customs database did not prove that the applicant’s car had been unlawfully imported or registered; nor was such an absence among the exhaustive grounds for cancellation listed in section 40(3). They further emphasised that the vehicle had been registered six times in Ukraine and that on each occasion the competent authorities had conducted the required checks without raising any objections, even though since 2005, by a ruling of the investigator, it had been forbidden to register, re-register or deregister the car as it had been officially declared to be an item of evidence in the criminal investigation. Given those circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence that the applicant had acquired the car unlawfully or submitted any forged document in order to register it, the courts concluded that cancelling the registration under section 40(3) had been unlawful and had amounted to unjustified interference with his property rights.

6. By a final decision of 22 October 2014, the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine (“the HACU”) overturned the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It accepted the lower courts’ factual findings but held that they had erred in their application of the substantive law. The HACU noted that the submission of documents confirming the payment of customs duties was a mandatory condition for the registration of an imported vehicle. It considered that the absence of any data in the customs register concerning the car in question indicated that its registration had been carried out without payment of the required duties or on the basis of forged customs‑duty documents, and it concluded that the traffic police had accordingly been obliged under section 40 of the vehicle registration rules to cancel the car’s registration, irrespective of who owned the vehicle – be it the person who had purchased and imported it into Ukraine without payment of customs duties, or another person who had subsequently acquired ownership. The HACU therefore found that the traffic police had acted lawfully in cancelling the applicant’s car registration.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF Protocol NO. 1 to THE CONVENTION

7. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic decisions cancelling the registration of his car had been arbitrary and against the law.

8. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), considers that the applicant’s complaints fall to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only.

1. The parties’ submissions

9. With regard to admissibility, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies, as he had not lodged a claim for damages against the traffic police (who in 2003 had unlawfully registered the car for the first time on the basis of knowingly false documents relating to the payment of customs duty) in order to recover losses allegedly sustained by him on account of the subsequent cancellation of the car’s registration. The Government further contended that the applicant could have initiated separate proceedings to secure a court judgment establishing his ownership of the car, and subsequently applied for a new registration.

10. On the merits, the Government argued that the decision to cancel the applicant’s registration had been in accordance with the relevant domestic legal provisions and had been justified – as confirmed by the final decision of the HACU in the applicant’s case. They maintained that that decision had been consistent with the domestic courts’ established practice in similar cases. In the Government’s view, the interference in issue had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the safety of road traffic.

11. The Government further averred that there was no evidence that that interference had imposed on the applicant an excessive individual burden. They argued that the State was entitled to correct mistakes, including those arising from its own negligence, and pointed out that the applicant could have sought compensation from the traffic police for any damage resulting from the unlawful initial registration of the vehicle.

12. The applicant, in turn, mainly reiterated the arguments that he had advanced before the domestic courts (see paragraph 4 above) and emphasised that, even though he remained the owner of the vehicle, the cancellation of its registration had – for more than 12 years – prevented him from using it lawfully or enjoying possession of it.

2. The Court’s assessment
   1. Admissibility

13. The Court notes that in the present case the registration of the applicant’s car was cancelled nine years after its initial, allegedly unlawful, registration in Ukraine by the first owner, and that the car itself remained in the applicant’s ownership without any possibility of being lawfully used. Given those circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant pursued the most direct and relevant avenue of redress – namely judicial proceedings before the administrative courts challenging the cancellation of the registration. Those proceedings were carried through to the final-instance court – namely, the HACU, which upheld the contested cancellation.

14. The Court observes that an action in damages against the traffic police would not have secured the reinstatement of the vehicle registration, which was necessary for the applicant to be able to use his car lawfully. Furthermore, the suggestion that the applicant should have initiated fresh court proceedings aimed at re-establishing his ownership of property which he already possessed and which had been lawfully registered in his name for years (without his ownership ever being questioned by the authorities) would have imposed an excessive and formalistic burden on him.

15. The Government’s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.

16. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

17. The Court notes that the Government did not contest the fact that in the present case there had been an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the applicant’s possessions. Indeed, although the applicant formally retained ownership of the vehicle, the permanent withdrawal of its registration and licence plates deprived it of its intended function and of any meaningful economic utility. Accordingly, the alleged interference falls to be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Yaroslavtsev v. Russia, no. 42138/02, § 32, 2 December 2004).

18. The Court reiterates that any measure interfering with the rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must be carried out in accordance with the law, pursue one or more legitimate aims and be proportionate. In the present case, it observes that the cancellation of the applicant’s registration was based on section 40(3) of the vehicle registration rules. Under that provision, as worded at the relevant time, the traffic police were required to cancel a vehicle’s registration in the event that it was established that the vehicle had a falsified identification number, that the vehicle was wanted by law‑enforcement authorities, or that it was revealed that the vehicle had been registered, re-registered or deregistered on the basis of fictitious or forged documents (including fictitious customs documents). It was this last ground on which the traffic police relied when cancelling the registration of the applicant’s car – a decision subsequently upheld by the HACU.

19. The Court notes, however, that there is no evidence that any forged or falsified document was ever used in the registration of the applicant’s vehicle. As established by the lower courts (and as undisputed by the HACU), the 17 December 2010 decision of the Nikopol Town Court discontinuing the criminal proceedings against the officers – which was referred to by the central traffic police authority when ordering the cancellation of 183 vehicle registrations, including that of the applicant (see paragraph 3 above) – did not mention the applicant’s car and made no findings in that respect. The HACU nonetheless considered that the absence of any record of payment of import duties in the customs database was sufficient to justify the cancellation. The Court notes, however, that no such grounds were provided for in the vehicle registration rules at the relevant time; it was only by a December 2020 amendment that the submission of documents inconsistent with the data recorded in the relevant State registers was added as grounds for cancellation. To the extent that the HACU at the time in question interpreted such an absence as equivalent to the use of forged documents, the Court finds that that interpretation went well beyond the wording of section 40, could not have been foreseen by the applicant, and can hardly be reconciled with the requirement of legal certainty.

20. However, even if the Court were to proceed on the assumption that that interpretation was acceptable under domestic law, and that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring road safety (as argued by the Government), the cancellation was still disproportionate.

21. The Court reiterates in this connection that assessing whether a fair balance has been struck requires an overall examination of the different interests at stake, which may call for an analysis of the conduct of the parties, including the means employed by the State and their implementation, in particular the authorities’ obligation to act in a timely, correct and consistent manner (see, for example, Moskal v. Poland, no. 10373/05, §§ 69-74, 15 September 2009, and Bidzhiyeva v. Russia, no. 30106/10, § 64, 5 December 2017).

22. In the present case, the applicant’s good faith is not in dispute and has never been called into question at the domestic level: he purchased a vehicle on the open market which had already been registered and he duly re-registered it in his own name (in accordance with the law), submitting all the required documents, which were then verified and accepted by the competent authority without objection. The Court therefore considers that, by registering the vehicle, the authorities gave the applicant a legitimate hope of continuing to enjoy his property in peace. However, three years after his purchase of the vehicle and nine years after its initial registration, the registration was cancelled owing to the absence of any record in the customs register concerning the vehicle’s customs clearance (such absence being treated as proof of forgery during the initial registration).

23. In the Court’s view, that sequence of events illustrates the fundamental unfairness in a domestic legal system which imposes an absolute and automatic obligation to cancel registration in such circumstances, and which does not allow the authorities to either take into account their own error or weigh up the various interests at stake. Such a legal framework exposes individuals to an indefinite risk of losing their possessions as a result of acts or omissions for which they are not responsible. In the present case, it resulted in the applicant, whose good faith is undeniable, being unable to use his vehicle for more than 12 years.

24. The Court cannot but note that the lower courts sought to interpret the applicable legal framework in a manner consistent with the Convention – holding, inter alia, that the cancellation of registration was permissible only where the true owner had personally relied on falsified documents. However, that approach was overturned by the HACU, which, at final instance, adopted the opposite reading and confirmed that vehicle registration had to be cancelled automatically once irregularities were discovered, irrespective of the passage of time or the conduct and good faith of the current owner.

25. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that – even assuming that the interference was lawful – the cancellation of the applicant’s registration imposed an excessive burden on him that was incompatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Arutyunov v. Russia, no. 5552/06, §§ 33-35, 18 December 2018).

26. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

27. The applicant submitted, in essence, that the situation in which he had found himself – with his vehicle’s registration having been unlawfully cancelled, leaving him unable to use it for more than 12 years – should cease. He also submitted that in the absence of State registration, the commercial value of his car was greatly diminished.

28. The Government maintained that the vehicle registration had been cancelled lawfully.

29. In view of its finding under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considers that the finding of a violation in the present judgment constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of the applicant’s claim.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
3. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 January 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Martina Keller Andreas Zünd
Deputy Registrar President